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COOPERATIVE CLEAN ENERGY*
ALEXANDRA B. KLASS** & GABRIEL CHAN***
The last decade has seen significant attention and debate among academics,
policymakers, and the broader public about how to accelerate the “clean energy
transition” in the United States. Legal academics have made valuable
contributions to the literature in this field, developing a rich body of scholarship
on a broad range of legal, policy, economic, and technological aspects of the clean
energy transition. But this scholarship has for the most part ignored the role of
rural electric cooperatives, which serve 15% of U.S. electricity consumers. This
scholarship gap has important implications. Rural electric cooperatives, first
created by local communities in the United States in the early part of the
twentieth century to electrify rural America, now serve over half of the U.S.
landmass. As such, these cooperatives are positioned to be key players in building
land-intensive renewable energy resources and expanding the electric grid. And
while cooperatives today own and operate fewer coal-fired power plants than
they have in decades past, as not-for-profit entities, the drivers for cooperatives
to retire existing carbon-intensive power plants and build new clean energy are
fundamentally different than the drivers for other actors in the electricity sector
shaped by profit motives. Understanding these differences is critical to avoid
leaving rural America with billions of dollars of stranded assets that struggle to
compete against low-cost clean energy.
In this Article, we draw on the structure and foundational principles underlying
the cooperative form itself to offer a framework for rural electric cooperatives to
thrive in the clean energy transition. Notably, the proposals we develop in this
Article do not primarily rely on imposing new federal or state clean energy
mandates on cooperatives, as has been the focus of the limited legal scholarship
that exists to date. The long history of Congress and state legislatures allowing
cooperatives to “self-regulate” makes exclusive reliance on such mandates a
limited solution at best. Instead, we draw on the seven “Cooperative Principles”
that govern all cooperatives—open and voluntary membership; democratic
member control; members’ economic participation; autonomy and independence;
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education, training, and information; cooperation among cooperatives; and
concern for community. Emphasis on these principles allows cooperatives to
engage in the clean energy transition in a way that builds on their history and
governing principles as self-help organizations controlled by their members. Such
an approach also recognizes the foundational role of member control within
cooperatives, which has the potential to inform broader calls for increasing
democratic accountability and racial and gender equity within the clean energy
transition.
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INTRODUCTION
The last decade has seen significant attention and debate among
academics, policymakers, and the broader public about how to accelerate the
“clean energy transition” in the United States. This attention and debate is
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justified given the environmental stakes and public policy challenges.
Continued reliance on fossil fuels to generate electricity—particularly coal
plants—exacerbates climate change and contributes to localized air pollution.1
Apart from environmental impacts, running as many coal plants as currently
operate can be prohibitively costly.2 Experts estimate that phasing out the
nation’s coal plants and replacing them with renewable energy would, in the
aggregate, save electricity customers over $10 billion annually, while continuing
to run those plants could leave power-plant owners and their customers with
hundreds of billions of dollars of regulatory risk.3 Legal academics have made
valuable contributions to the literature in the field, developing a rich body of
scholarship on a broad range of legal, policy, economic, and technological
aspects of the clean energy transition in the electricity sector.4
But this scholarship has for the most part ignored the role of rural electric
cooperatives (also referred to in the energy sector as “RECs,” “electric
cooperatives,” “co-ops,” “rural electric associations,” “REAs,” “electric
1. David Coady, Ian Parry, Louis Sears & Baoping Shang, How Large Are Global Fossil Fuel
Subsidies?, 91 WORLD DEV. 11, 20 (2017) (estimating that total monetized environmental externalities
from coal totaled $3.1 trillion in 2015, equivalent to 3.8% of global GDP, of which approximately threefourths was due to local air pollution and one-fourth was due to global warming).
2. See, e.g., U.S. Coal Plant Retirements Linked to Plants with Higher Operating Costs, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=42155 [https://
perma.cc/9U7Z-RH8W] (finding that variations in operating costs are a significant determinant of
forecasted retirement dates of coal plants).
3. See, e.g., PAUL BODNAR, MATTHEW GRAY, TAMARA GRBUSIC, STEVE HERZ, AMANDA
LONSDALE, SAM MARDELL, CAROLINE OTT, SRIYA SUNDARESAN & UDAY VARADARAJAN, HOW
TO RETIRE EARLY: MAKING ACCELERATED COAL PHASEOUT FEASIBLE AND JUST 14 (2020),
https://rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/How-to-retire-early-June-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2CRT-W7YZ] (estimating that a phaseout of coal plants and replacement by renewable energy would
save customers at least $10 billion annually); MATT GRAY & LAURENCE WATSON, NO COUNTRY
FOR COAL GEN 8 (2017), https://yoursri.at/media-new/images/2017-09-22_no-country-for-a-coalgen.pdf [https://perma.cc/YH4B-A3CY] (estimating $185 billion in “regulatory risk” for coal plant
owners projected through 2035).
4. See, e.g., William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614
(2014); William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in
Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810 (2016); Matthew R. Christiansen & Joshua C. Macey, Long
Live the Federal Power Act’s Bright Line, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1360 (2021); Lincoln L. Davies, U.S.
Renewable Energy Policy in Context, 15 ENV’T L. & POL’Y 33 (2015); Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive
Authority To Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783 (2016); Jody Freeman & David
B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J.
Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L.
REV. 1801 (2012); Joshua C. Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Rate Regulation Redux, 168 U. PA. L. REV.
1181 (2020); Jonas J. Monast, Maximizing Utility in Electricity Regulation, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 135
(2015); Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621 (2015); Shelley Welton, Clean
Electrification, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 571 (2017); Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267
(2017) [hereinafter Welton, Public Energy]; Shelley Welton, Electricity Markets and the Social Project of
Decarbonization, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1067 (2018) [hereinafter Welton, Electricity Markets]; Shelley
Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, 116 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2018) [hereinafter Welton, Energy
Democracy]; Hannah J. Wiseman & Hari M. Osofsky, Regional Energy Governance and U.S. Carbon
Emissions, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 143 (2016).
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membership corporations,” “EMCs,” “rural electric membership corporations,”
“REMCs,” “electric power associations,” and “EPAs”), focusing instead on the
economic and regulatory structure governing investor-owned utilities, which
serve the majority of U.S. electricity consumers.5 This scholarship gap has
important implications. Rural electric cooperatives—first created by local
communities in the United States in the early twentieth century and later
expanded by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress to electrify rural
America6—operate in decision-making environments fundamentally distinct
from other parts of the energy system. And while rural electric cooperatives are
rapidly transitioning their energy supply mixes,7 as of 2019, rural electric
cooperatives own and continue to operate 12% of the nation’s coal-fired power
plants (by output).8 Moreover, the debt associated with these coal plants makes
5. See infra note 14 and tbl.1 (discussing different types of electric utilities and the percentage of
consumers they serve).
6. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PATH TO POWER 519–22
(1982) (discussing President Roosevelt’s creation of the Rural Electrification Administration in 1935
and Congress’s enactment of the Rural Electrification Act of 1936 in the first part of a chapter
discussing President Johnson’s role in helping create the Pedernales Electric Cooperative in Texas in
1938 when he was a new Congressman representing that region).
7. For example, the three largest rural electric cooperatives in the country have seen significant
changes to their power supply mix in the last ten years. Oglethorpe Power, based in Georgia, met 44%
of its members’ energy needs with coal in 2010 but only 4% of member energy needs with coal in 2020.
Compare Diverse Mix of Generating Resources, OGLETHORPE POWER, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/788816/000104746911002388/g82683mm01i007.gif [https://perma.cc/98B3-7RJN], with
Oglethorpe’s Diversified Power Supply Portfolio, OGLETHORPE POWER, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/788816/000162828021006087/a2020q4investorbriefing008.jpg [https://perma.cc/RD6P742X]. Associated Electric Cooperative, based in Missouri and also serving members in Oklahoma,
met nearly 80% of its members’ energy needs with coal in 2010 but only 50% of member energy needs
with coal in 2019. Compare ASSOCIATED ELEC. COOP. INC., ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2010),
https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/48208628/view-the-2010-annual-report-associatedelectric-cooperative-inc [https://perma.cc/QE2V-76QU], with ASSOCIATED ELEC. COOP. INC.,
ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2019), https://www.aeci.org/media/5138/2019-annual-report-plus-cover-factbook-audited-statement-single-pgs.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9DU-5HUE]. Basin Electric Cooperative,
based in North Dakota and also serving members in nine states from Montana to New Mexico to Iowa,
met 64% of its winter capacity needs with coal while delivering 9% of energy from renewables in 2010,
but met 40% of its winter capacity needs with coal while delivering 19% of its energy from
renewables in 2020. Compare BASIN ELEC. POWER COOP., ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2010),
https://www.transmissionhub.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Annual-Report-Basin-ElectricPower-Cooperative-BEPC.pdf [https://perma.cc/YS63-ASSG], with At a Glance, BASIN ELEC.
POWER COOP., https://www.basinelectric.com/About-Us/Organization/At-a-Glance/ [https://perma.
cc/DM5C-ZJX6].
8. See CHRISTOPHER VAN ATTEN, AMLAN SAHA, LUKE HELLGREN & TED LANGLOIS,
BENCHMARKING AIR EMISSIONS OF THE 100 LARGEST ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCERS
IN THE UNITED STATES 34–40 (2020), https://www.ceres.org/sites/default/files/reports/2020-07/
Air%20Emissions%20Benchmark%202020.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G6Q-5A3X] (listing the top one
hundred U.S. electric power producers, the energy mix of their power plant assets, and the amount of
various air pollutants, including CO2, emitted by each producer). Rural electric cooperatives own 12%
of the nation’s coal-fired power plants by output, and those plants, in turn, produce 56% of the energy
generation from plants owned by rural electric cooperatives. Form EIA-923 Detailed Data with Previous
Form Data (EIA-906/920), U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia923/
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up a significant fraction of the total debt on cooperatives’ balance sheets.9
Strategically retiring these plants and replacing them with cleaner energy
sources would reduce the nation’s contribution to global climate change and
help ensure that rural America is not left with billions of dollars of stranded
assets.10 Further, a cost-effective national transition to clean energy is likely to
require both utilizing significant land area for deploying solar and wind
resources11 and building substantial amounts of new power lines across large
regions.12 Thus, the broad geographic coverage of rural electric cooperatives can
enable them to be key players in the deployment of clean energy and its
supporting infrastructure, which will bolster the benefits of the clean energy
transition for rural Americans.13
[https://perma.cc/5F8Q-KXY3] (Nov. 3, 2021) (choose “2020:EIA-923 ZIP” on right sidebar). In
2019, the retail power sold by cooperatives was generated from co-op-owned resources, directly
purchased generation, and market purchases amounting to 32% coal, 32% natural gas, 15% nuclear, and
19% renewables. NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, AMERICA’S ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES 2 (2021)
[hereinafter AMERICA’S ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES], https://www.electric.coop/wp-content/uploads/
2021/04/Co-op-Facts-and-Figures.pdf [https://perma. cc/DRD6-6KXV].
9. In 2017, rural electric cooperatives produced 50% of the energy they consumed from energygeneration assets they owned themselves because, like most other utilities, they also purchased energy
from third parties directly and on wholesale markets to meet their demand. See JOSEPH GOODENBERY,
ALLISON HAMILTON, LAUREN KHAIR & MICHAEL LEITMAN, ELECTRIC INDUSTRY GENERATION,
CAPACITY, AND MARKET OUTLOOK 3 (2019), https://www.cooperative.com/programs-services/bts/
resource-adequacy-markets/Documents/ram_outlook_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TLZ5-QTJY]. For
six of the thirteen largest rural electric cooperatives, coal plants make up over 85% of the power
generation assets owned by the cooperative (by output). See VAN ATTEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 34.
10. See, e.g., RON LEHR & MIKE O’BOYLE, SOLAR FOR COAL SWAPS 5 (2020) [hereinafter
LEHR & O’BOYLE, SWAPS] (comparing the economics of coal plants to local solar generation); ERIK
HATLESTAD, KATIE ROCK & LIZ VEAZEY, RURAL ELECTRIFICATION 2.0: THE TRANSITION TO A
CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY 6–10 (2019) (discussing the billions of dollars of coal debt held by
cooperatives); ERIC GIMON, AMANDA MYERS & MIKE O’BOYLE, COAL COST CROSSOVER
14 (2021), https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Coal-Cost-Crossover-2.0-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D9DF-5Q9L] (comparing the economics of coal, wind, and solar energy).
11. SAMANTHA GROSS, BROOKINGS, RENEWABLES, LAND USE, AND LOCAL OPPOSITION
IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/
FP_20200113_renewables_land_use_local_opposition_gross.pdf [https://perma.cc/RN3X-G6YQ].
12. See Patrick R. Brown & Audun Botterud, The Value of Inter-Regional Coordination and
Transmission in Decarbonizing the US Electricity System, 5 JOULE 115, 155 (2021); Electricity Prices Reflect
Rising Delivery Costs, Declining Production Costs, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 7, 2017),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32812 [https://perma.cc/EH2T-2734] (showing
that electricity delivery costs made up 22% of the total cost of electricity delivery for FERC-regulated
utilities in 2006 but 36% of electricity costs in 2016). In projections of future electricity prices,
transmission and distribution costs are estimated to comprise over half of total electricity prices by
2050. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ELECTRICITY OUTLOOK 2021, at 8 (2021)
[hereinafter U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., OUTLOOK 2021], https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/
04%20AEO2021%20Electricity.pdf [https://perma.cc/X83B-QDYJ].
13. See KATIE SIEGNER, KEVIN BREHM & MARK DYSON, SEEDS OF OPPORTUNITY 21 (2021),
https://rmi.org/insight/seeds-of-opportunity/ [https://perma.cc/JT7X-LK4J] (enter an email address
in the box below “Email *”; then click “Download”) (estimating that solar and wind generation
deployed toward making the U.S. electric grid 90% carbon-free by 2035 would generate greater revenue
than cattle, corn, or soy production, the top three agricultural commodities).
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There are over eight hundred rural electric cooperatives in the United
States today, which deliver power to forty-two million people across forty-eight
states.14 These cooperatives own approximately 40% of the electric distribution
lines that connect residential, commercial, industrial, and agricultural energy
consumers to the electric grid.15 The consumers served by cooperatives are
demographically distinct from those served by other utilities, reflecting their
history as providers of initial electricity access to rural farmers. While some
cooperatives now serve rapidly growing suburban areas of the country, they
largely maintain distinct consumer bases from other utilities, serving over 90%
of the counties identified as being in persistent poverty by the U.S. Treasury
Department, many of which are located in the Southeast.16 But perhaps the most
important difference between cooperatives and other electric utilities is their
corporate structure and operation—they are not-for-profit, federally taxexempt entities governed by boards elected by the member-owners that both
own the cooperative and purchase electricity from it.17
The clean energy transition is well underway in many parts of the U.S.
electricity sector. From 2005–2019, increased reliance on natural gas, renewable
energy, energy efficiency, and other factors drove a 33% decrease in carbon
dioxide emissions from the electricity sector.18 However, rural electric
cooperatives saw only an 18% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions over this
period.19 In the context of flat or declining electricity demand, aging
infrastructure, rapid technological change, and state and federal clean-energy
policy, the U.S. electric grid has significantly reduced its decades-long reliance
on large, “baseload” power plants owned and controlled by electric utilities that
function as regulated monopolies.20 The “central station” grid and regulatory
structures of the past have been increasingly replaced by regional wholesale
electricity markets.21 Such markets are able to integrate a growing mix of natural
gas and large-scale renewable energy plants, coupled with a simultaneous
growth in energy efficiency, smaller-scale solar energy, microgrids, and energy
14. AMERICA’S ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES, supra note 8, at 1; see also infra tbl.1.
15. AMERICA’S ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES, supra note 8, at 1.
16. NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY: ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVES AND PERSISTENT POVERTY COUNTIES 1 (2018), https://www.cooperative.com/
programs-services/bts/Documents/Advisories/Member-Advisory-on-Persistent-Poverty-CountiesJune-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DJM-GGG9].
17. MICHAEL SETO & CHERYL CHASIN, GENERAL SURVEY OF I.R.C. 501(C)(12)
COOPERATIVES AND EXAMINATION OF CURRENT ISSUES 176–77 (2002), https://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-tege/eotopice02.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PYZ-SU6B].
18. Calculations for emissions reductions in all utilities are based on U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., AUGUST 2020 MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 117 (2020), https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/
data/monthly/archive/00352008.pdf [https://perma.cc/BR5G-UGB5].
19. AMERICA’S ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES, supra note 8, at 3.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra notes 193–96 and accompanying text.
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storage.22 But, as we explain in this Article, the history, governance, regulation,
and corporate structure of rural electric cooperatives have combined to create
very different conditions under which they might embrace these changes.
In this Article, we draw on the structure and foundational principles
underlying the cooperative form itself to create a framework for the clean
energy transition in rural electric cooperatives. We evaluate three case studies
of cooperatives around the country to build this framework for change. These
cases demonstrate different approaches for how cooperatives can navigate their
structures and leverage their principles to advance the energy transition: by
exiting long-term institutional relationships, collaborating within their existing
institutional relationships, and bolstering grassroots accountability and
relationships with their member-owners. Significantly, our proposals do not
rely on imposing new federal or state clean energy mandates on cooperatives,
as has been the focus of the limited legal scholarship on rural electric
cooperatives that exists to date.23 Although such mandates can be effective in
certain circumstances, the long history of Congress and many state legislatures
allowing rural electric cooperatives to “self-regulate” makes exclusive reliance
on such mandates a limited solution at best.24
Instead we draw on the seven “Cooperative Principles” that guide all
cooperatives—open and voluntary membership; democratic member control;
members’ economic participation; autonomy and independence; education,
training, and information; cooperation among cooperatives; and concern for
community.25 Emphasis on these principles can allow rural electric cooperatives
22. See infra Part II.
23. A Westlaw search of law review articles on the topic of rural electric cooperatives and clean
energy yields only two results. See Gabriel Pacyniak, Greening the Old New Deal: Strengthening Rural
Electric Cooperative Support and Oversight To Combat Climate Change, 85 MO. L. REV. 409 (2020);
Zachary Brecheisen, Comment, Green Acres: How Bringing Pennsylvania Rural Electric Cooperatives Under
the Full Provisions of the Alternative Energy Portfolio Standard Can Boost Renewable Energy Growth in
Pennsylvania, 19 PENN ST. ENV’T L. REV. 333 (2011). Unlike this Article, both of the prior articles
propose new federal or state regulation governing cooperatives to enable clean energy transition.
Pacyniak, supra, at 481; Brecheisen, supra, at 334. Two other law review articles address deficiencies in
rural electric cooperative governance more broadly and do not discuss clean energy transition. See
Debra C. Jeter, Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Democracy and Dysfunction: Rural Electric
Cooperatives and the Surprising Persistence of the Separation of Ownership and Control, 70 ALA. L. REV. 361
(2018); Jim Cooper, Electric Co-Operatives: From New Deal to Bad Deal?, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335
(2008). Both of these articles also advocate for new federal or state legislation to reform cooperative
governance problems. See Jeter et al., supra, at 442–43 (“[W]e think it necessary to complement a
movement to apply state corporate law to [rural electric cooperatives] with federal legislative action to
make clear that [cooperative] member interests are securities under the federal securities laws.”);
Cooper, supra, at 370 (“Because it is unlikely that co-op insiders will voluntarily change their behavior,
even at the urging of their own advisors, legislation will be necessary.”).
24. See infra Part I (discussing limited federal and state regulation of cooperatives).
25. See Understanding the Seven Cooperative Principles, NAT’L RURAL ELEC.
COOP. ASS’N, https://www.electric.coop/seven-cooperative-principles%E2%80%8B/ [https://perma.
cc/8WNZ-UADH]; Jeter et al., supra note 23, at 385–86 (discussing the seven Cooperative Principles
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to engage in the clean energy transition in a way that is consistent with their
history and identity as self-help organizations controlled by their members.
Such an approach also incorporates the increasing grassroots activism within
cooperatives, which has the potential to increase democratic accountability
focused on clean energy deployment and increase racial and gender equity in
cooperative governance.
Part I begins by introducing the cooperative model—first developed in
England in the 1840s—and its adoption by rural communities in the United
States in the early part of the twentieth century. It explains how the federal
government enabled the electrification of rural America beginning in the 1930s,
at a time when nearly 90% of farms lacked access to electricity.26 This part then
explores the unique regulatory status of rural electric cooperatives under federal
and state law. Unlike investor-owned utilities, which are subject to
comprehensive federal and state regulation of their rates, prices, charges, and
contracts under the Federal Power Act, Congress excluded rural electric
cooperatives from federal regulation when it enacted the statute in 1935.27
Likewise, most states exempt rural electric cooperatives from rate regulation
and clean energy mandates.
Part II discusses the clean energy transition in the United States. It
documents the dramatic increase in the deployment of low-cost renewable
energy, made possible by state and federal policies to encourage clean energy,
the development of regional wholesale electricity markets across much of the
country, and the increasing economic feasibility of a variety of “distributed
energy resources,” including energy efficiency, load-control devices, microgrids,
energy storage, and smaller-scale solar.28 This part explains the unique financial
and their application to rural electric cooperatives); CTR. FOR THE NEW ENERGY ECON., POWERING
COOPERATIVES 7 (2019).
26. See Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Rural Electrification Administration, U.S. DEP’T
AGRIC. (Feb. 2017), https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2016/05/20/celebrating-80th-anniversaryrural-electrification-administration [https://perma.cc/GJB4-8QLZ]; Cooper, supra note 23, at 345–46,
346 n.77 (discussing REA financing for rural electric cooperatives); Jonathan Adelstein, From REA to
RUS—75 Years of Lighting the Way for Rural America, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (Feb. 21, 2017),
https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2010/05/00/rea-rus-75-years-lighting-way-rural-america [https://
perma.cc/AVJ9-PTMG] (discussing history of the REA and transition to the RUS); The Electric
Cooperative Story, NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, https://www.electric.coop/our-organization/
history/ [https://perma.cc/9HUF-BDHB] (same).
27. See infra Section I.B.1.
28. Distributed energy resources or “DERs” are “physical and virtual assets that are deployed
across the distribution grid, typically close to load, and usually behind the meter, which can be used
individually or in aggregate to provide value to the grid, individual customers, or both” and include
“solar, storage, energy efficiency, and demand management.” Tanuj Deora, Lisa Frantzis & Jamie
Mandel, Distributed Energy Resources 101: Required Reading for a Modern Grid, ADVANCED ENERGY
ECON. (Feb. 13, 2017), https://blog.aee.net/distributed-energy-resources-101-required-reading-for-amodern-grid [https://perma.cc/CAT5-YEKT]. For a recent discussion of regulations related to energy
storage, see Nat’l Ass’n of Reg. Util. Comm’rs v. FERC, 964 F.3d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (upholding
FERC rule setting pricing rules for energy storage in regional wholesale energy markets).
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and operational environments of cooperatives that preclude the usual tools
available to spur clean energy deployment in investor-owned utilities—state
clean energy mandates, tax and other financial incentives, ratepayer-funded
programs, and shareholder pressure.29 Thus, rural electric cooperatives require
a different approach.
Part III evaluates the challenges facing rural electric cooperatives through
three case studies. Each case study explores how different cooperatives have
addressed internal and external pressures for reform and are pursuing the clean
energy transition through different pathways. The first case study illustrates an
“exit” approach, focusing on contentious litigation between a group of rural
electric cooperatives in the Intermountain West. These cooperatives created
long-term contractual obligations among themselves decades ago to costeffectively produce and distribute power. Now, however, as some member
cooperatives seek increased reliance on renewable energy, they have attempted
to exit these long-term contracts. The second case study shows a “collaborative”
pathway through recent clean energy development at the Great River Energy
cooperative in Minnesota. In that case, Great River Energy and its member
cooperatives made decisions, including contract renegotiations, to allow a
smoother transition to retire or divest from their jointly owned coal plants. The
third case study illustrates a “grassroots” pathway, focusing on the recent rise
of grassroots organizations in the southeastern United States intent on
promoting participation, equity, and racial diversity in cooperative governance
as well as an accelerated transition to cleaner energy. Collectively, these case
studies illustrate a range of tools available to cooperatives to enable the clean
energy transition.
Part IV addresses how to define and implement “cooperative clean
energy.” Building on the case studies in Part III, we propose a range of
approaches for rural electric cooperatives to move into a clean energy future
that focus on using the existing cooperative structure and the seven Cooperative
Principles. These approaches include: (1) increasing the value of the clean
energy transition by more closely integrating cooperatives into wholesale
markets, (2) rethinking cost allocation for clean energy investments, (3)
rethinking cost allocation for retirement of fossil fuel assets, and (4) bolstering
support for internal governance that provides representation for all cooperative
members equitably.

29. See, e.g., 1 NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, COOPERATIVE UTILITY PV FIELD MANUAL
25–26 (2018) (explaining that “[e]lectric cooperatives are almost exclusively tax exempt and thus not
able to monetize [renewable energy] tax incentives” and therefore work with third parties or for-profit
subsidiaries to monetize most federal renewable incentives).
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I. RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES: A REGULATORY AND GOVERNANCE
HISTORY
Cooperative businesses were first established in England in the nineteenth
century, predating rural electric cooperatives by seven decades.30 Modern
definitions of cooperatives emphasize their operation as autonomous businesses
owned and controlled by their users, workers, or another aligned group to meet
the common economic, social, and cultural needs of their community.31 Modern
cooperatives generally adhere to the seven Cooperative Principles, which were
developed by the International Cooperative Alliance.32 Today, one-in-three
Americans are a member of at least one cooperative business, with the
agriculture, grocery, health care, and finance sectors having the largest
cooperative businesses.33
At a conceptual level, cooperatives have been proposed as a viable business
model to address the concern of consumer-harming monopoly rents that result
from suppliers holding market power and setting prices above what competitive
markets would otherwise establish. Aspects of electric service delivery can be
considered a “natural monopoly,” which creates the potential for consumer
welfare losses.34 There are generally four primary approaches to protecting
consumers from bearing the costs of monopoly rent-seeking that are relevant
for electric service delivery, each implying a different utility business model
and level of regulation. First, for-profit, investor-owned utilities can be granted
an exclusive franchise for providing electric service and regulated by publicly
accountable bodies to control prices and availability of quality service.35 Second,
competition can be introduced in some aspects of providing electric service to
reduce the market power of incumbent firms.36 Third, providing electric service
30. KIMBERLY A. ZEULI & ROBERT CROPP, COOPERATIVES: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (2004).
31. Id.
32. MICHAEL BOLAND, AN INTRODUCTION TO COOPERATION AND MUTUALISM 9 (2017);
Cooperative Identity, Values & Principles, INT’L COOP. ALL. (2018), https://www.ica.coop/en/
cooperatives/cooperative-identity [https://perma.cc/34TK-V7LU]; Understanding the Seven Cooperative
Principles, supra note 25.
33. NAT’L COOP. BANK, THE 2019 NCB CO-OP 100, at 3 (2020).
34. A natural monopoly is defined as a firm in a product market for which “the entire demand . . .
can be satisfied at lowest cost by one firm rather than two or more.” See Richard A. Posner, Natural
Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548 (1968).
35. In the absence of competition—particularly for electric transmission and distribution
services—direct control of for-profit utilities through regulation has been the general approach taken
to protect customer interests against monopoly costs. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF
ENTERPRISE 169–70 (2009). However, regulation is also costly due to imperfection in the
government’s ability to monitor firms and an efficiency disincentive associated with overly stringent
regulation. See id.
36. Wholesale markets and other structural changes have increased the ability for the generation
functions of electricity service delivery to experience some degree of competition that lowers costs. For
example, merchant generators provide market-rate generation in restructured wholesale electricity
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can be made a government function.37 Finally, cooperative businesses, in which
consumers own the means of production, can be established to provide
electricity in a manner that aligns the interests of producers with consumers,
converting any excess revenues back to the cooperative’s consumers through
capital credits.38
In the electric sector, cooperative businesses have provided electric service
to U.S. consumers for over a hundred years.39 Rural electric cooperatives were
created to transform rural America. Their purpose was not just to provide
electric service for the first time to the areas they served, but also to educate
farmers in democratic practices and create rural economic wealth.40 Today, rural
electric cooperatives provide electric power to forty-two million people in over
markets. However, electricity transmission and distribution functions generally still meet the
conditions of natural monopoly. See, e.g., Scott Hempling, Testimony Before the California Public
Utilities Commission Forum on Governance, Management, and Safety Culture: To Improve Utility
Performance, Fix the Culture of Entitlement 7 (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.scotthemplinglaw.com/
files/pdf/hempling_culture_of_entitlement_cpuc_26_apr.pdf [https://perma.cc/22AS-TRML]. Other
aspects of electricity service delivery may be opened to competition to greater or lesser extents. See id.
37. See ERIC RAUCHWAY, WHY THE NEW DEAL MATTERS 50 (2021) (detailing the justification
for the federal government’s large hydroelectric generation buildout in the 1930s and 1940s with the
express goal of serving as a “‘national yardstick’ against which to measure the prices levied by private
power companies . . . [and] ‘prevent extortion against the public’ by private firms.” (quoting President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address in Portland, Oregon, on Public Utilities and Development
of Hydroelectric Power (Sept. 21, 1932))). At a local level, municipal retail electricity providers—
municipal utilities or “munis”—are also nonprofit entities like rural electric cooperatives but, unlike
cooperatives, they are governed by democratically elected city councils or a utility commission
appointed by a city council, raise capital through operating revenue or tax-exempt bonds, and are
subject to few federal or state regulations. See, e.g., What Is Public Power?, AM. MUN. POWER,
https://www.amppartners.org/consumers/what-is-public-power [https://perma.cc/4JBC-EK2D]; see
also supra note 14 and tbl.1 (showing percentage of U.S. power provided by government utilities).
38. The economic justification for cooperatives as an alternative to investor-owned utilities is in
the ability of cooperatives to align “the firm’s interests with those of its customers” and avoid “not only
the costs of monopoly but also the costs of rate regulation.” See HANSMANN, supra note 35, at 169–70.
Capital credits are the excess revenues above costs that a cooperative distributes to members, analogous
to the dividends an investor-owned utility returns to its shareholders. Understanding Capital Credits,
OCONTO ELEC. COOP., https://ocontoelectric.com/understanding-capital-credits/ [https://perma.cc/
PJF5-5SP2]; see also infra notes 121–22. Retiring capital credits through direct payments to members
helps cooperative members internalize the economic benefits of being cooperative members and creates
tax benefits for the cooperative. See NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N & NAT’L RURAL UTILS.
COOP. FIN. CORP., CAPITAL CREDITS TASK FORCE REPORT 18 (2005). However, member equity
can also be retained by a cooperative to invest in parallel enterprises not necessarily related to electricity
service provision, which can create risks and rewards for the cooperative members. See W.G. Beecher,
Is It Time To Revoke the Tax-Exempt Status of Rural Electric Cooperatives?, 5 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY
CLIMATE & ENV’T 221, 239–40 (2014); infra Section I.C (discussing investments).
39. See Jeter et al., supra note 23, at 364–65; see also Linda A. Cameron, Rural Electrification in
Minnesota, MNOPEDIA (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.mnopedia.org/thing/rural-electrificationadministration-minnesota [https://perma.cc/8GCW-VWCX] (noting one of the earliest electric
cooperatives formed in Minnesota in 1914); History, PARKLAND LIGHT & WATER,
https://www.plw.coop/about-us/history/ [https://perma.cc/K22X-QZYX] (noting the history of an
electric cooperative formed in Washington in 1914).
40. See Jeter et al., supra note 23, at 365.
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twenty million residences, businesses, farms, and schools across forty-eight
states.41 Rural electric cooperatives were formed to serve dispersed energy needs
in rural areas, and today, they cover over 50% of the U.S. landmass.42 To serve
this wide area, rural electric cooperatives own approximately 40% (over two
million miles) of the nation’s electric distribution lines, which connect
electricity users to the electric grid.43 By mile of distribution line, rural electric
cooperatives have about one-third of the consumer density compared to other
utilities.44
Rural electric cooperatives today have self-organized into multilevel,
federated structures. There are approximately eight hundred “distribution
cooperatives,” which sell and distribute power to their member-owners.45
Groups of distribution cooperatives collectively own and manage over sixty
“generation and transmission” or “G&T” cooperatives.46 The G&T
cooperatives generate or procure power from a variety of energy resources—
hydropower, coal, natural gas, nuclear, wind, and solar—and sell power to their
member distribution cooperatives. The terms of the power sales between
distribution cooperatives and the G&T cooperatives they own are generally set
in power supply contracts. Many of these contracts are binding, long-term
contracts, known as “all-requirements” contracts, discussed in more detail
below.47
In 2019, cooperatives sold 14% of total U.S. electricity and served 15% of
the nation’s energy consumers through their network of transmission and
distribution lines, as shown in Table 1.48 The breakdown of the share of
41. See AMERICA’S ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES, supra note 8, at 1.
42. Id. For maps showing the geographic coverage of U.S. rural electric cooperatives, see id.;
America’s Electric Cooperative Network, NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N (2004),
https://www.otsegoec.coop/sites/otsegoec/files/documents/CooperativeNetwork.pdf [https://perma.
cc/C846-PA4T].
43. See infra tbl.1.
44. See infra tbl.1.
45. AMERICA’S ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES, supra note 8, at 1.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2; see also Liz Veazey, Overview of Generation & Transmission Co-ops & All Requirements
Contracts, WE OWN IT, https://weown.it/resource-gnt-all-requirements-overview [https://perma.cc/
TP4X-ACCF] (showing map of G&T cooperatives); infra note 221 (discussing all-requirements
contracts).
48. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2019 (2021); U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2015 (2016). For details on different types of power providers,
see supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text. The number of retail entities for investor-owned utilities
and power marketers is based on the count of distinct entities reporting electricity sales in 2019 to the
Energy Information Administration (accounting for sales in multiple states). The number of rural
electric cooperatives is based on merging cooperative utilities that complete form EIA-861 and hold
membership in the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association. Government utilities include
municipal utilities, federal power marketers (such as the Bonneville Power Administration), political
subdivisions (such as the Salt River Project), and state utilities (such as the Long Island Power
Authority). Customers of municipal utilities make up 74% of customers of government utilities. See
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electricity sold, share of consumers served, share of transmission and
distribution line miles, consumer density per mile of distribution line, and
number of retail entities by all utility types is detailed in Table 1.
Table 1. Key Statistics of Different Utility Types

Utility
Type
InvestorOwned
Utilities
Power
Marketers
Government
(including
municipal,
state, federal,
and other
public
utilities)
Rural
Electric Coops

Share of
Electricity
Sold
(2019)

Share of
Consumers
Served
(2019)

Share of
Transmission
Lines
(by mile,
2015)

Share of
Distribution
Lines
(by mile,
2015)

Consumers
per Mile of
Distribution
Line (2015)

Number
of
Retail
Entities
(2019)

59%

64%

66%

54%

29.1

158

8%

5%

--

--

--

87

19%

16%

18%

10%

31.2

~2,000

14%

15%

17%

37%

8.0

~800

The remainder of this part explores the creation and development of rural
electric cooperatives starting with the New Deal period in the 1930s, the limited
role of federal and state regulation of cooperatives, and present-day dynamics
of cooperative governance.
A.

Rural Electrification, the New Deal, and the Rise of the Rural Electric
Cooperative

The first rural electric cooperatives in the United States were established
in the 1910s by small rural communities.49 By the 1930s, as part of the New
QUADRENNIAL ENERGY REV., TRANSFORMING THE NATION’S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM: THE
SECOND INSTALLMENT OF THE QER, at A-33 (2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/
02/f34/Quadrennial%20Energy%20Review--Second%20Installment%20%28Full%20Report%29.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6KC2-3443]. Miles of transmission and distribution lines were corrected due to a
labelling issue in the original data. The American Public Power Association reports that there are
approximately two thousand public power utilities, which are primarily municipal utilities. AM. PUB.
POWER ASS’N, PUBLIC POWER FOR YOUR COMMUNITY 7 (2016).
49. See D. CLAYTON BROWN, ELECTRICITY FOR RURAL AMERICA: THE FIGHT FOR THE REA
13–14 (1980) (noting that, while the earliest history of electric cooperatives in the United States is
disputed, the Stoney Run Light and Power Company in Granite Falls, Minnesota, was functioning as
an electric cooperative in 1914, and by the time the REA was formed in 1935, there were approximately
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Deal, President Franklin D. Roosevelt embraced the capability of the federal
government to provide financing as a tool to enable the electrification of rural
America. This effort came at a time when nearly 90% of farms lacked access to
electricity, despite having the technical capability to receive electric service, and
when research was demonstrating that farm electrification would improve
lives.50 The large majority of farms were not connected to the electric grid
because the existing investor-owned utilities asserted that they could not earn a
sufficient profit from rural electrification, even with government incentives.51
This led Congress, with the strong support of President Roosevelt’s
administration, to enact the Rural Electrification Act of 1936,52 which enabled
the Rural Electrification Administration or “REA” (renamed the Rural Utilities
Service, or “RUS,” in 1994), to provide low-interest financing for rural
electrification.53 Initially, federal loans primarily financed the construction of
fifty electric cooperatives in operation, each with approximately twenty to two hundred memberowners); see also JACK DOYLE, LINES ACROSS THE LAND: RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES: THE
CHANGING POLITICS OF ENERGY IN RURAL AMERICA 3 (Vic Reinemer ed., 1979) (discussing how
early advocates of rural electrification in the United States were inspired by rural electric cooperatives
established in the early 1900s in Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and Ontario).
50. See RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMIN., RURAL LINES USA: THE STORY OF
COOPERATIVE RURAL ELECTRIFICATION 3–4 (1966) (noting that by 1915, engineers were able to
transmit power one hundred miles and that most farmers lived within one hundred miles of a
generating station and discussing a study in the early 1920s showing that connecting farms with
electricity and electric equipment improved health and happiness).
51. See Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Rural Electrification Administration, supra note 26; see
also CARO, supra note 6, at 516 (“For two decades and more [prior to the 1930s], in states all across the
country, delegations of farmers, dressed in Sunday shirts washed by hand and ironed by sad iron, had
come, hats literally in hand, to the paneled offices of utility-company executives to ask to be allowed
to enter the age of electricity . . . . But in delegations or alone, the answer they received was almost
invariably the same: that it was too expensive . . . .”); JOHN RIGGS, HIGH TENSION: FDR’S BATTLE
TO POWER AMERICA 147 (2020) (“[Morris] Cooke threw the administration’s weight behind a more
aggressive national approach, claiming the private utilities’ failure to electrify rural areas was due to
‘prohibitive costs of line construction, to excessive demands for cash contributions from farmers to pay
for the lines which would serve them, to high rates which discourage the abundant use of current, and
to the traditional policy of private utilities of extending the monopolistic franchises as widely as
possible, while extending their actual service only to those areas which are most profitable.’” (quoting
Letter from Morris L. Cooke, Adm’r, Rural Elec. Admin., to George W. Norris, U.S. Sen. from
Nebraska (Nov. 14, 1935))); Richard Hirsh, Shedding New Light on Rural Electrification: The Neglected
Story of Successful Efforts To Power Up Farms in the 1920s and 1930s, 92 AGRIC. HIST. SOC’Y 296, 296–
97 (2018); Abby Spinak, Infrastructure and Agency: Rural Electric Cooperatives and the Fight for
Economic Democracy in the United States 239–40 (Jan. 16, 2014) (Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology) (on file with Massachusetts Institute of Technology Libraries).
52. Rural Electrification Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-605, 49 Stat. 1363 (codified as amended in
7 U.S.C. §§ 901–950cc-2).
53. RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 4–6. The Rural Electrification Act of
1936 made loans available for financing the construction and operation of generation, transmission, and
distribution to rural areas not receiving service from a central station, including home wiring and
appliances. Id. The Act defined rural areas as those outside of municipalities with populations above
1,500. Id. at 5. While the REA initially sought to work with private utilities, applications to the REA
from private companies included provisions for rates in rural areas significantly higher than those in
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electric distribution networks and only supported a relatively small amount of
energy generation.54
When many rural electric cooperatives were first being established in the
late 1930s, many states lacked laws specifically addressing rural electric
cooperatives, despite already having in place extensive laws regulating private,
investor-owned utilities. In response, REA legal staff drafted a model state
law—the Electric Cooperative Corporation Act—which established the
authority to create rural electric cooperatives and exempted them from rate
regulation by state utility commissions under the assumption that they would
be “self-regulated,” not-for-profit corporations.55 By 1940, twenty-three states
had adopted a version of the Electric Cooperative Corporation Act.56 As of
2020, only seven states fully regulated cooperative rates, charges, and
contracts.57
By the 1950s, rural electric cooperatives had become the primary means by
which over 90% of rural Americans accessed electricity.58 Around this same
time, the economics of electricity were fundamentally changing. Large-scale
generation with substantial economies of scale—particularly large coal plants
but also nuclear power—began to crowd out alternatives.59 In order to take
advantage of the lower-than-average cost power from centralized generation
and build the large-scale transmission infrastructure necessary to transport
electricity over long distances, the hundreds of rural electric cooperatives across
the country began to work together to form G&T cooperatives.60 G&T
place in urban areas and thus were not seriously considered. Id. at 4. The Rural Electrification Act then
included language specifically calling for preference to public entities and cooperatives. Id. at 5–6; see
also CARO, supra note 6, at 519–21 (discussing President Roosevelt’s creation of the REA by executive
order in 1935 and congressional enactment of the Rural Electrification Act in 1936); FRANK J. BUSCH,
POWER FOR THE PEOPLE: MONTANA’S COOPERATIVE UTILITIES 157–73 (1976) (discussing REA
policies and requirements for financing); PHILIP J. FUNIGIELLO, TOWARD A NATIONAL POWER
POLICY: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY, 1933–1944, at 139–45 (1973)
(discussing the failure of investor-owned utilities to work with the REA to expand electricity to rural
parts of the country and the agency’s subsequent pivot to cooperatives).
54. Cooper, supra note 23, at 345–46, 346 n.78.
55. RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 7 (discussing the model state law and
self-regulating nature of rural electric cooperatives); see also, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-301 to 311 (LEXIS through Apr. 20, 2021) (demonstrating how states, like Arkansas, adopted the model state
law, titled it the “Electric Cooperative Corporation Act” and included provisions for rural electric
cooperative articles of incorporation, bylaws, membership, and use of revenues).
56. RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMIN., supra note 50, at 7.
57. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
58. See The Electric Cooperative Story, supra note 26.
59. Energy Sources Have Changed Throughout the History of the United States, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (July 3, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=11951 [https://perma.cc/
E9BA-L7SS] (showing that, in the mid-20th century, coal-powered and nuclear electric generation
began to rise).
60. See CLYDE T. ELLIS, A GIANT STEP 60–61 (1966). The first G&T cooperative was
established in 1938 in Wisconsin, and by the 1970s, nearly 20% of cooperative power was sourced from
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cooperatives provided the structure for small distribution utilities to collectively
govern investments in large-scale generation and transmission infrastructure.61
Following the 1973 Oil Crisis, and during the time that many G&T
cooperatives were investing in new generation capacity to support loads that
would grow through the 1980s, Congress enacted the Powerplant and Industrial
Fuel Use Act62 requiring that all new baseload power plants have the capability
to use coal rather than natural gas or petroleum.63 About two-thirds of the coal
generation owned by cooperatives today was built between 1978–1987, the years
this law was in force.64
To support the financing of large collective investments, local distribution
cooperatives accepted the REA’s mandate that they enter into long-term “allrequirements” contracts for energy services, thereby binding themselves
together with their G&T cooperative “families” for multiple decades, consistent
with the expected lifetime of their co-invested assets.65 In the past decade, these
contracts—originally intended to protect the federal government’s
investments—have come under intense scrutiny as the economics of electricity
shift toward lower-cost, wholesale electricity wheeled over long distances and
distributed energy resources that lack the economies of scale of fossil fuel
generation.66 This greater diversity of the cost-effective means of delivering
G&Ts, with the remainder sourced from investor-owned utilities or federally owned power producers.
See id.; DOYLE, supra note 49, at 3.
61. Greensboro Lumber Co. v. Ga. Power Co., 634 F. Supp. 1345, 1359–62 (N.D. Ga. 1986),
aff’d, 844 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11th Cir. 1988) (discussing the formation of G&T cooperatives and stating
that they “were formed to meet the perceived need for greater efficiency in rural electric service through
large-scale power generation and distribution”).
62. Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15, 19, 42, 45, and 49 U.S.C.).
63. Building a 100 Percent Clean Economy: Solutions for the U.S. Power Sector: Hearing Before the
Energy Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Com., 116th Cong. 6 (2019) [hereinafter 100 Percent
Clean Economy Hearings] (statement of Hon. Jim Matheson, Chief Executive Officer, National Rural
Electric Cooperative Association), https://www.electric.coop/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MathesonNRECA-Written-Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK8M-3MR5] (explaining that, from 1978–1987
under the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, G&T cooperatives were under federal mandate to
build “coal capable” baseload power plants to preserve scarce natural gas supplies because cooperatives
could not purchase affordable power elsewhere); see also Pacyniak, supra note 23, at 452.
64. Nat’l Rural Elec. Coop. Ass’n, Comments on Proposed Carbon Pollution Emission
Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units and Notice of Data
Availability 51 (Dec. 1, 2014); see also Pacyniak, supra note 23, at 452–53.
65. Ala. Power Co. v. Ala. Elec. Coop., 394 F.2d 672, 675 (5th Cir. 1968) (explaining that the
REA mandate that G&T cooperatives enter into long-term, all-requirements contracts with their
member-owners is “to assure that the borrower will have a market for the power generated and
transmitted by the REA-financed facilities and thus be able to repay the loan”); see also Greensboro
Lumber Co., 634 F. Supp. at 1541–42 (rejecting argument that REA-mandated all-requirements
contracts violate federal antitrust laws).
66. Compare FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, AD18-10-000, DISTRIBUTED ENERGY
RESOURCES: TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE BULK POWER SYSTEM 7 (2018),
https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/der-report_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7LRY-L4NZ]
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energy services to individuals and businesses is creating opportunities and
challenges for all corners of the energy system to develop greater flexibility.67
For cooperatives, this may require unique approaches, which are discussed
throughout the remainder of the Article.
B.

Federal and State Regulation of Rural Electric Cooperatives

In this section, we discuss federal and state law regulating rural electric
cooperatives. As explained below, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”) does not generally regulate cooperative rates, charges, or contracts
under the Federal Power Act of 1935 (“FPA”),68 but states have authority to
regulate such rates, charges, and contracts in the public interest.69 As a policy
matter, however, very few states regulate cooperative rates or impose clean
energy standards or other requirements on cooperatives.70 The generally stated
justification for designating cooperatives as “self-regulating” and “selfgoverning” stems from the cooperative form itself—cooperatives are not-forprofit, federally tax-exempt entities governed by locally-elected boards that
return or reinvest all excess revenues.71 This means that rural electric
cooperative decisions about energy resources, electricity rates, and other
business operations are subject to far less federal, state, or public scrutiny than
such decisions by investor-owned utilities.
1. Federal Regulation of Rural Electric Cooperatives
Under the FPA, FERC regulates contracts, rates, and charges for the
transmission and wholesale sale of electricity in interstate commerce to ensure
such contracts, rates, and charges are “just and reasonable.”72 At the time of its
enactment, the FPA regulated “public utilities” and excluded from coverage
(citing a study by Navigant showing growth in annual installations of distributed energy
resource capacity from approximately 25 gigawatts (“GW”) per year in 2015 to over 40 GW per
year in 2020 and forecasting growth to approximately 65 GW per year by 2024), with Renewables
Account for Most New U.S. Electricity Generating Capacity in 2021, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan.
11, 2021), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=46416 [https://perma.cc/6LWF-WTXW]
(estimating that less than 40 GW of capacity tracked by the EIA—excluding most distributed energy
resources—will be installed in 2021).
67. INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, POWER SYSTEM FLEXIBILITY FOR THE
ENERGY TRANSITION pt. 1, at 8 (Nov. 2018), https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/
Publication/2018/Nov/IRENA_Power_system_flexibility_1_2018.pdf?la=en&hash=72EC26336F127
C7D51DF798CE19F477557CE9A82 [https://perma.cc/HVH5-EDY5].
68. Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, tit. II, 49 Stat. 803, 838–63 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
69. See discussion infra Section I.B.1; see also JIM LAZAR, REGUL. ASSISTANCE PROJECT,
ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US 15–16 (2d ed. 2016).
70. See infra Section I.B.2.
71. See supra note 23 (discussing scholarly criticism of this lack of regulation); see also Beecher,
supra note 38 (questioning the continued tax-exempt status of rural electric cooperatives).
72. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a), (b), (d), (e), (f).
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“the United States, a State or any political subdivision of a State . . . or any
agency, authority, or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing, or
any corporation which is wholly owned, directly or indirectly, by any one or
more of the foregoing . . . .”73 Because this statutory exclusion did not mention
rural electric cooperatives at all, the question arose whether they should be
included in the definition of a “public utility” or should otherwise be subject to
rate regulation under the FPA.
By the 1960s, FERC’s predecessor—the Federal Power Commission—and
the lower federal courts had held that the FPA applies only to “public utilities”
and that Congress did not intend to subject rural electric cooperatives to FPA
regulation.74 The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed this analysis in 1983 in
Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Public Service Commission.75 The
Court agreed that the lack of FPA coverage for rural electric cooperatives was
based on the history leading up to Congress’s enactment of the FPA, which was
an effort to address rampant fraud, misrepresentation, and financial abuses by
investor-owned utilities in the electricity sector.76 It stated that Congress used
the FPA to govern the actions of public utilities and chose the REA (which was
created around the same time) to govern the actions of rural electric
cooperatives through its authority under the Rural Electrification Act.77 At the
73. See id. In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress addressed cooperatives explicitly by
amending § 824(f) to exclude from regulation any “political subdivision of a State, an electric
cooperative that receives financing under the Rural Electrification Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 901 et seq.)
or that sells less than 4,000,000 megawatt hours of electricity per year . . . .” Pub. L. No. 109-58,
§ 1291(c), 119 Stat. 594, 985 (2005) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824(f)); see also infra Section III.A.2
(discussing Tri-State’s request to be subject to FERC regulation under the FPA by adding a new
member that was not a rural electric cooperative).
74. See Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 391 F.2d
470, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1968); City of Paris v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 399 F.2d 983, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
In re Dairyland Power Coop., 37 F.P.C. 12, 15 (1967).
75. 461 U.S. 375, 380–83 (1983) (discussing reasons for lack of FPA jurisdiction over rural electric
cooperatives).
76. See id. (discussing reasons for lack of FPA jurisdiction over rural electric cooperatives); Salt
River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 391 F.2d at 475 (“It is not easy to choose words which
will adequately characterize various ethical aspects of [the actions of investor-owned utilities prior to
the enactment of the FPA] without an appearance of undue severity. Nevertheless the use of words
such as fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, dishonesty, breach of trust, and oppression are the only
suitable terms to apply if one seeks to form an ethical judgment on many practices which have taken
sums beyond calculation from the rate paying and investing public.”).
77. Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 461 U.S. at 384. The Rural Electrification Act authorized the REA to,
among other things, make loans for rural electrification, including loans to finance power plants,
transmission and distribution lines, and other approved energy-related programs; assist electric
borrowers to implement demand side management, energy conservation programs, and renewable
energy systems; and promote studies, investigations, and reports on the progress of electrification
service in rural areas. See Rural Electrification Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-605, §§ 1–2, 49 Stat. 1363,
1363 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 901–902); United States ex rel. Rural Utils. Serv. v. Cajun
Elec. Power Coop., Inc. (In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc.), 109 F.3d 248, 255 (5th Cir. 1997)
(discussing powers of the REA Administrator).
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same time, the Court rejected the argument that cooperatives are inherently
“self-regulating,”78 and upheld states’ power to regulate the rates, charges, and
contracts of rural electric cooperatives.79 Nevertheless, the Court left open the
possibility that a state ratemaking-decision could “so seriously compromise
important federal interests,” including REA loan repayment, that the REA
could preempt the state action.80
In the years following the Supreme Court’s decision in Arkansas Electric
Cooperative Corp., the lower federal courts addressed the extent to which the
REA can preempt state regulatory authority over cooperatives. Of particular
concern was the potential for conflicts between the REA’s desire to ensure
repayment of REA loans and efforts of state public utility commissions to shield
cooperative ratepayers from price increases. In the 1980s, power providers
around the country, including G&T cooperatives, had invested heavily in
nuclear plants that were never built due to cost overruns and overestimations
of electricity demand growth.81 These G&T cooperatives had secured REA
loans for their investments, and with the mounting losses from the unbuilt
plants, they risked defaulting on the loans unless they could significantly raise
member rates.82 When the REA demanded that the G&T cooperatives raise
member rates to ensure repayment, state public utility regulators in Indiana and
Louisiana asserted jurisdiction over those rates, found that the public interest
was not served by increasing rates, and prohibited the cooperatives from
charging them.83 The REA then enacted new regulations designed to preempt
the state public utility commission decisions and ensure loan repayment.84
These cases reached the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the
Fifth Circuit in the 1990s in Wabash Valley Power Association v. Rural Electric

78. Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 461 U.S. at 394 (“An argument could be made that, because AECC’s
Board of Directors consists exclusively of representatives of its 17 customers, it is effectively selfregulating, and that therefore any state regulation is not supported by an appreciable state interest . . . .
Nevertheless, there is evidence that even cooperative power utilities may engage in economically
inefficient behavior, . . . and we will not under these circumstances second-guess the State’s judgment
that some degree of governmental oversight is warranted.” (citations omitted)).
79. Id.; see also Matt Grimley, Just How Democratic Are Rural Electric Cooperatives?, INST. FOR
LOC. SELF-RELIANCE (Jan. 13, 2016), https://ilsr.org/just-how-democratic-are-rural-electriccooperatives/ [https://perma.cc/VX6S-3XR5] (discussing the limited number of states that regulate the
rates cooperatives charge their members); infra Section I.B.2 (discussing state regulation of
cooperatives).
80. Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 461 U.S. at 389.
81. See Wabash Valley Power Ass’n v. Rural Electrification Admin. (Wabash II), 988 F.2d 1480,
1482 (7th Cir. 1993); LINCOLN L. DAVIES, ALEXANDRA B. KLASS, HARI M. OSOFSKY, JOSEPH P.
TOMAIN & ELIZABETH WILSON, ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 352–53 (2d ed. 2018) (discussing
nuclear plant cost overruns and electricity growth overestimations).
82. Wabash II, 988 F.2d at 1482; In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 109 F.3d at 252–53.
83. Wabash II, 988 F.2d at 1482; In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 109 F.3d at 252–53.
84. Wabash II, 988 F.2d at 1482; In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 109 F.3d at 252–53.
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Administration85 and United States ex rel. Rural Utilities Service v. Cajun Electric
Power Cooperative, Inc.86 Both courts held that the REA did not have authority
under the Rural Electrification Act to preempt the state commissions’
regulation of cooperatives.87
These cases thus establish that even though FERC does not generally
regulate cooperative rates, charges, and contracts under the FPA,88 states retain
broad authority to regulate cooperative actions regarding rates and the use of
energy resources. As set forth below, however, as a matter of policy, very few
states regulate cooperative rates, choosing instead to consider cooperatives as
not-for-profit “self-regulating” and “self-governing” entities. Moreover, many
states that impose clean energy standards or other requirements on investorowned utilities either do not apply them to cooperatives or apply them more
leniently.
2. State Regulation of Rural Electric Cooperatives
In general, states regulate the rates of their investor-owned utilities for
services they provide to retail electricity customers, whether for energy,
transmission, or distribution services.89 When it comes to rural electric
cooperatives, however, the regulatory landscape is vastly different. Only seven
states—Arizona, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, and
Vermont—fully regulate the rates G&T or distribution cooperatives charge to
their members.90 In a few other states, the public utility commission can assert
85. 988 F.2d 1480 (7th Cir. 1993).
86. 109 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 1997).
87. See Wabash II, 988 F.2d at 1490; In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 109 F.3d at 257–58.
88. Under the FPA, if a cooperative does not have outstanding REA/RUS loans and is not wholly
owned by cooperatives with REA/RUS loans, or is over a certain size, it becomes FERC-regulated. See
Public Utility Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, tit. II, § 201, 49 Stat. 803, 847 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 824(f)) (“No provision in this subchapter shall apply to, or be deemed to include, the
United States, a State or any political subdivision of a State, an electric cooperative that receives
financing under the Rural Electrification Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 901 et seq.) or that sells less than
4,000,000 megawatt hours of electricity per year, or any agency, authority, or instrumentality of any
one or more of the foregoing, or any corporation which is wholly owned, directly or indirectly, by any
one or more of the foregoing . . . .”); Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, 170 FERC ¶ 61,224
paras. 82–86 (June 12, 2020) (finding that a G&T cooperative is subject to FERC regulation if it adds
a member-owner that is not itself exempt under 16 U.S.C § 824(f) because it is no longer wholly owned
by exempt entities).
89. See ALEXANDRA B. KLASS & HANNAH J. WISEMAN, ENERGY LAW 219–22 (2d ed. 2020)
(discussing state regulation of utilities). Even in states that have “restructured” their electricity sector
to allow competition among energy providers, utilities still retain monopoly status regarding the
transmission and distribution of electricity in set service areas and state utility commissions continue
to regulate the rates for those services. Id.
90. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 15, § 2; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-203, -365, -367 (Westlaw
through legislation effective April 20, 2021 of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 55th Leg.); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 269-1(1), -16(b) (2021); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 278.040, 279.201 (Westlaw through legislation
effective Apr. 12, 2021 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. and the Nov. 3, 2020 election); LA. CONST. art. IV,
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authority over cooperative rates or charges if they are responding to a consumer
complaint, if the cooperative raises rates above a certain percentage, or if the
cooperative is over a certain size.91 In all other states, the public utility
commission either has no jurisdiction over cooperative rates or cooperatives
may choose to opt in or opt out of rate regulation.92

§ 21(B); Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 544 So. 2d 362, 363–66 (La. 1989)
(confirming public service company jurisdiction over cooperative rates); ME. STAT. tit. 35-A, §§ 111,
310, 3502, 3709 (2020); MD. CODE ANN. PUB. UTIL. §§ 1-101(x), -101(ff), 4-101, -209, 7-502 (LEXIS
through legislation effective Apr. 13, 2021, from the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 30, §§ 201(1), 209(a)(4), 218d(c) (LEXIS through Act 2 of the 2021 Sess.).
91. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 37-17-103 (LEXIS through 2021 Gen. Sess. of the Wyo. Leg.)
(stating that cooperative boards may adopt a resolution to obtain exemption from public service
commission rates except for cooperatives with annual sales over two billion kilowatt-hours); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 62-6-4 (Westlaw with emergency legislation through Ch. 140 (End) of the 1st Reg. Sess.
and Ch. 4 (End) of the 1st Spec. Sess. of the 55th Leg. (2021)) (requiring a G&T cooperative to file
rates with public regulation commission and allowing the commission to determine reasonableness of
those rates in response to a protest by three or more member utilities); S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-27-10(7)
(Westlaw through 2021 Act No. 20) (stating that cooperatives are not considered “electric utilities”
subject to rate regulation, but must file rates and schedules with office of regulatory staff and are subject
to rate audits); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-1-103(2)(a), -9.5-106 (LEXIS through Ch. 31 of the
2021 Reg. Sess. and effective as of Apr. 29, 2021) (stating that rural electric cooperatives can vote to
become exempt from commission rate regulation but commission retains jurisdiction over disputes
concerning cooperative rates, charges, rules, and regulations); ALASKA STAT. §§ 42.05.990(6),
42.05.141, 42.05.711–712 (2021) (stating cooperatives may vote to be exempt from commission rate
regulation); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-4-903 to -906, 23-4-908 (LEXIS through Apr. 20, 2021) (stating
cooperatives are generally exempt from rate regulation but must notify the commission of any rate
changes, and the commission retains authority to regulate reasonableness of rates; additionally,
cooperative members can petition for rate review); VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.3 (LEXIS through the
2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb. and Acts 2021 Spec. Sess. I, cc. 55, 56, 78, 82, 110, 117, 118, 171,
216, 220 and 243) (stating commission does not regulate or set rates for cooperatives so long as the rate
change does not exceed 5% within a three-year period).
92. See, e.g., NAT’L RURAL UTILS. COOP. FIN. CORP., SETTING RATES: BEST PRACTICES FOR
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES pt. 3, at 3–4 (Jan. 4, 2008), https://www.cooperative.com/cfc/documents/
rates_setting_part3.pdf [https://perma.cc/QUT3-63CV] (discussing state regulation of cooperative
rates). In Minnesota, one distribution cooperative, Dakota Electric, has chosen to allow the Public
Utilities Commission to regulate its rates while the other cooperatives in the state have not. See MIKE
BULL, RSCH. DEP’T OF THE MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REGULATION OF ENERGY
UTILITIES IN MINNESOTA *1 (2002), https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/ss/ssegutil.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U55B-Z7CY]. In Iowa, one cooperative has opted in to rate regulation. See
IOWA CODE ANN. § 476.1A (2021) (“The board of directors or the membership of an electric
cooperative corporation or association otherwise exempt from rate regulation may elect to have the
cooperative’s rates regulated by the board.”); IOWA UTILS. BD., FISCAL YEAR 2017 ANNUAL REPORT
4 (2018), https://iub.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2018/09/annualreport_fy2017_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YUY5-PXAG] (noting that Linn County REC had opted in to rate regulation by the
Iowa Utilities Board). In Oklahoma, five out of thirty-two cooperatives have declined to opt out of rate
regulation. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 158.27 (Westlaw with emergency effective legislation
through Ch. 365 of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 58th Leg. (2021)) (“[T]he member-consumers of a rural
electric cooperative [are allowed to] exempt themselves from regulation by the Commission . . . .”);
Electric Utility, OKLA. CORP. COMM’N, https://oklahoma.gov/occ/divisions/public-utility/electricutility.html [https://perma.cc/XX4V-TU5K] (listing cooperatives that have and have not opted out of
rate regulation).
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State regulation of rural electric cooperatives in areas besides ratemaking
is also often lighter than that imposed on investor-owned utilities. For instance,
thirty states require at least some electricity providers to comply with state
“renewable portfolio standards” or “clean energy standards” by sourcing a
certain percentage of electricity sales from renewable energy resources or
carbon-free energy resources.93 However, most of these states either do not
impose those requirements on rural electric cooperatives at all or impose more
relaxed standards.94 Nevertheless, cooperatives may still voluntarily adhere to
the standards applied to investor-owned utilities as a matter of proactive policy
compliance or in response to member expectations.
Although several states have recently imposed very aggressive clean
energy mandates or greenhouse gas reduction targets—up to 100% clean
electricity and greenhouse gas neutrality by a particular year95—there is no
guarantee that existing policies will be successfully implemented, that a
significant number of additional states will follow suit, or that such policies will
apply to all sectors and utilities, including rural electric cooperatives. Indeed,
many states do not have clean energy mandates on any power providers, have
very modest mandates, or have rescinded requirements enacted in prior years.96
Thus, without new state policies, rapidly transitioning to a clean energy
future may require rural electric cooperatives across the country to evaluate how
their internal decision-making could be brought into closer alignment with the
changing dynamics of the clean energy transition. Importantly, such an
evaluation must grapple with the challenges of leveraging internal cooperative
self-governance, as discussed below.
C.

Modern Cooperative Governance

Rural electric cooperatives nationwide have long operated according to
seven Cooperative Principles, originally developed in the 1800s to guide the
operation of all types of cooperatives.97 Applying these principles to support the
93. See, e.g., DSIRE & NC CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., RENEWABLE & CLEAN ENERGY
STANDARDS *1 (2020), https://s3.amazonaws.com/ncsolarcen-prod/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/
RPS-CES-Sept2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6GR-946S] (showing renewable portfolio standards and
clean energy mandates in all the states); Laura Shields, State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewableportfolio-standards.aspx [https://perma.cc/3CJM-5QXD] (describing renewable portfolio standards
and summarizing laws in the states); GALEN BARBOSE, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB’Y, U.S.
RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARDS: 2018 ANNUAL STATUS REPORT 6 (2018); Welton, Electricity
Markets, supra note 4, at 1084–86 (discussing state renewable portfolio standards).
94. See, e.g., Shields, supra note 93 (showing thirty states with renewable energy or carbon-free
mandates on electricity providers but only thirteen that apply those standards to rural electric
cooperatives).
95. See DSIRE & NC CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., supra note 93.
96. See, e.g., id.; Shields, supra note 93.
97. Understanding the Seven Cooperative Principles, supra note 25.
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clean energy transition in the twenty-first century is made complex because
technologies, the electric grid, policy, and member expectations are changing.
These changes create situations in which the Cooperative Principles can work
against each other and cooperative members whose interests previously aligned
no longer see the same mutual benefit in maintaining historic agreements. Rural
electric cooperatives were designed as vehicles for democratically directed
collective action to enable cooperatives to capture economies of scale and make
collective decisions on behalf of their members. In some cases, however, the
democratic functioning of cooperatives has been challenged by a lack of
accountability to—and representation of—all members. Some of these
challenges arise due to governance concerns that are manifest in all democratic
institutions when representative agents are not accountable to their
constituents—a challenge that may be even more contentious in multilevel,
federated structures, like those in which cooperatives operate, where the
interests of some members diverge from others.98
In recent years, academics,99 legislators,100 activists,101 and some
cooperatives themselves102 have offered critiques of rural electric cooperative
governance, often suggesting that some cooperatives have violated their own
foundational principles. While there is considerable diversity of circumstances
and differences in institutional capacity among the hundreds of cooperatives in
the country, in this section we discuss a range of issues in cooperative
governance that can apply to distribution cooperatives and G&T cooperatives.
We also acknowledge that our review of cooperative governance issues is
somewhat limited in that the cases that have developed a public record are only
those in which extreme governance challenges have required outside mediation.
In these cases, there is some degree of failure (or claims of failure) to implement
the Cooperative Principles, but more generally, these cases illustrate how the
Cooperative Principles can come into conflict with each other. We acknowledge

98. See, e.g., Yannis Papadopoulos, Accountability and Multi-Level Governance: More Accountability,
Less Democracy?, 33 W. EUR. POL. 1030, 1033–36 (2010).
99. See Jeter et al., supra note 23, at 396–97.
100. Governance and Financial Accountability of Rural Electric Cooperatives: The Pedernales Experience:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 67 (2008) [hereinafter Pedernales
Hearings] (statement of Rep. Jim Cooper, Member, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform)
(“Without full disclosure, co-op democracy is a sham.”); id. at 106 (statement of Rep. Patrick Rose,
Tex. H. of Reps.) (“We need open meetings and open records to apply to all co-ops across the State.
We need all of our co-ops to submit third-party, independent audits to the Public Utility Commission
annually . . . . We also need minimum standards of governance so that good people can run for the
board and have a fair shot at being elected.”).
101. JOHN FARRELL, MATT GRIMLEY & NICK STUMO-LANGER, INST. FOR LOC. SELFRELIANCE’S ENERGY DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE, RE-MEMBER-ING THE COOPERATIVE WAY 7–8
(2016).
102. See, e.g., infra notes 132–57, 161–76 and accompanying text (discussing concerns associated
with Pedernales Electric Cooperative and Basin Electric Cooperative).
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that many unique governance challenges arise in cooperatives but are managed
internally as a result of successfully implemented strategy, effective leadership
and management, or innovative decision-making structures.103 But in these cases
of internally managed change, decision-making is not tracked in a public record,
unlike with public utilities, whose decisions are recorded in a regulatory docket.
In highlighting the governance challenges of some cooperatives, we do not
seek to imply that the cooperative form itself is incompatible with the goals of
the clean energy transition. In fact, we believe the opposite: there are many
virtues to the cooperative form that position cooperatives in an important and
capable position to support the clean energy transition, particularly a transition
that prioritizes community wellbeing and energy democracy.104 And
importantly, the internal governance challenges facing some cooperatives must
be assessed relative to the governance challenges other utility business models
face in meeting societal and community goals for energy transition. These
include the obstacles governmental entities face in raising large amounts of
capital,105 the administrative costs of regulating investor-owned utilities in the
presence of high information asymmetries,106 the potential misalignment of
incentives of a for-profit utility’s investors and its customers,107 the possibilities
of market manipulation in competitive electricity markets,108 and the
imperfections and possibilities for corruption in providing governmental
oversight of utilities.109
103. See, e.g., KEITH TAYLOR & SARAH OUTCAULT, U.C. DAVIS ENERGY & EFFICIENCY INST.,
HOW SOUTH CAROLINA’S ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES BUILD CAPACITY THROUGH MULTI-LEVEL
GOVERNANCE (2019), https://energy.ucdavis.edu/wp-content/uploads/Report-How-SCs-ElectricCoops-Govern-at-Scale.pdf [https://perma.cc/CL9A-XPSA] (presenting a case study of multilevel
governance in the Central Electric Power Cooperative in South Carolina).
104. Concern for community and democratic member control are two of the Cooperative
Principles. See Understanding the Seven Cooperative Principles, supra note 25.
105. While the economics of municipal bonds that are regularly used by municipal utilities are
changing, the median municipal bond remains much smaller than the median corporate bond, limiting
the means that governmental utilities have to raise capital. AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, supra note 48, at
22.
106. See DAN AAS & MICHAEL O’BOYLE, YOU GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR: MOVING TOWARD
VALUE IN UTILITY COMPENSATION pt. 2, at 12 (2016) (explaining the information asymmetries
regulators face vis-à-vis utilities and the limited means regulators have to overcome information
asymmetries).
107. See, e.g., Andrew Satchwell, Andrew Mills & Galen Barbose, Regulatory and Ratemaking
Approaches To Mitigate Financial Impacts of Net-Metered PV on Utilities and Ratepayers, 85 ENERGY POL’Y
115, 115 (2015) (“[F]inancial interests of U.S. utilities are poorly aligned with customer-sited solar
photovoltaics under traditional regulation.”).
108. See GIULIA GALLO, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y, ELECTRICITY MARKET
MANIPULATION: HOW BEHAVIORAL MODELING CAN HELP MARKET DESIGN 9–11 (2015)
(detailing examples of greed and market manipulation in several wholesale markets).
109. See LEAH CARDAMORE STOKES, SHORT CIRCUITING POLICY: INTEREST GROUPS
AND THE BATTLE OVER CLEAN ENERGY AND CLIMATE POLICY IN THE AMERICAN STATES 164–
93 (2020) (detailing the case of regulatory capture by the investor-owned utility Arizona
Public Service); see also Dan Gearino, Illinois and Ohio Bribery Scandals Show the Perils of Mixing Utilities
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1. Governance of Distribution Cooperatives
Democratic member control sets rural electric cooperatives apart from
investor-owned utilities and can closely align the norms of cooperatives with
the goals of energy democracy, just as other non-electric cooperatives have been
linked with promoting democracy.110 However, governance challenges in
cooperatives can arise when cooperative members do not actively participate in
the governance of the cooperative, either by choice—a form of free-riding111—
or due to structural disenfranchisement.
The governance of a rural electric cooperative is generally structured
around a board of directors that is elected from the membership it serves.112 But
concern surrounding democratic member control in some cooperatives began at
the outset of rural electrification and continues today because of challenges
associated with members actively holding the cooperative’s board of directors
to account.113 For instance, a practice that creates board accountability problems
is the reliance on an annual meeting as the primary vehicle for outreach and
board elections.114 Historically, voter turnout at these meetings is generally
low—lower than for other local elections, such as for school boards.115 For
cooperatives without bylaws permitting mail-in votes, a member’s attendance
at the annual meeting is often the only way to be counted.116 Even for some
cooperatives that permit absentee voting, in some cases, absentee ballots may
not be used to establish the quorum necessary to have the vote in the first
and Politics, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (July 26, 2020), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/26072020/
ohio-illinois-bribery-scandals-utilities-climate-change-commonwealth-edison-firstenergyhouseholder/ [https://perma.cc/J55V-KZMD] (detailing bribery scandals in Illinois and Ohio involving
the investor-owned utilities FirstEnergy and Commonwealth Edison).
110. See Mark J. Kaswan, Developing Democracy: Cooperatives and Democratic Theory, 6 INT’L J. URB.
SUSTAINABLE DEV. 190, 193–94 (2014); see also Joyce Rothschild, Workers’ Cooperatives and Social
Enterprise: A Forgotten Route to Social Equity and Democracy, 52 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1023, 1031–32
(2009) (providing an example of workers’ cooperatives and improved democratic decision-making).
111. See Arend Lijphart, Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma: Presidential
Address, American Political Science Association, 1996, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 11 (1997)
(“[N]onvoting is a form of free riding—and . . . free riding of any kind may be rational but is also selfish
and immoral.”).
112. Jeter et al., supra note 23, at 396.
113. Id. at 386–87; FARRELL ET AL., supra note 101, at 15–16.
114. Jeter et al., supra note 23, at 388–89 (explaining that cooperative annual meetings provide the
primary opportunity for the manager and board to connect with and inform members, and for members
to connect with one another).
115. Id. at 391 (showing that during the 1930s and 1940s, attendance figures came in at about 20–
30% or lower); Grimley, supra note 79 (stating that, in 2016, 72% of rural electric cooperatives had less
than 10% voter turnout for board elections).
116. See ELEC. COOP. GOVERNANCE TASK FORCE, ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE
TASK FORCE REPORT 36–37 (2018), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6561940/ElectricCooperative-Governance-Task-Force-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9H7-5N6U] (discussing voting
practices); Jeter et al., supra note 23, at 432 (discussing low turnout for meetings and member lack of
information).
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place.117 As for the board nomination process, if a nominating committee is
established that consists of—or is appointed by—sitting board members, in
some cooperatives, that committee can reject new candidates.118 Along similar
lines, in some cooperatives, boards are free to appoint interim members if
vacancies occur in the middle of a term,119 which in conjunction with member
indifference, has the potential to kick off a cycle of undemocratic and
unaccountable governance.120
One way in which a lack of accountability can impact members of a
cooperative is through the misuse of member capital, known alternatively as
“capital credits” or “patronage capital.”121 Member capital represents the
revenues a cooperative collects in exceedance of its costs and margins; and, as a
not-for-profit entity, such excess revenue should be returned to member-owners
based on their economic participation or reinvested in a manner that benefits
member-owners.122 The problem of rural electric cooperatives withholding
capital credits is as old as cooperatives themselves—after early rural electric
cooperatives failed to return capital credits to their members in the 1940s,123 the
REA established a program to track and return capital credits to members.124
Despite the program’s popularity, there have been notable instances of boards
misappropriating member capital by giving themselves expensive perks or

117. Compare Restated Bylaws of Crow Wing Cooperative Power and Light Company art. II, § 5
(June 10, 2017), https://www.cwpower.com/files/CWP_Board/2018BoardBylaws.pdf [https://perma.
cc/BHE4-94RZ] (permitting the use of mail-in ballots to establish a quorum only for a
question submitted to vote by mail or electronically), with Pedernales Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Bylaws art. II, § 5 (May 21, 2018), https://2bqwe7212tygr0q3a7b9e1bv-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/PEC-Bylaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/N39Y-L44W] (showing no limits on the
use of mail-in or electronic ballots to establish a quorum in new bylaws enacted after the governance
scandal). For a discussion of the Pedernales scandal, see infra notes 132–57 and accompanying text.
118. See Jeter et al., supra note 23, at 429–30.
119. See ELEC. COOP. GOVERNANCE TASK FORCE, supra note 116, at 44 (explaining that the
practice can be good for saving the cooperative time and expense but should be done in a fair manner).
120. See Cooper, supra note 23, at 341–42.
121. Jeter et al., supra note 23, at 396 (describing patronage equity and how it can be used); id. at
415 (explaining that a failure to distribute capital credits can be an indicator of other trouble); see also
Cooper, supra note 23, at 338.
122. AMERICA’S ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES, supra note 8, at 4 (showing co-ops returned more
than $1.3 billion in capital credits to members in 2019).
123. Jeter et al., supra note 23, at 391–94 (describing how a failure to refund capital credits in the
early days of cooperatives led to takeover attempts of cooperatives in the 1940s); Beecher, supra note
38, at 236–39 (describing the disproportionately faster growth in rural electric cooperative equity
compared to retired capital credits, the overcapitalization of rural electric cooperatives, and the “lax
oversight and minimal reporting requirements” for capital credit retirement).
124. Jeter et al., supra note 23, at 393–94 (describing the program and its wide adoption by the
industry); see also ELEC. COOP. GOVERNANCE TASK FORCE, supra note 116, at 57 (discussing the high
regard for the program today).
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padding their own salaries.125 But flexibility to return capital credits also can
allow cooperatives to support their members in times of distress. During the
COVID-19 pandemic, several cooperatives returned significantly higher levels
of capital credits to provide economic assistance to their members.126
Complicating matters of managing excess revenues, cooperatives are
allowed and encouraged to be engines for local economic development,
including through investing member capital and directing federally financed
loans and grants into local development projects.127 Nearly all cooperatives
invest in such enterprises, which can include community development projects,
such as fire station retrofits and programs with local businesses.128 Federal law
allows cooperatives to maintain their tax-exempt status while investing in forprofit projects, businesses, or subsidiaries, as long as at least 85% of the
cooperative’s income is derived from core business activities serving
members.129 Some of these investments have been challenged for their failure
to fulfill the legislative intent of stimulating development in rural areas.130
Notably, however, many rural electric cooperatives have recently invested in
broadband deployment in their communities, drawing analogies to their history
of providing initial access to electricity in rural communities when for-profit

125. See infra notes 132–57 and accompanying text (discussing Pedernales); see also TAYLOR &
OUTCAULT, supra note 103, at 25 (discussing a case involving Tri-County Electric Co-op in South
Carolina).
126. Erin Kelly, Co-op Voices: The Expanding Financial Toll of the COVID-19 Pandemic, NAT’L
RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N (May 18, 2020), https://www.electric.coop/covid-19-co-op-voicesexpanding-financial-toll-of-pandemic [https://perma.cc/2BAZ-PE5F].
127. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., USDA RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUMMARY OF MAJOR
PROGRAMS, https://www.rd.usda.gov/files/RD_ProgramMatrix.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XHK-X27W]
(describing the numerous programs available through the U.S. Department of Agriculture for
cooperatives to implement local loans or grants).
128. See generally, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RURAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
LOAN & GRANT (REDLG) PROGRAM RECIPIENTS IN IOWA, https://www.rd.usda.gov/sites/
default/files/IA%20REDLG%20News%20Release%20CHART%20-%2010272020.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8C3M-BD7B] (detailing investments made under the USDA’s Rural Economic Development Loan
and Grant program in Iowa).
129. Beecher, supra note 38, at 233–34 (providing the additional nuance that “the scope of
member income and permissible ‘losses and expenses’ has yet to be settled by the [Rural Utilities]
Service and the courts” and noting that there are several categories of income that are excluded from the
85% requirement); see also Lydia O’Neal, Rural Electric Co-ops See Need for Tax Fix as “Existential
Issue,” BLOOMBERG TAX (Aug. 29, 2019), https://news.bloombergtax.com/environment-and-energy/
rural-electric-co-ops-see-need-for-tax-fix-as-essential-issue?context=search&index=0 [https://perma.
cc/P8AY-KNH6] (describing one cooperative slowing a broadband development project to avoid
exceeding the 15% limit on non-electricity revenue).
130. The Rural Local Broadcast Signal Act: Hearing on H.R. 3615 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm.
Trade, & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Com., 106th Cong. 1, 66 (2000) (describing that, in 1997,
only one-half of one percent of non-electric investments made by rural electric cooperatives “have been
made in rural development projects” and instead “RUS borrowers have used discretionary funds to
invest in businesses located in urban areas and a variety of securities”).
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companies that primarily served urban areas did not bring similar service to
rural areas.131
One of the most notorious cases of rural electric cooperative governance
scandal and reform involved Pedernales Electric Cooperative in Texas, the
largest distribution cooperative in the United States.132 Then-Congressman
Lyndon B. Johnson helped start Pedernales in Johnson City, Texas, in 1938,133
and the cooperative now covers expansive rural areas in central Texas as well as
suburban areas outside Austin and San Antonio.134 A “member revolt” began in
early 2006, when a few cooperative members explored available options to
either install solar panels on their homes or, alternatively, partake in a green
power program similar to that offered by the municipal utility in nearby Austin,
Texas.135 At that time, a member-owner of the cooperative called Pedernales
and learned that the green power programs then offered were cumbersome,
expensive, and designed to dissuade members from opting in.136 After raising
these and other issues at a scheduled cooperative member meeting, a small
group of member-owners started to work together to bring about changes to the
cooperative.137
Initially, these members spoke with the nominating committee to
challenge the uncontested board elections and expand the nomination process,
but the committee again ran the elections with the sitting board members up
for reelection unopposed.138 This group of member-owners then attempted to
131. See Marguerite Reardon, Electric Cooperatives Could Be the Key to Solving the Rural Digital
Divide, CNET (Feb. 9, 2020), https://www.cnet.com/news/electric-cooperatives-could-be-the-key-tosolving-the-rural-digital-divide/ [https://perma.cc/ARW5-HT3E].
132. See Pedernales Hearings, supra note 100, at 2 (statement of Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H.
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform); see also Brief for Pedernales Electric Cooperative, Inc. as
Amicus Curiae for Rejection and in Support of Petitioner at 6, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 2016).
133. CARO, supra note 6, at 522–28 (discussing creation of Pedernales); Larry King, Lyndon
Slept Here, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1968, at B6 (“[He] got the cooperative project by brashly marching
into F.D.R.’s office one day, armed with charts and a pointer . . . . “); About Us: The Cooperative
Story, PEC, https://www.pec.coop/about-us/cooperative-difference/cooperative-story/ [https://perma.
cc/U6BJ-8YY4].
134. Your Service: Business Development, PEC, https://www.pec.coop/your-service/ [https://perma.
cc/2L92-CTSH].
135. Ric Sternberg, GreenDreams: Pedernales Electric Coop Revolution, YOUTUBE (Feb. 10, 2011),
https://youtu.be/KIJHRMCxbrM [https://perma.cc/J8X2-MARW]. For instance, Austin Energy’s
green power program, called GreenChoice, allows members to voluntarily opt in to pay an additional
surcharge on some or all of their electricity consumption to pay for the utility’s procurement of
renewable power on behalf of the customer. See FAQs, AUSTIN ENERGY, https://austinenergy.com/ae/
green-power/greenchoice/faqs [https://perma.cc/5QJX-9J4K].
136. Sternberg, supra note 135.
137. Id.
138. Pedernales Hearings, supra note 100, at 84 (statement of John Watson, Member, Pedernales
Electric Cooperative) (“Seven members attended and presented three candidates. All were highly
qualified, but the committee re-nominated the directors whose terms were expiring so they were
unopposed on the proxy ballots mailed to members.”).
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present a bylaw amendment to change the nominating process but were again
denied.139 Texas State Senator Troy Fraser, himself a cooperative memberowner, attempted to attend a board meeting in the capacity of a cooperative
member-owner, but was barred from entering.140 These efforts to exclude
cooperative members from the democratic process ultimately led to
Congressional hearings,141 civil litigation,142 and criminal convictions.143
The resulting scandal was called “the Enron of the Hill Country.”144 The
investigations exposed a governance breakdown resulting in self-perpetuation
of directors145 and excessive salaries,146 alongside rampant spending.147 In 2007,
a small group of members initiated a class action on behalf of Pedernales
members and sued the board of directors and the cooperative.148 The General
Manager and Board President resigned during the lawsuit.149 Pedernales
implemented a plan to restructure its bylaws and address member concerns over
fair elections.150 The parties reached a settlement agreement in 2008, under
which Pedernales agreed to retire and return $23 million in patronage capital
to its members over a period of five years.151 The settlement also awarded $4
million to the class representatives.152 The fallout continued with criminal
charges filed. In 2010, a jury found the former General Manager guilty of theft,

139. Id.
140. Pedernales Hearings, supra note 100, at 70 (statement of State Sen. Troy Fraser, Chair, Tex. S.
Bus. & Com. Comm.).
141. See id. at 95 (statement of Juan Garza, General Manager, Pedernales Electric Cooperative).
142. Id. at 69–70 (statement of State Sen. Troy Fraser, Chair, Tex. S. Bus. & Com. Comm.); see
also Hall v. Pedernales Elec. Coop., Inc., 278 S.W.3d 536 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).
143. See infra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
144. Zeke MacCormack & Vianna Davila, Ex-PEC Leader Is Convicted, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSNEWS (Dec. 10, 2010, 11:35 PM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article/Ex-PECleader-is-convicted-873703.php [https://perma.cc/ZDN3-AEYP].
145. Pedernales Hearings, supra note 100, at 84 (statement of John Watson, Member, Pedernales
Electric Cooperative). The board engaged in a closed nominating process, resulting in “a selfperpetuating board with an average tenure of 22 years.” Id.
146. Id. at 70 (statement of State Sen. Troy Fraser, Chair, Tex. S. Bus. & Com. Comm.). General
Manager Bennie Fuelberg received $390,000 annually, a five-year $2 million bonus contract, and a
$375,000 signing bonus for agreeing to the $2 million bonus. Id. Board President W.W. “Bud” Burnett
earned $190,000 per year and retirement benefits, but “had no real duties or also a severe lack of
knowledge of what was going on in the co-op.” Id.; see also Hall, 278 S.W.3d at 540 (discussing PEC’s
mishandling of funds).
147. Pedernales Hearings, supra note 100, at 2 (statement of Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H.
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform) (“In just 5 years Mr. Fuelberg and the board spent $700,000
to stay in five-star hotels like the Ritz Carlton and Four Seasons, dine at expensive restaurants, and
buy themselves fancy chocolates and Celine Dion concert tickets.”).
148. Hall, 278 S.W.3d at 539.
149. Id. at 540.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 540–41.
152. Id. at 541.
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money laundering, and misapplication of fiduciary property.153 The
cooperative’s attorney was also convicted on those three charges, receiving jail
time and probation for his involvement.154
The scandal resulted in positive changes for the cooperative. All board
meetings are now open to members, recorded, and posted on the website.155
Pedernales created an expense and audit committee as well as a board
compensation committee.156 Pedernales also embraced renewable energy by
adopting plans to build thirty megawatts (“MW”) of solar installations near its
biggest members and a program to provide low-interest loans to help members
build on-site renewable generation.157 In summary, the Pedernales case can be
interpreted as a cooperative successfully leveraging its tools of self-governance
to restructure its internal practices to better align its performance with the
interests of the members it serves. While external parties to the cooperative
drew attention to the problems within Pedernales, it was the cooperative
members themselves who set the course of action for the reforms that ultimately
redirected Pedernales to better serve their members.
2. Governance of G&T Cooperatives
Applying the Cooperative Principles to rural electric cooperatives today is
made complex by the multilevel, federated structure of G&T and distribution
cooperatives. In this multilevel structure, cooperative governance is
encountering intersections of multiple principles, particularly open and
voluntary membership, democratic member control, autonomy, and
cooperation among cooperatives.158 In situations where these principles have
come into conflict, many distribution utilities have reexamined the governance
of their G&T. In some cases, they have pushed for improved governance
practices to the benefit of all G&T members, while in others, they have brought
attention to difficult tensions between the competing interests of individual
distribution utilities and the G&T collective.159 Managing these tensions can be
interpreted not necessarily as a failure of governance, but rather as an expected
“transaction cost” of any multitiered governance system that seeks mutually

153. MacCormack & Davila, supra note 144.
154. Zeke MacCormack, PEC Attorney’s Probation Includes 500 Days in Jail, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS (June 1, 2011, 12:27 AM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local/article/PECattorney-s-probation-includes-500-days-in-jail-1403091.php [https://perma.cc/59SZ-WWJX].
155. Pedernales Hearings, supra note 100, at 95–96 (statement of Juan Garza, General Manager,
Pedernales Electric Cooperative).
156. Id.
157. Kaiba White, Pedernales Electric Co-op Expands Affordable Solar Energy Programs, PUB. CITIZEN
(Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.texasvox.org/pedernales-electric-co-op-expands-affordable-solar-energyprograms/ [https://perma.cc/66NM-QVCC].
158. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
159. See infra Part III.
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beneficial, non-zero-sum outcomes from collective action among diverse
parties.160
From a legal perspective, many of the governance challenges in G&T
cooperatives are tensions between the G&T and one or more of its members.
But from a governance perspective, these tensions are often more accurately
understood as tensions between distribution utility members of the same G&T
cooperative. Because a G&T is governed by a board of directors comprised of
directors of its distribution utility members, a conflict of a G&T with a member
is a conflict between a member and the other member utilities.
One recent example that illustrates this type of contention involves Basin
Electric Power Cooperative, a multistate “super G&T,” and McKenzie Electric
Cooperative, a distribution cooperative.161 McKenzie serves electricity
consumers in Montana and North Dakota and is a member of Upper Missouri
Power Cooperative, which is a “paper G&T,” meaning that it does not own any
generation assets or significant transmission infrastructure.162 Upper Missouri,
in turn, is a member cooperative of Basin, along with ten other G&T
cooperatives across nine states from the U.S. border with Canada to the U.S.
border with Mexico.163 According to McKenzie, it has long expressed concerns
about Basin’s funding of for-profit subsidiaries, such as a gasification and
fertilizer facility.164 However, McKenzie has no direct representation on Basin’s
board that would allow it to meaningfully participate in Basin’s investment
160. See, e.g., Jered B. Carr & Christopher V. Hawkins, The Costs of Cooperation: What the Research
Tells Us About Managing the Risks of Service Collaborations in the U.S., 45 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 224,
225–30 (2013).
161. A “super G&T” is a G&T cooperative that services other G&T cooperatives. See
STAN STELTER, GENERATION FOR GENERATIONS: A VISION FOR GIANT POWER 14
(Kathleen Ellisen Risch ed., 2011), https://www.basinelectric.com/_files/pdf/Basin-Electric-50thHistory-Book.pdf [https://perma.cc/PA2E-CU53]. Basin provides power to eleven G&T cooperatives
across nine states in the Missouri River Basin. See Members, BASIN ELEC. POWER COOP.,
https://www.basinelectric.com/about-us/members [https://perma.cc/B8GT-DYMB]; STELTER, supra,
at 14, 18 (referring to Basin as a “super G&T” in its implementation of a “vision for Giant Power” that
would create a “glorified G&T approach” and put cooperatives “in a position as a group to deal from
strength rather than, as a large number of separate entities, from weakness”); see also Motion to
Intervene and Protest of McKenzie Electric Cooperative, Inc. at 5–7, Basin Elec. Power Coop., Nos.
ER19-2909-000 and ER20-2-000 (FERC Oct. 21, 2019) [hereinafter Motion to Intervene] (discussing
the relationship between Basin, Upper Missouri, and McKenzie).
162. Motion to Intervene, supra note 161, at 5–6.
163. See id. at 6–7 (discussing the relationship between Basin, Upper Missouri, and McKenzie);
supra note 161 (discussing Basin).
164. See id. at 9, 22 (describing the arrangement and detailing McKenzie’s concerns since 1988
about the Great Plains Synfuels Plant, currently owned and operated by Basin’s for-profit subsidiary,
Dakota Gasification Co.). The Great Plains Synfuels Plant is the only operating coal gasification
plant in the country. 7.5.1 Great Plains Synfuels Plant, NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB’Y,
https://www.netl.doe.gov/research/Coal/energy-systems/gasification/gasifipedia/great-plains [https://
perma.cc/7EC3-RBQ6]. It was constructed in the 1980s with the support of the federal government
but declines in natural gas prices jeopardized the early profitability of the plant, precipitating
investments to modify the design of the plant for additional efficiencies and output streams. See id.
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decisions. Instead, McKenzie has a representative on Upper Missouri’s Board,
and in turn, Upper Missouri has a representative on Basin’s board—a
representative who was chosen in an election in which McKenzie was one of
eleven voting distribution cooperatives.165 According to McKenzie, because
McKenzie’s board member on the Upper Missouri board was not chosen to
represent Upper Missouri on Basin’s board, Basin’s three-tiered governance
structure rendered McKenzie virtually unrepresented on Basin’s board.166
Instead, the board member from Upper Missouri on Basin’s board has been
required to serve competing interests of three different tiers of cooperatives.167
McKenzie had seen rapid load growth in the past decade168 due to
significant economic development spurred by the fracking industry.169 This
growth necessitated significant generation and transmission infrastructure
investments by Basin Electric.170 But from McKenzie’s perspective, rapid load
growth also created a potential for McKenzie to economically self-supply its
energy needs. Under its existing power supply contract, McKenzie was subject
to a 22% rate increase, which it claimed was in part due to Basin’s $600 million

165. See Amended and Restated Bylaws of Basin Electric Power Cooperative art. I, § 2(a),
art. III, § 1 (Nov. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Basin Bylaws], https://www.basinelectric.com/_files/pdf/
Bylaws-and-Resolutions/20201104–ORG–BEPCBylaws-Amended-at-2020-Annual-Meeting_v1_0.
pdf [https://perma.cc/4V7Q-Z6QE] (describing the composition of Basin’s board as generally one
representative from each of its Class A members with Class A members entitled to one vote per
member and Class B members entitled to one vote per district); Bylaws of Upper Missouri G&T
Electric Cooperative, Inc. art. IV (1980) (describing elections of its Board of Trustees, with one Trustee
coming from each distribution member).
166. Motion to Intervene, supra note 161, at 8 (describing McKenzie’s lack of representation
despite purchasing 40% of Upper Missouri’s power and Upper Missouri purchasing 30% of Basin’s
power).
167. See Basin Bylaws, supra note 165, at art. IV, § 7 (showing that issues related to the “dual
director” position are not explicitly addressed within the bylaws).
168. From 2009–2018, McKenzie’s revenue grew by a factor of twelve and its energy consumption
grew by a factor of ten. Compare Annual Electric Power Industry Report, Form EIA-861 Detailed Data Files,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/ [https://perma.cc/3QT46E34] (Oct. 6, 2020) (choose “2009 Reformatted ZIP” on right sidebar), with id. (choose “2018 ZIP”
on right sidebar).
169. For county-level oil production, see Public Finance in the Booming Bakken, DUKE ENERGY
INITIATIVE, https://energy.duke.edu/content/public-finance-booming-bakken [https://perma.cc/
954Q-B5KZ]. For the location of North Dakota oil and gas wells, see N.D. GEOLOGICAL SURV.,
OVERVIEW OF THE PETROLEUM GEOLOGY OF THE NORTH DAKOTA WILLISTON BASIN 4,
https://www.dmr.nd.gov/ndgs/Resources/ [https://perma.cc/QQ3P-THHR]. For North Dakota
electric cooperative service areas, see N.D. ASS’N OF RURAL ELEC. COOPS., MEMBER DIRECTORY
12 (2019), https://www.ndarec.com/sites/ndarec/files/2019%20NDAREC%20Directory(online).pdf
[https://perma.cc/4ECV-9SR6].
170. Basin reported investing $1 billion in generation and transmission facilities over seven years
to meet the fast growth in McKenzie Electric’s service area. Jill Schramm, McKenzie Electric
Files Protest Under New FERC Jurisdiction, MINOT DAILY NEWS (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.
minotdailynews.com/news/local-news/2019/10/mckenzie-electric-files-protest-under-new-fercjurisdiction/ [https://perma.cc/53GF-7PEA].
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loss from investing in a gasification company.171 McKenzie and other member
distribution cooperatives inquired about exiting their power supply relationship
with Basin, but Basin refused to provide the requested exit information or buyout terms, arguing that doing so would violate the terms and conditions of the
power supply contract signed by McKenzie in 2015.172 This prompted McKenzie
to intervene in Basin’s first-ever rate filing with FERC in 2019173 and to request
that FERC reject Basin’s rate schedule as unjust and unreasonable.174 In 2020
and 2021, FERC issued orders setting the dispute for a hearing and settlement
procedures regarding whether the contract terms, including exit provisions,
were just and reasonable under the FPA.175
Ultimately, while McKenzie has raised concerns about the perceived lack
of open and voluntary membership, democratic member control in its
relationship with Basin, and McKenzie’s resulting lack of autonomy, the merits
of these concerns depend in part on the historical context that established
Basin’s contemporary rates and contracts with McKenzie. Notably, the rapid
changes in McKenzie’s own economic conditions parallel the destabilizing effect
that clean energy is causing throughout the energy system. As the clean energy
transition accelerates, the energy system is likely to see rapid capital turnover
and policy developments that significantly change the value of historic contracts
that bind together G&Ts and their members. Consequently, it is likely that the
fundamental drivers of the McKenzie case will proliferate—namely, a
perception by distribution utilities that they can procure wholesale power more
affordably on their own than with their G&T and its associated sunk costs. In
171. Motion to Intervene, supra note 161, at 17–19; Amy R. Sisk, Power Cooperatives Embroiled in
Dispute Stemming from Money Woes at Synfuels Plant, BISMARCK TRIB. (Feb. 9, 2020),
https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/power-cooperatives-embroiled-in-disputestemming-from-money-woes-at-synfuels-plant/article_0f73ff07-9b005c97-9f84-3e16227c3c9f.html
[https://perma.cc/8GFC-N6FJ]. In August 2021, Basin Electric announced that it had reached an
agreement to sell the Great Plains Synfuels Plant by 2023. Basin Electric, Bakken Energy Reach Next Step
in Potential Sale of Synfuels Plant, DAKOTA GASIFICATION CO. (Aug. 16, 2021), https://dakotagas.com/
News-Center/news-releases/Basin-Electric,-Bakken-Energy-reach-next-step-in-potential-sale-ofSynfuels-Plant [https://perma.cc/US52-3V4M].
172. See Letter from Clayton Monsen, President, McKenzie Elec. Coop. Bd. of Dirs., to Upper
Missouri Power Coop. Bd. of Dirs. (Jan. 30, 2019) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
Letter from Travis Thompson, President, Upper Missouri Power Coop., to Basin Elec. Power Coop.
(Feb. 6, 2019) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Letter from Paul M. Sukut, CEO &
Gen. Manager, Basin Elec. Power Coop., to Class A Members, Basin Elec. Power Coop. (Feb. 15,
2019) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
173. See supra Section I.B (noting that FERC generally does not regulate cooperative rates under
the FPA). In 2019, Basin sought FERC regulation for similar reasons as the Tri-State G&T
cooperative, discussed in more detail infra Section III.A.2. See BASIN ELEC. POWER COOP., 2020
ANNUAL REPORT 55 (2020), https://www.basinelectric.com/_files/pdf/financials/Annual-Report2020-WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8TA-MMQX].
174. Motion to Intervene, supra note 161, at 4, 8, 13–15 (describing the history of the dispute).
175. See Basin Elec. Power Coop., 174 FERC ¶ 61,094 (Feb. 18, 2021); Basin Elec. Power Coop.,
172 FERC ¶ 61,221 (Sept. 14, 2020).
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this context, distribution utilities are likely to continue challenging their power
supply contracts and disputing the legitimacy of their agency in their G&T’s
collective agreements. For cooperative managers with an interest in
maintaining the G&T structure, this will likely require developing governance
procedures that cultivate buy-in and new approaches to creating value for their
members in a rapidly evolving grid not solely reliant on capturing economies of
scale in power generation.
The examples of Pedernales and McKenzie-Basin show that as the energy
system has become embedded in everyday life and has grown in scale and
complexity, both distribution cooperatives and G&T cooperatives are facing
new challenges in adapting the Cooperative Principles to modern governance
practice. The example of Pedernales illustrates how a cooperative can run astray
of the desires of its members—but that the members can ultimately be effective
in regaining control.176 And the McKenzie-Basin example illustrates how the
multitiered governance structure of distribution cooperatives and their G&T
cooperatives that has been effective in realizing economies of scale can create
difficulties for a minority of cooperatives in maintaining collective action as
conditions change.
While the governance issues described in this section are not unique and
partially extrapolate to other cooperatives, the remainder of this Article focuses
on leveraging the ability of cooperatives to act as self-regulating and selfgoverning entities to drive the clean energy transition and realize the goals of
“energy democracy.”177 And although there are known limitations of selfgovernance, it is nevertheless unlikely that the already-limited state and federal
regulation of cooperatives will increase in stringency in the near term. Thus,
the structural form of cooperatives and their ability to self-govern has the
greatest potential to deliver collective benefits associated with a clean energy
transition.
II. THE CLEAN ENERGY TRANSITION
Part II details the dramatic decline in the cost of clean energy technologies
as well as the increasing deployment of renewable energy and “distributed
energy resources.”178 It describes how the new economic potential of clean
energy across the country is the result of dramatic price reductions, increasing
consumer interest, technological innovation, state clean energy policies, federal

176. Pedernales Hearings, supra note 100, at 60 (statement of Rep. Tom Davis, Member, H. Comm.
on Oversight & Gov’t Reform) (“Pedernales customers regained control of their company and co-op
democracy remains the most potent safeguard against mismanagement and waste.”).
177. See generally Welton, Energy Democracy, supra note 4 (discussing energy democracy and
proposals for reform).
178. For a definition of “distributed energy resources,” see supra note 28.
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tax incentives, globalization of clean energy production,179 and the creation of
regional wholesale electricity markets. These developments have created the
potential for a rapid increase in the deployment of clean energy, and together
with the rapid expansion of natural gas production, have led to an even more
rapid decline in the use of coal-fired power.180 However, the regulatory and
economic frameworks that underlie this transition do not create the same
incentives and requirements for rural electric cooperatives as they do for
investor-owned utilities.
Renewable energy technologies, particularly wind and solar, have seen
dramatic cost reductions in recent years. From 2009 to 2020, the levelized cost
of wind energy declined by 71% and the levelized cost of solar energy declined
by 90% due to supply- and demand-side innovation and policy.181 Utility-scale
wind and solar are now cost competitive with all other forms of new electricity
generation on an unsubsidized, levelized-cost basis.182 Even compared to the
marginal operating cost of continuing to generate power from conventional coal
and nuclear plants, wind and solar are also now cost competitive.183 Reflecting
these economics, wind and solar energy provided 45% and 31%, respectively, of
new electric generating capacity in 2020.184 In addition, distributed energy
resources—particularly energy efficiency,185 demand response,186 energy
179. See, e.g., GREGORY F. NEMET, HOW SOLAR ENERGY BECAME CHEAP 65–158 (2019)
(detailing the history of how solar energy has declined in cost through fundamental research in the
United States, Japanese niche markets, expanded market-share through the German feed-in-tariff
policy, and improved manufacturing processes in China).
180. U.S. Renewable Energy Consumption Surpasses Coal for the First Time in over 130 Years, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 28, 2020), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=43895
[https://perma.cc/GH3Y-U3UA] (presenting data showing U.S. coal generation and renewable
generation from 1776–2019 with renewable energy consumption passing that of coal in 2019).
181. LAZARD, LAZARD’S LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS—VERSION 14.0, at 9
(Oct. 2020), https://www.lazard.com/media/451419/lazards-levelized-cost-of-energy-version-140.pdf
[https://perma.cc/95XK-RVN4].
182. See id. at 2.
183. See id. at 4.
184. Preliminary Monthly Electric Generator Inventory (Based on Form EIA-860M as a Supplement to
Form EIA-860), U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/
[https://perma.cc/GE8D-47F8] (choose “March 2021” on right sidebar).
185. See IAN HOFFMAN, CHARLES A. GOLDMAN, SEAN MURPHY, NATALIE MIMS, GREG
LEVENTIS & LISA SCHWARTZ, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB’Y, THE COST OF SAVING
ELECTRICITY THROUGH ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS FUNDED BY UTILITY CUSTOMERS:
2009–2015, at 42–43, 50 (2018), https://eta-publications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/cose_final_report_
20200429.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW3J-RGSE] (documenting that while the cost of administering
energy efficiency programs has increased over time, the total cost of saved electricity through efficiency
measures remains well below prevailing retail electricity rates).
186. See FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, 2019 ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE AND
ADVANCED METERING 19–21 (2019), https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/DR-AMReport2019_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/P88C-9QA7] (describing the actions taken by grid operators and
utilities in 2019 to deploy demand response to ensure reliability as the system transitions to one of
increased asynchronous renewables).
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storage,187 and electric vehicles188—have also seen increasingly favorable
economics. These resources are either cost competitive with conventional
resources now or are forecasted to be economic in more applications in the near
future, particularly if deployed in tandem to provide greater firm capacity, such
as combining solar with storage.189
The challenges of integrating renewable energy and distributed energy
resources into the electricity system are well documented.190 These challenges
are compounded by the difficulties associated with addressing climate change,
which will require unprecedented rapid deployment of clean energy in parallel
with increased demand for electricity in sectors that have been historically
powered by fossil fuels—particularly transportation and building heating and
cooling.191 To accomplish this level and pace of clean energy deployment,
187. See generally WESLEY COLE & A. WILL FRAZIER, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y,
COST PROJECTIONS FOR UTILITY-SCALE BATTERY STORAGE (2019), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/
fy19osti/73222.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9EA-2DGY] (showing a synthesis of twenty-five publications
forecasting four-hour lithium-ion energy storage systems with mid-point estimates forecasting that
costs will decline by 45% from 2020–2030 and by 59% by 2050).
188. See Björn Nykvist & Måns Nilsson, Rapidly Falling Costs of Battery Packs for Electric Vehicles, 5
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 329, 329 (2015) (documenting an industry-wide 14% annual decline in
the cost of electric vehicle battery packs from 2007–2014).
189. See, e.g., RYAN WISER, MARK BOLINGER, WILL GORMAN, JOE RAND, SEONGEUN JEONG,
JOACHIM SEEL, CODY WARNER & BAN PAULOS, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB’Y, HYBRID
POWER PLANTS: STATUS OF INSTALLED AND PROPOSED PROJECTS 15 (2020), https://etapublications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/hybrid_plant_development_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT3PEMGH] (noting that many utilities and developers are combining storage with solar projects, with
over 102 GW—over one-quarter of all solar projects—in proposed solar-plus-storage projects
in interconnection queues as of the end of 2019); Brenna Goth & Tripp Baltz, Solar Projects, Batteries,
To Replace New Mexico Coal Plant Power, BLOOMBERG L. (July 29, 2020, 5:26
PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/environment-and-energy/X2V7Q05C0000
00?bna_news_filter=environment-and-energy#jcite [https://perma.cc/4FFF-JB2N (dark archive)]
(discussing New Mexico Public Regulation Commission approval of investor-owned utility PNM’s
proposal to replace a retiring coal plant with 650 MW of solar projects and 300 MW of battery storage
to comply with New Mexico’s clean energy mandate in the 2019 Energy Transition Act).
190. For a discussion of the challenges and solutions associated with integrating intermittent wind
and solar resources into the electric grid, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 369, 562–64 (Ottmar
Edenhofer, Ramón Pichs Madruga, Youba Sokona, Kristin Seyboth, Patrick Matschoss, Susanne
Kadner, Timm Zwickel, Patrick Eickemeier, Gerrit Hansen, Steffen Schlömer & Christopher von
Stechow eds., 2012), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/SRREN_Full_Report-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E49K-X4PR]; L. BIRD, M. MILLIGAN & D. LEW, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY
LAB’Y, INTEGRATING VARIABLE RENEWABLE ENERGY: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 4–9
(2013), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/60451.pdf [https://perma.cc/YLB4-V8E6]; JACQUELIN
COCHRAN, PAUL DENHOLM, BETHANY SPEER & MACKAY MILLER, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY
LAB’Y, GRID INTEGRATION AND THE CARRYING CAPACITY OF THE U.S. GRID TO INCORPORATE
VARIABLE RENEWABLE ENERGY 7–8 (2015), https://www.nrel.gov/fy15osti/62607.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JJ9X-D9UH].
191. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2019 WITH
PROJECTIONS TO 2050 (2019), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/ieo2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V5GN-SYTM] (discussing expected growth of wind and solar energy); see also Simon Evans, ‘Profound
Shifts’ Underway in Energy System, Says IEA World Energy Outlook, CARBON BRIEF (Nov. 13, 2019,

100 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2021)

2021]

COOPERATIVE CLEAN ENERGY

37

expenditures on electric-grid infrastructure are projected to grow significantly
to relieve grid congestion, reduce location-specific impacts of intermittent
generation, and transport energy from rural areas with more available clean
energy resources to urban load centers.192
FERC-regulated regional transmission organizations (“RTOs”) and
independent system operators (“ISOs”) have allowed retail power providers
across much of the country to obtain low-cost—and increasingly, renewable—
electricity from multistate regional transmission grids without the need to build
new large-scale “baseload” power plants that dominated the rapid expansion of
energy generation from the 1950s to the 1980s.193 The legal and institutional
context for building out the high-voltage electric grid is rooted in multijurisdictional decision-making, with states largely responsible for siting issues
and RTOs/ISOs largely responsible for planning processes and operations of

8:20 AM), https://www.carbonbrief.org/profound-shifts-underway-in-energy-system-says-iea-worldenergy-outlook [https://perma.cc/V8GC-RYHL] (comparing historical outlooks from the World
Energy Outlook to historical data and noting that the World Energy Outlook generally underestimates
growth in renewable energy).
192. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., OUTLOOK 2021, supra note 12 (discussing projected
increases in energy expenditures through 2050 in all sectors); JOHANNES PFEIFENBERGER & JUDY
W. CHANG, THE BRATTLE GRP., WELL-PLANNED ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION SAVES CUSTOMER
COSTS: IMPROVED TRANSMISSION PLANNING IS KEY TO THE TRANSITION TO A CARBONCONSTRAINED FUTURE (2016), https://www.eesi.org/files/WIRES-Report-Well-Planned-ElectricTransmission-Saves-Customer-Costs.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YVX-R5V2] (discussing significant,
regional electric transmission needs required to support a low-carbon electricity future); see also James
W. Coleman, Pipelines & Power-lines: Building the Energy Transport Future, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 263, 268–
72 (2019) (explaining why renewable energy is particularly dependent on transmission grid
infrastructure).
193. Over this period, coal provided the majority of “baseload” or “firm” capacity as electricity
demand often grew by more than 5% per year. See Demand Trends, Prices, and Policies Drive Recent
Electric Generation Capacity Additions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.
eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=25432 [https://perma.cc/GD2B-WGML] [hereinafter Demand
Trends]; U.S. Economy and Electricity Demand Growth Are Linked, but Relationship Is Changing, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 22, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=10491
[https://perma.cc/NG67-BXF4] [hereinafter Electricity Demand]. To a slightly lesser extent, growing
electricity demand over this period was provided from other firm sources, namely nuclear and natural
gas (natural gas also provides “peaking” capacity that enables load balancing over short time intervals).
See Demand Trends, supra. Beginning in the early 2000s, electricity demand continued to grow, but at a
slower pace, and natural gas capacity dominated new additions. See Demand Trends, supra; Electricity
Demand, supra. Only since the mid to late 2000s have wind and solar provided a meaningful level of
new capacity. See Demand Trends, supra. In 2019, wind and solar comprised 64% of all new capacity
additions in the United States. See New Electric Generating Capacity in 2019 Will Come from Renewables
and Natural Gas, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.php?id=37952 [https://perma.cc/D8CN-U474]. For a discussion of “baseload,” see Joseph
Daniel, Even Cycling Coal Is Losing Money. Only “Summer” Coal Makes Sense in Texas, Louisiana,
ENERGYPOST.EU (Feb. 20, 2020), https://energypost.eu/even-cycling-coal-is-losing-money-onlysummer-coal-makes-sense-in-texas-louisiana/ [https://perma.cc/SP6Z-BDHM].
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multistate power markets.194 RTOs/ISOs play an important role in facilitating
renewable energy by allowing renewable energy developers to site projects in
locations with higher quality renewable resources and affordable land and sell
to customers far away across the transmission grid.195 In fact, the majority of
new renewable electricity added to the grid for reasons other than compliance
with state requirements has occurred in regions with robust RTO/ISO markets,
particularly the three markets in the wind-rich areas of the Midwest and
Texas.196
The economics of wind, solar, and distributed energy resources and the
reduction of interconnection barriers for renewables by RTOs/ISOs is leading
to greater clean energy deployment by utilities and energy consumers for
reasons other than state policy compliance.197 However, the institutional
structure of utilities and their consumers can make such support for clean
energy more or less feasible.198 As of early 2021, forty-two investor-owned
utilities or their holding companies in the United States have made
commitments to lower their greenhouse gas emissions, thirty of which have
made commitments to either generate 100% clean energy, reduce carbondioxide emissions by 100%, or be carbon neutral.199 Notably, these pledges have
194. For an overview of the electric transmission and distribution grid, see Alexandra B. Klass,
Expanding the U.S. Electric Transmission and Distribution Grid To Meet Deep Decarbonization Goals, 47
ENV’T L. REP. 10749, 10749–51 (2017).
195. See JOHANNES PFEIFENBERGER, JUDY CHANG, ONUR AYDIN & DAVID LUKE OATES, THE
BRATTLE GRP., THE ROLE OF RTO/ISO MARKETS IN FACILITATING RENEWABLE GENERATION
DEVELOPMENT 1 (2016), http://files.brattle.com/files/5733_the_role_of_rto_iso_markets_in_facili
tating_renewable_generation_development.pdf [https://perma.cc/988D-R7UW] (discussing the
benefits of RTO/ISO markets for offering a “[r]eady-made market for real-time energy,” “[l]ower-cost
integration, balancing, and congestion management,” and “[i]mproved regional transmission access and
generation interconnection processes”).
196. See id. at 3–6. RTOs/ISOs serve two-thirds of U.S. electricity consumers in California, Texas,
much of the Midwest, some parts of the South, and the Northeast, as well as over half of Canadian
consumers. See Coming Together To Create a Smarter & Stronger North American Power Grid, ISO/RTO
COUNCIL, https://isorto.org/#about-section [https://perma.cc/49ZQ-WLUK].
197. In 2018, 28% of all non-hydro renewable energy in the United States was generated under
voluntary programs or actions by 6.3 million customers who took actions such as participating in utility
green pricing programs, entering into direct renewable contracts through power purchase agreements,
or purchasing renewable energy certificates. See JENNY HEETER, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y,
& ERIC O’SHAUGNESSY, CLEAN KILOWATTS LLC, STATUS AND TRENDS IN THE VOLUNTARY
MARKET (2018 DATA) 2–3 (2019), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy20osti/74862.pdf [https://perma.
cc/7QZR-5X6G].
198. See REBA Deal Tracker, RENEWABLE ENERGY BUYERS ALL., https://rebuyers.org/dealtracker/ [https://perma.cc/W3S2-PS9V]. For example, corporate sponsors of voluntary renewable
deals are disproportionately represented by technology companies like Facebook, Google, and Apple.
See RE100 Members, RE100, https://www.there100.org/companies [https://perma.cc/9W7D-X57G].
Local governments that have made 100% clean energy commitments are located throughout the
country. See Check Out Where We Are Ready for 100%, SIERRA CLUB, https://www.sierraclub.org/readyfor-100/map?show=committed [https://perma.cc/YMG2-2FXG].
199. For a complete list, see Utilities’ Path to a Carbon-Free Energy System by 2050, SMART
ELEC. POWER ALL., https://sepapower.org/utility-transformation-challenge/utility-carbon-reduction-
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come under scrutiny by environmental groups for setting nonbinding
aspirational targets that are not matched with consistent investment plans.200
Still, investor-owned utilities primarily derive profits from earning a regulated
rate of return on approved capital expenditures but generally earn no returns
on fuel and operating costs, which are passed through to customers.201
Generally, renewable energy projects are primarily capital expenditures with
significantly lower operating costs, allowing investor-owned utilities to earn
increased relative profits.202 Further, as more affordable clean energy has
challenged the operating economics of historically justified capital investments
with remaining debt obligations, investor-owned utilities have sought strategies
through their regulators to protect their financial position as their assets become
increasingly at risk of being “stranded.”203
Thus, many of the largest investor-owned utilities have begun to embrace
the clean energy transition by finding new alignment between their profitseeking fiduciary responsibility, policy and market rules, and strategies that
allow them to own—and therefore profit from—the capital-intensive
investment associated with building out renewables and the supporting electric
grid.204 Additionally, state legislatures and regulators often impose clean energy
tracker/ [https://perma.cc/AWP7-GT9B] (including a complete list of utilities that have announced
carbon reduction goals). Recently, three G&T cooperatives have also made net-zero carbon pledges:
Platte River Power Authority in Colorado pledged to reach 100% non-carbon energy by 2030; North
Carolina Electric Membership Corporation pledged to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050; and
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative in Virginia pledged to reach net-zero carbon dioxide emissions by
2050. See id.
200. JOHN ROMANKIEWICZ, CARA BOTTORFF & LEAH C. STOKES, SIERRA CLUB, THE
DIRTY TRUTH ABOUT UTILITY CLIMATE PLEDGES 10–11 (2021), https://www.sierraclub.org/sites/
www.sierraclub.org/files/blog/Final%20Greenwashing%20Report%20(1.22.2021).pdf [https://perma.
cc/FV3W-W95W].
201. See Can American Utilities Profit from the Energy Transition?, ECONOMIST (July 27, 2019),
https://www.economist.com/business/2019/07/27/can-american-utilities-profit-from-the-energytransition [https://perma.cc/QBB9-QS3D (dark archive)] (describing Xcel Energy’s “steel for fuel”
strategy which prioritizes “invest[ing] more in wind farms, on which it can earn a regulated return, and
spend less on fossil fuels, on which it cannot. In the long term, consumers save money and the utilities
make more of it”).
202. Id.
203. Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82 BROOK. L. REV.
645, 659 (2017) (“[S]tranded cost recovery and the tools used by regulators to address them . . .
contributed to a blinkered regulatory perspective, distorting the cost of capital to consistently favor old
energy infrastructure over new entrants and new projects. Importantly, they were not driven by judicial
mandate so much as by political and regulatory processes that invited utilities (and their investors) to
invest resources in lobbying for compensation for the stranded costs associated with industry changes,
typically in the form of additional charges that customers would pay in their future bills. While this
approach to stranded cost compensation was designed to ensure that the firm would be able to continue
to attract capital at a low cost to consumers, it also served to lock in the status quo, resulting in delays
in industry transitions, including slowing the onset of new technologies.”).
204. See Utilities’ Path to a Carbon-Free Energy System by 2050, supra note 199 (noting that sixteen of
the twenty largest investor-owned utilities, by market cap, are among the thirty-eight utilities to have
announced carbon reduction goals); see also Brian R. Murphy, Renewable Energy Ownership: A Game
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mandates on investor-owned utilities,205 and regulated utilities can also seek
advantages within political systems by offering clean energy commitments in
exchange for other concessions.206 Investor-owned utilities may experience
particularly strong incentives to volunteer renewable energy commitments if
they operate in a regulatory environment that minimizes the downside risk to
the utility’s shareholders of incurring the full cost associated with stranded
assets.207
Rural electric cooperatives face a very different set of internal and external
institutional incentives to adopt clean energy. While G&T cooperatives sell a
larger share of their power from coal-fired power than other electricity
providers, their power mixes are rapidly changing. For instance, while the U.S.
electricity sector as a whole has reduced its dependence on coal-fired power to
23% of total electric generation in 2019 (down from 39% in 2014), cooperatives
continued to sell electricity of which 32% was generated from coal in 2019

Plan for Utilities, UTIL. DIVE (May 22, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/renewable-energyownership-a-game-plan-for-utilities/555268/ [https://perma.cc/5A3U-HXRS] (describing the historic
regulatory hurdles preventing utilities from owning renewable assets and the emerging opportunity for
investor-owned utilities to own renewables if tax incentives phase down).
205. See supra Section I.B.
206. See Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, “Voluntary” Approaches to Environmental Regulation:
A Survey, in ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 75, 86 (Maurizio Franzini &
Antonio Nicita eds., 2002) (stating that private firms may take environmental action above the level
of regulation in part to act “strategically in the political and regulatory arenas to influence the actions
of regulators,” including by preempting or weakening forthcoming regulations, reducing the extent of
regulatory monitoring, or raising the costs of rivals).
207. ANDY BILLICH, MICHAEL COLVIN & TIMOTHY O’CONNOR, ENV’T DEF. FUND,
MANAGING THE TRANSITION: PROACTIVE SOLUTIONS FOR STRANDED GAS ASSET RISK
IN CALIFORNIA 23 (2019), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/documents/Managing%20the%20
Transition_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UCJ-ZRJZ] (explaining the general trade-offs regulators make in
addressing who bears responsibility for stranded assets along several dimensions, including between
current versus future customers and between shareholders versus ratepayers). For a discussion of how
debt versus equity splits are informing the feasibility of utilities to swap debt obligations tied to assets
at risk of being stranded, such as coal plants, for equity in new clean energy technology, see RON LEHR
& MIKE O’BOYLE, ENERGY INNOVATION, DEBT FOR EQUITY UTILITY REFINANCE (Dec.
2018), https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Debt-for-Equity-Issue-Brief_12.3.
18.pdf [https://perma.cc/XD6M-HXN2]. See also Stranded Asset Risk Is Low for US Regulated Utilities
Sector as It Shifts Toward Renewable Energy, MOODY’S INVS. SERV. (Nov. 5, 2018),
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Stranded-asset-risk-is-low-for-US-regulated-utilities-PBC_1148481 [https://perma.cc/4P7B-D8A2] (stating with regard to investor-owned utilities, “[w]hile
exposure to stranded assets could increase during the industry’s transition to renewables from natural
gas and coal, Moody’s expects regulators will allow utilities to recover costs from customers” which,
based on historical precedent, would not impact the credit quality of these utilities); Douglas N. Jones
& Richard A. Tybout, Environmental Regulation and Electric Utility Regulation: Compatibility and Conflict,
14 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 31, 44 (1986) (“Other things being equal, and with a rate of return at
least as high as utility stockholders could otherwise earn, the utility has an interest in adding to
property, as long as regulators include that property in the rate base . . . .”).
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(down from 54% in 2014).208 Facing increasing regulatory risk and other
pressure to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from their coal fleet, rural electric
cooperatives are making significant investments in carbon capture and
sequestration technology demonstration projects.209 However, cooperatives are
not as invested in gas as other utilities: in 2019, while the U.S. electric system
relied on natural gas for 38% of delivered energy, cooperatives sold 32% of their
energy from natural gas.210 Rural electric cooperatives also have a slightly higher
share of power sales derived from renewables at 19% compared to 18% for the
United States overall, in part due to significant generation from federally owned
hydroelectric resources.211 In the context of rapidly changing generation sources,
the ownership structure of energy generation is also changing. As rural electric
cooperatives are not-for-profit entities, they generally tend to contract for
renewable energy generation rather than owning renewable generation. But in
terms of the power plant assets that cooperatives own and operate, many of the
largest G&T cooperatives have an ownership portfolio that exceeds 85% coalfired power.212
While renewable energy technologies continue to see dramatic capital cost
declines, cooperatives still face several factors that weaken this underlying
economic signal for renewable energy. Because cooperatives are not-for-profit
entities whose owners are also its consumers, they neither experience the same
internal incentives that create a capital bias in investor-owned utilities nor enjoy
the regulatory protections from stranded-asset risk that underlie some investorowned utilities’ embrace of capital-intensive clean energy.213 Instead,
cooperatives face long-term obligations to manage debt, a significant fraction of
which was originally tied to federally financed coal-fired power plants, although
208. See AMERICA’S ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES, supra note 8; Electric Power Monthly: Table 1.1.
Net Generation by Energy Source, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/electricity/
monthly/epm_table_grapher.php?t=epmt_1_01 [https://perma.cc/K7N8-6UEG].
209. Benjamin Storrow, Carbon Capture Test Facility Opens in Wyoming, SCI. AM. (May 17,
2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/carbon-capture-test-facility-opens-in-wyoming/
[https:// perma.cc/9JFQ-5QP2]; Frank Jossi, Can This North Dakota Co-op Prove the Potential of Carbon
Capture and Storage?, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 30, 2020), https://energynews.us/2020/03/
30/midwest/can-this-north-dakota-co-op-prove-the-potential-of-carbon-capture-and-storage/ [https://
perma.cc/X547-VSPF].
210. AMERICA’S ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES, supra note 8; Electric Power Monthly: Table 1.1. Net
Generation by Energy Source, supra note 208.
211. AMERICA’S ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES, supra note 8; Electric Power Monthly: Table 1.1. Net
Generation by Energy Source, supra note 208.
212. See VAN ATTEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 36–40.
213. The capital bias of firms subject to rate-of-return regulation was first proposed by Harvey
Averch and Leland L. Johnson. See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under
Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1052 (1962). Robert Spann empirically demonstrated
Averch and Johnson’s proposition in regulated electric utilities. See Robert M. Spann, Rate of Return
Regulation and Efficiency in Production: An Empirical Test of the Averch-Johnson Thesis, 5 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. SCI. 38, 50–51 (1974).
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many G&T cooperatives refinanced their coal-plant debt in recent years.214 The
federal debt held by rural electric cooperatives can have restrictions that are not
equally applied to private loans. While federal loans from the RUS, the lead
federal agency that provides public financing for cooperatives, were initially set
at rates lower than most contemporary private rates, federal debt is more
difficult to refinance than private debt.215 And as market interest rates have
declined, cooperatives have not been able to fully take advantage of the
economic opportunity of lower debt-servicing costs.216 Cooperatives also cannot
easily take advantage of tax incentives for renewable energy which have created
significant incentives for for-profit independent power providers and some
investor-owned utilities to invest in renewable energy projects that they will

214. The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (“NRECA”) estimates that, in 2020,
five hundred co-ops held $42 billion in direct and guaranteed RUS loans. Erin Kelly, NRECA Will
Press New Congress To Approve Repricing of RUS Loans, NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://www.electric.coop/nreca-will-press-new-congress-to-approve-repricing-of-rus-loans [https://
perma.cc/KX24-CTB9]. Co-ops also hold debt from private financiers, notably the cooperatively
owned CoBank (part of the Farm Credit System) and the National Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance
Corporation (“CFC”). See Electric Distribution, COBANK, https://www.cobank.com/corporate/
industry/electric-distribution [https://perma.cc/599W-P8LM]; FITCHRATINGS, NATIONAL RURAL
UTILITIES COOPERATIVE FINANCE CORPORATION: FULL RATING REPORT 2–3 (2019),
https://www.nrucfc.coop/content/dam/nrucfc/public-tier/documents/investors/rating-reports/Fitch_
Rating_Full_Report_May_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HL2-SAS3].
215. In 2017, the RUS opened a pilot program for cooperatives to apply for loan refinancing. 82
Fed. Reg. 48,476, 48,476–77 (Oct. 18, 2017). A bill proposed in the 116th Congress would allow all coops to refinance their RUS debt based on prevailing rates and received sixty-four Republican cosponsors and sixty-two Democratic cosponsors in the U.S. House of Representatives. Flexible
Financing for Rural America Act of 2020, H.R. 7483, 116th Cong. (2020); see H.R. 7483 Cosponsors,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7483/cosponsors [https://
perma.cc/R76J-8RH9].
216. While cooperatives do also hold private debt, they face significant restrictions in refinancing
their federal debt. NRECA estimates that allowing co-ops to refinance their RUS loans to prevalent
rates in 2020 would save cooperatives $10.1 billion in aggregate, equivalent to nearly 25% of the total
value of RUS debt held by co-ops. See Kelly, supra note 214. Investor-owned utilities can more flexibly
borrow and refinance debt through bond issuances, and utility bond issuances from primarily investorowned utilities have been at record levels in the past few years due to a low interest-rate environment
and new capital investments in clean energy and natural gas. America’s Utilities Are on a Record Borrowing
Spree This Year, T&D WORLD (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.tdworld.com/utility-business/article/
21119598/americas-utilities-are-on-a-record-borrowing-spree-this-year [https://perma.cc/2RP6-LD8B
(staff-uploaded archive)]. Utilities with existing coal assets, which includes many electric cooperatives,
may also face financing restrictions from banks and insurers who have set internal policies to restrict
support for coal. TIM BUCKLEY, INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS, OVER 100 GLOBAL
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EXITING COAL, WITH MORE TO COME 4–5 (Feb. 27, 2019),
http://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/IEEFA-Report_100-and-counting_Coal-Exit_Feb2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/927F-6DEZ]. For example, in February 2020, JP Morgan announced that
it would phase out its “credit exposure” to coal by 2024, in part by no longer providing project finance
to develop or refinance coal-fired power plants unless the plant adopts carbon capture technology.
Hugh Son, JPMorgan Announces Big Moves To Support Environment, Including Ending Loans to Coal
Industry, CNBC (Feb. 25, 2020, 10:43 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/25/jpmorgan-says-it-willfund-200-billion-in-sustainable-deals-this-year.html [https://perma.cc/YNP2-G5H3].
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own.217 Finally, because cooperatives are self-regulated entities with reduced
oversight from legislative and regulatory authorities, general political influence
and advocacy campaigns have limited formal channels to influence cooperatives
compared to the highly structured regulatory environments in which investorowned utilities operate. As a result, new approaches to clean energy transition
are required for cooperatives, as discussed in the remainder of this Article.
III. LEVERS OF CHANGE: COOPERATIVE CASE STUDIES
This part evaluates in more detail the unique challenges and opportunities
associated with the clean energy transition for rural electric cooperatives. We
explore these challenges through three case studies, each of which evaluates a
different, but not mutually exclusive, pathway to shift these challenges and
opportunities within the rural electric cooperative landscape. The first case
study illustrates an “exit” approach, focusing on the member distribution
cooperatives seeking to leave the Tri-State G&T cooperative in the
Intermountain West. The second case study shows a “collaboration” pathway
through developments at the Great River Energy G&T cooperative in
Minnesota. The final case study illustrates a “grassroots” pathway, focusing on
the rise of social movements and nonprofit organizations in the southeastern
United States and their mission to promote participation, equity, and racial
diversity in cooperative governance to advocate—both internally and
externally—for clean energy transition and member accountability. Together,
these case studies provide valuable context for the range of clean energy
solutions proposed in Part IV for rural electric cooperatives around the country.

217. Co-op-owned facilities produce only 5% of the renewable power sold by cooperatives,
compared to 64.2% ownership for coal generation and 22.9% ownership for natural gas generation
(based on 2017 data). See GOODENBERY ET AL., supra note 9, at 3. These ownership ratios reflect the
financing and incentive structures for these different resources, and it is likely that cooperatives will
come to own a higher fraction of the current renewables projects from which they currently purchase
power once federal tax credits have been monetized by a third party. However, while investor-owned
utilities in some states are moving toward owning a higher fraction of renewables under state policies
that would allow investor-owned utilities to more effectively monetize federal tax credits, similar
attention has not been given to aligning the federal tax credit structure to the business model of electric
cooperatives. COHNREZNICK, 2019 TRENDS IN UTILITY RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCING 5 (2019),
https://2kqvnn450c7y4cnom33e1vx8-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/2019_
Trends_In_Utility_Renewable_Energy_Financing.pdf [https://perma.cc/P55T-LHAG]; see also, e.g.,
NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, supra note 29, at 25–26 (discussing electric cooperatives’ taxexempt status). A grant-in-lieu-of-tax-credit program, like the 1603 Program under the 2009 stimulus
package, could be beneficial to cooperatives, although the 1603 Program excluded non-taxpaying
entities, including rural electric cooperatives. SAMUEL V. BROWN, DAVID G. NDERITU, PAUL V.
PRECKEL, DOUGLAS J. GOTHAM & BENJAMIN W. ALLEN, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
RENEWABLE POWER OPPORTUNITIES FOR RURAL COMMUNITIES 126 (2011), https://www.purdue.
edu/discoverypark/sufg/docs/publications/RenewablePowerOpportunities-Final.pdf [https://perma.
cc/C3W2-2XPQ].
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Change Through Exit

Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association is a G&T cooperative
formed in 1952 by rural electric distribution cooperatives to provide wholesale
power for its member-owners.218 By 2020, Tri-State had grown to supply fortythree member distribution cooperatives providing service in parts of Colorado,
New Mexico, Wyoming, and Nebraska, and serving 1.3 million residential,
commercial, and industrial electricity consumers.219 A few, primarily Coloradobased, distribution cooperatives constitute the bulk of Tri-State’s total
electricity sales. United Power, serving the rapidly growing suburbs
surrounding the Denver airport, constitutes nearly 17% of Tri-State’s total
member revenue, and only ten members represent a full 60% of Tri-State’s total
member electricity sales.220
Each distribution utility member’s relationship with Tri-State is regulated
by two key documents—Tri-State’s bylaws (“Bylaws”) and each individual
member’s “all-requirements contract” with Tri-State (also known as an “ARC,”
or more generally, a “wholesale electric services contract,” “WESC,” or “power
supply contract”).221 The Bylaws require that each member purchase “electric
power and energy” from Tri-State at rates to be determined by the Tri-State
Board (comprised of representatives from its member distribution
cooperatives).222 The Bylaws also establish broad expectations for the member
cooperatives, which are then enforced through the all-requirements contracts.223
Each of the current all-requirements contracts between Tri-State and its
member distribution utilities were executed around 2007 and run through
2050.224 The contracts allow each member distribution cooperative to obtain up
218. CTR. FOR THE NEW ENERGY ECON., supra note 25, at 2.
219. Id.; TRI-STATE GENERATION & TRANSMISSION ASS’N, 2019 ELECTRIC RESOURCE PLAN
ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 12–13 (2019) [hereinafter TRI-STATE ELECTRIC 2019 RESOURCE
PLAN].
220. CTR. FOR THE NEW ENERGY ECON., supra note 25, at 2–3; TRI-STATE GENERATION
& TRANSMISSION ASS’N, BETTER TOGETHER: 2019 INVESTOR PRESENTATION 5 (2019), https://
tristate.coop/sites/tristate/files/PDF/2019%20SEC%20filings/InvestorPresentation-070919.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9CRB-Z675].
221. Consistent with industry practice, this Article uses the term “all-requirements contract” to
refer to a contract between a G&T cooperative and a member-owner distribution cooperative that
requires the member-owner to purchase 95% or more of the energy it sells to its members from the
G&T cooperative. See, e.g., Recommended Decision of Administrative Law Judge Robert I. Garvey
Granting Relief Requested and Setting Exit Charge Methodology at 9–13, La Plata Elec. Ass’n v. TriState Generation & Transmission Ass’n, Nos. 19F-0620E & 19F-00621E (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n
Nov. 6, 2019) [hereinafter ALJ Opinion on Exit Charge Methodology] (referring to the contracts
between Tri-State and its members capping self-supply at 5% as all-requirements contracts); see also
supra note 65 and accompanying text; infra note 414.
222. Amended and Restated Bylaws of Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc.
art. I, § 3(a) (Apr. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Tri-State Bylaws]; see supra note 165 and accompanying text.
223. See id.
224. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, 2019 Annual Report (Form 10-K) 4 (Mar. 12,
2020) [hereinafter Tri-State 2019 10-K].
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to 5% of their power requirements through self-supplied power—which can
include self-generated distributed solar and other local sources or wholesale
energy purchased from third parties, with all remaining power purchased from
Tri-State.225 These contracts provide Tri-State with predictable revenue to plan
the development of its generation and transmission system and provide
assurance to Tri-State’s creditors that Tri-State will be able to meet its debt
repayment commitments.226 The Bylaws state that a member cooperative may
leave Tri-State only once it fulfills “equitable terms and conditions” determined
by Tri-State’s Board and “it has met all its contractual obligations” to TriState.227
Historically, Tri-State generated most of its energy from five coal-fired
plants built between 1959 and 2006.228 At the start of 2020, Tri-State had the
capacity to provide 4,317 MW to its member cooperatives.229 Tri-State
distributes this power to its member-owners over 5,665 miles of self-owned
transmission lines.230 The economics of Tri-State’s coal plants have caused an
increasing number of Tri-State’s members and outside groups to criticize the
continued use of these plants.231 Additionally, Tri-State was “ranked first in the

225. Id. at 4–6.
226. Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association Wholesale Electric Service Contract with
La Plata Electric Association, Inc. 2 (July 1, 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see
supra note 65 and accompanying text; infra note 414.
227. Tri-State Bylaws, supra note 222, at art. I, § 4(a). Free entry and exit is a core cooperative
tenant underlying the Cooperative Principles of open and voluntary membership and autonomy and
independence. See Understanding the Seven Cooperative Principles, supra note 25; infra note 287.
228. MARK DYSON & ALEX ENGEL, ROCKY MTN. INST., A LOW-COST ENERGY FUTURE FOR
WESTERN COOPERATIVES 5 (2018), https://rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/RMI_Low_Cost_
Energy_Future_for_Western_Cooperatives_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UNY-KSMJ].
229. Tri-State 2019 10-K, supra note 224, at 2. Of this generation, at the start of 2020, Tri-State
owned 1,782 MW of coal generating capacity (41% of total) and 903 MW of natural gas/oil generating
capacity (21% of total). Id. It contracted for 1,059 MW of renewable energy and 573 MW of “other”
power. Id. Of its renewable generation, approximately 550 MW came from large-scale federal
hydropower purchases, while the remainder came from wholesale contracts for solar, wind, and smallscale hydropower, in addition to 123 MW of local renewable power provided by the distribution
cooperatives themselves. Id. at 2, 12–13.
230. Id. at 13; TRI-STATE ELECTRIC 2019 RESOURCE PLAN, supra note 219, at 14.
231. See, e.g., DYSON & ENGEL, supra note 228, at 4–7 (discussing economics of Tri-State’s plants
as compared to a transition to renewable energy). Market participants evaluating Tri-State’s energy
mix found that Tri-State’s delivered cost of power of 7.5¢ per kilowatt-hour was 53% more than the
average wholesale delivered cost of power at 4.9¢ per kilowatt-hour. CTR. FOR THE NEW ENERGY
ECON., supra note 25, at 5. Tri-State publicly disputed the Rocky Mountain Institute study at the time
of its publication, stating that it did “not have the detailed inputs, complex models and technical
expertise necessary to forecast the association’s future costs” and “does not equate to the thorough
resource modeling in . . . integrated resource planning.” High-Level Report by Rocky Mountain Institute
Cannot Accurately Forecast Tri-State’s Future Costs, TRI-STATE GENERATION & TRANSMISSION ASS’N
(Aug. 23, 2018), https://tristate.coop/tri-state-responds-rocky-mountain-institute-report-resourceplanning [https://perma.cc/3AL6-MS43].

100 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2021)

46

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

country in pounds of CO2 emitted per megawatt-hour of electricity produced”
in 2017.232
In 2017, the Bylaws required Tri-State to review the terms of its allrequirements contracts with its member distribution cooperatives.233 By this
time, several Tri-State distribution cooperatives wished to add more low-cost
distributed solar in their service areas but were prevented from doing so by the
5% limit on non-Tri-State power in their all-requirements contracts.234 During
the contract review proceedings, the Tri-State board rejected a request from
one of its member cooperatives, La Plata Electric, to raise the 5% limit on selfsupplied generation to 10%, and instead, the board adopted a new policy which
lowered the price paid to member cooperatives for self-generated solar
energy.235 Tri-State justified this policy on grounds that it needed to ensure a
return on investment for its fossil fuel plants.236 This prompted a number of
member cooperatives to seek to exit their relationship with Tri-State before
their scheduled contract expiration dates.237 However, the determination of fair
terms for an early exit from the all-requirements contract was, and continues to
be, contentious.
If G&T cooperatives were able to perfectly offset the loss of an exiting
member’s revenue with a reduction in operating costs, then the issue of exit fees
would be of minimal importance. However, the sunk costs associated with large
power plants cannot be recovered with reductions in variable costs, and in
contrast to investor-owned utilities, G&T cooperatives can traditionally only
finance their large fixed costs with debt.238 As a result, if a member cooperative
exits its G&T cooperative, then the G&T cooperative’s reduction in revenue is
not offset by a reduction in costs, and to preserve the economic position of
remaining members, the departing member must pay an exit fee.239
232. CTR. FOR THE NEW ENERGY ECON., supra note 25, at 3.
233. Tri-State 2019 10-K, supra note 224, at 6.
234. Joe Smyth, Clean Cooperative, Uncooperative: Tri-State Policies Are Limiting Colorado
Communities from Developing Local Renewable Energy Projects, CLEAN COOP. (2018),
https://www.cleancooperative.com/uncooperative.html [https://perma.cc/384T-9DEB].
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. See infra Section III.A.1.
238. Public Answer Testimony and Attachments of Tri-State Generation and Transmission
Association, Inc. Witness Patrick L. Bridges at 15–16, 18, La Plata Elec. Ass’n v. Tri-State Generation
& Transmission Ass’n, No. 19F-0620E (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Feb. 12, 2019) (“Utilizing debt
allows Tri-State to spread the capital cost of these resources over their useful lives instead of funding
them all up-front.”).
239. See Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association’s Post-Hearing Statement of Position
at 31, La Plata Elec. Ass’n v. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, Nos. 19F-0620E & 19F0621E (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n May 28, 2020). In 2019, Tri-State had an operating revenue of $1.3
billion and operating expenses of $1.2 billion. Id. at 18; Tri-State 2019 10-K, supra note 224, at 44.
Much of the difference between the two values was made up of interest expenses, which totaled $151
million. Tri-State 2019 10-K, supra note 224, at 64.
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Determining a fair exit fee is difficult to accomplish because it requires a
philosophical decision regarding the extent to which the fair allocation of sunk
costs should be based on the originally intended utilization of the
investments,240 the most recent utilization of the investments,241 or the
prospective costs of utilizing the investments as currently imagined, leading to
proposed allocations that can be highly divergent.242
1. Member Exit Requests
Since 2017, Tri-State member cooperatives representing more than 25% of
Tri-State’s total membership have made requests to exit their contracts, but the
consideration of exiting began earlier with Kit Carson Electric Cooperative, a
small distribution cooperative near Taos, New Mexico.243 Since 2008, Kit
Carson has sought to invest in increased distributed solar energy to meet
member preferences for clean energy. By the early 2010s, Kit Carson’s managers
and executives were unhappy with Tri-State’s wholesale prices for electricity
(which had increased over 100% between 2000 and 2016244), the unpredictability

240. See Direct Testimony and Attachments of Susan F. Tierney, Ph.D. at 22, La Plata Elec. Ass’n
v. Tri-State Generation and Transmission Ass’n, No. 19F-0620E & 19F-0621E (Colo. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n Jan. 10, 2020) (noting that, in the context of the contested exit fee of the La Plata distribution
utility from its G&T, Tri-State, “[a] cost-incurrence principle would encourage the Commission to
determine a just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory exit charge that takes two core economic concepts
into account: first, only those costs that are unavoidable and which have already been incurred by TriState in anticipation of serving La Plata over the life of the WESC contract; and second, the financial
benefits and burdens of La Plata’s role as an owner of Tri-State”).
241. See JIM LAZAR, PAUL CHERNICK & WILLIAM MARCUS, REGUL. ASSISTANCE PROJECT,
ELECTRIC COST ALLOCATION FOR A NEW ERA 98 (Mark LeBel ed., 2020).
242. See generally Michael T. Morley, Avoiding Adversarial Adjudication, 41 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV.
291, 327 (2014) (explaining that each party to a dispute is “entitled to shape their lawsuit” and
“determine the issues” they want the court to adjudicate).
243. Kit Carson was not the first member-owner to try to leave Tri-State. In the 1980s, Tri-State
member-owner Shoshone River Power sought to terminate its all-requirements contract with Tri-State
through dissolution and sale of its assets to an investor-owned utility. See Tri-State Generation &
Transmission Ass’n v. Shoshone River Power, 874 F.2d 1346, 1350 (10th Cir. 1989). On appeal to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the court held in 1989 that the contract between Shoshone
and Tri-State was a “unique” requirements contract based on the length of the contract, the ownership
relationship between the parties, the presence of REA funding, and the substantial debt held by TriState. Id. at 1355–56. As a result, the court concluded that Shoshone could not absolve itself of its
contractual obligations through dissolution but that appropriate damages could be determined as a
remedy. Id. at 1364. Notably, the REA intervened in the proceedings on behalf of Tri-State claiming
irreparable damage if the assets were sold. Id. at 1350.
244. Over the same time period, average retail electricity prices in New Mexico and Colorado
overall had seen 39% and 67% increases, respectively. Compare Annual Electric Power Industry Report,
Form EIA-861 Detailed Data Files, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/electricity/
data/eia861/ [https://perma.cc/3QT4-6E34] (choose “2000 Reformatted ZIP” on right sidebar), with
id. (choose “2016 ZIP” on right sidebar).
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of rate increases, and the contract’s 5% cap on self-supplied generation.245 Kit
Carson initially made a request to exit its contract with Tri-State in 2015. In
response to Kit Carson’s exit request, Tri-State “initially demanded $137
million as an exit charge (or nearly seven times the amount of Kit Carson’s
annual power purchase from Tri-State).”246 In 2016, Kit Carson and Tri-State
reached an exit agreement without litigation.247 The final exit charge was
negotiated down to $49.5 million, made up of $37 million in cash and $12.5
million “for the retirement of Kit Carson’s patronage capital.”248 At the time of
its exit, Kit Carson represented only 1.8% of Tri-State’s total energy sales.249
The cash for Kit Carson’s exit was provided by Guzman Energy, a private
wholesale energy provider based in Florida and Colorado that describes itself
as “designed specifically to help transition an outdated energy economy into the
renewable age.”250 In return for providing the exit fee, Kit Carson signed a tenyear, fixed-price contract with Guzman for wholesale energy at a price 15%
lower than what it had paid Tri-State the year before, inclusive of repayment
of the exit fee in the first five years of the contract.251 In sharp contrast to the
restrictions under its contract with Tri-State, the Kit Carson-Guzman contract
allowed Kit Carson unlimited self-generation,252 and Guzman also committed

245. KARL CATES & SETH FEASTER, INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS, CASE
STUDY: HOW KIT CARSON ELECTRIC ENGINEERED A COST-EFFECTIVE COAL EXIT 3 (2019)
[hereinafter IEEFA REPORT].
246. Formal Complaint at 18, United Power, Inc. v. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n,
No. 19F-0621E (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Nov. 6, 2019). Kit Carson’s CEO stated that “Tri-State
calculated its exit formula by multiplying the annual revenue it collects from Kit Carson and
multiplying it by the number of years remaining in the contract, then subtracting Tri-State’s costs.” Id.
at 18 n.34. This demand is consistent with the formula the Tenth Circuit found valid in Shoshone River
Power, 874 F.2d at 1348–49.
247. Peter Maloney, Seeking More Renewables, Kit Carson Co-op Exits Relationship with Tri-State
G&T, UTIL. DIVE (June 29, 2016), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/seeking-more-renewables-kitcarson-co-op-exits-relationship-with-tri-state/421719/ [https://perma.cc/2EA8-CTNS].
248. J.R. Logan, Kit Carson CEO Reyes Says Tri-State Break Has Two Big Advantages, TAOS NEWS
(June 30, 2016), https://www.taosnews.com/news/kit-carson-ceo-reyes-says-tri-state-break-has-twobig-advantages/article_7ac805ff-4a5c-5ef2-9899-58b6a5f21236.html [https://perma.cc/QA52-C5C7].
For a discussion of patronage capital, see supra note 121 and accompanying text.
249. Logan, supra note 248; KIT CARSON ELEC. COOP., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2018),
https://kitcarson.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/2016-Annual-Report-Book.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D22E-MTEU].
250. IEEFA REPORT, supra note 245, at 3. The Guzman offer has been characterized as an example
of a “solar for coal swap” in which a third party—in this case Guzman—effectively purchases and retires
coal assets in conjunction with a contract for new solar that includes repayment for purchasing and
decommissioning coal—in this case paying for the calculated stranded asset costs associated with exit.
See LEHR & O’BOYLE, SWAPS, supra note 10, at 2, 6–9.
251. IEEFA REPORT, supra note 245, at 3–5.
252. While Kit Carson’s members now contribute 9% of total capacity during peak daylight hours
through member-owned rooftop solar, Kit Carson’s policy to support rooftop solar through net
metering has recently raised concerns of unfair cross-subsidization. See Doug Cantwell, Kit Carson
Electric CEO: Rooftop Solar Not Paying Its Fair Share, TAOS NEWS (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.
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to assist Kit Carson in developing 35 MW of solar power by 2022.253 Skeptics
of Kit Carson’s exit have pointed to the additional risk associated with
purchasing energy from Guzman, an unregulated private energy service
provider that may have greater exposure to price volatility and bankruptcy.254
Kit Carson also signed two separate transmission agreements to replace its
previous bundled “all-in” rate from Tri-State, with costs that can vary from
month to month and contribute to significant fluctuations in Kit Carson’s total
power costs.255 A direct comparison of the impact of Kit Carson’s exit on
residential costs is difficult because of the different ways in which components
of electricity costs are incorporated in rates. Nevertheless, Kit Carson’s average
all-in price for residential electricity service has continued to increase above
inflation from 2013–2019.256
taosnews.com/news/business/kit-carson-electric-ceo-rooftop-solar-not-paying-its-fair-share/article_
73b1bb63-1f99-5543-a9ba-2f28c85de2ea.html [https://perma.cc/3WCX-TAEP].
253. KIT CARSON ELEC. COOP., supra note 249, at 3; see IEEFA REPORT, supra note 245, at 5
(“[Kit Carson] executives estimate that the local direct economic benefits of its solar buildout will total
$10 million annually by 2020 and say it will support about 50 full-time equivalent jobs per year. They
estimate further that the deal with Guzman will save the co-op $50-$70 million over the full 10-year
life of the agreement.”). By 2019, Kit Carson was already meeting 48% of its energy needs with
renewables and was on track to meet a 70–80% renewable goal quickly with investments in wind energy
and battery storage. Allen Best, Solar Plus Storage Will Put Kit Carson Electric at 48% Renewables,
MOUNTAIN TOWN NEWS (Nov. 11, 2019), https://mountainnews.net/2019/11/11/solar-plus-storagewill-puts-kit-carson-electric-at-48-renewables/ [https://perma.cc/Z4R2-RAKQ].
254. See Mary Shin, Kit Carson Electric Setting National Example for Renewable Energy, DURANGO
HERALD (Apr. 14, 2018), https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/kit-carson-electric-settingnational-example-for-renewable-energy/#:~:text=Carson%20Electric%20Cooperative-,Kit%20Carson
%20Electric%20setting%20national%20example%20for%20renewable%20energy,co%2Dop’s%20total%
20energy%20consumption [https://perma.cc/4HJQ-7V4A] (quoting the concerns of a manager at La
Plata Electric Association, a distribution member of Tri-State that has since requested information
about exiting its relationship with Tri-State). Kit Carson’s reason for breaking their contract with TriState can be understood as grounded in Kit Carson’s dissatisfaction with the rigidity of their power
supply contract that blocked them from both the upside and downside of market risk. Guzman’s
contract offer opens Kit Carson to the upside benefits of clean energy available in wholesale markets
and shields Kit Carson from some market downside risk by fixing energy prices for the ten-year
duration of the contract. But at a market-fundamentals level, Guzman is hedging wholesale price risk
according to private business practices that Kit Carson does not have control over. In contrast, the
power prices Kit Carson was paying to Tri-State were hedged under a collective investment structure
built up over many decades and grounded in long-lived physical assets.
255. Application of Kit Carson Electric Cooperative, Inc. for Continuation of Its Fuel and Purchased
Power Cost Adjustment Clause at 5–12, In re Kit Carson Elec. Coop., Inc. (N.M. Pub. Regul. Comm’n
Apr. 17, 2020) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
256. Compare Annual Electric Power Industry Report, Form EIA-861 Detailed Data Files, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/ [https://perma.cc/3QT4-6E34] (Oct. 6,
2020) (choose “2013 ZIP” through “2019 ZIP” on right sidebar), with Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers: All Items in U.S. City Average, FRED ECON. DATA, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/
CPIAUCNS [https://perma.cc/KY9R-N9MZ] (June 10, 2021). In addition to rising faster than
inflation, Kit Carson’s average residential retail electricity prices grew faster than prices in New Mexico
overall and among New Mexico cooperatives. EIA Electric Sales, Revenue, and Average Price, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/electricity/sales_revenue_price/ [https://perma.cc/
5ACH-LUUR] (showing that Kit Carson’s average residential retail electricity price was 22% greater
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Five months after Kit Carson’s exit from Tri-State, another Tri-State
member cooperative with approximately twice the revenue of Kit Carson—
Delta-Montrose—requested that Tri-State provide it with its own cost to exit.257
In response to that request, Tri-State purportedly demanded an exit charge of
over $320 million.258 Delta-Montrose participated in an internal Tri-State
dispute and appeal process but did not reach an agreement with Tri-State.259
During the process, Tri-State refused to give Delta-Montrose information that
would let it meaningfully evaluate either the Delta-Montrose or Kit Carson exit
calculations, and also asserted it could set an exit charge “in its sole discretion,”
regardless of whether it was “just or reasonable” under state law.260
In December 2018, Delta-Montrose filed an action with the Colorado
Public Utilities Commission requesting that the Commission establish a just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory exit fee under its statutory authority.261 TriState filed a motion to dismiss, and the motion was opposed by DeltaMontrose, the Sierra Club, and a majority of Colorado state legislators.262 In
2019, the Colorado Commission denied the motion to dismiss, ordered
discovery, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the matter.263 Days prior to
the hearing, however, Delta-Montrose and Tri-State reached an agreement on
an exit fee of $136.5 million, consisting of a cash payment of $88.5 million and

than the New Mexico average and 9% greater than New Mexico cooperatives in 2013 and 48% greater
than the New Mexico average and 27% greater than New Mexico cooperatives in 2019).
257. See Response of Amici Curiae United Power, Inc. & La Plata Electric Ass’n, Inc. to Tri-State
Generation & Transmission Ass’n’s Motion to Dismiss at 1, Delta-Montrose Elec. Ass’n v. Tri-State
Generation & Transmission Ass’n, No. 18F-0866E (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Feb. 4, 2019). DeltaMontrose covers 28,000 members in Western Colorado. Mark Jaffe, Western Slope Utility Serving Delta,
Montrose Settles on $136.5 Million Fee To Break Up with Tri-State, COLO. SUN (Apr. 13, 2020, 4:54 PM),
https://coloradosun.com/2020/04/13/tri-state-delta-montrose-energy-breakup-fee/ [https://perma.cc/
V3XL-T22L] [hereinafter Jaffe, Western Slope Utility]. Like Kit Carson, Delta-Montrose’s contract with
Tri-State ran through 2040 and was limited to 5% self-generation. Tri-State 2019 10-K, supra note 224,
at 4.
258. Robert Walton, Colorado ALJ Clears Way for Tri-State Exit Fee Determination, UTIL.
DIVE (May 20, 2020), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/colorado-alj-clears-way-for-tri-state-exitfee-determinations-despite-grow/578260/#:~:text=A%20Colorado%20Administrative%20Law%20
Judge,State%20Generation%20and%20Transmission’s%20service [https://perma.cc/E6PY-WMP7].
259. Formal Complaint at 5, Delta-Montrose Elec. Ass’n v. Tri-State Generation & Transmission
Ass’n, No. 18F-0866E (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Dec. 6, 2018).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 6.
262. See Letter from Colorado Legislators to Jeffery P. Ackermann, Chairman, Colorado Pub. Util.
Comm’n, & Frances A. Koncilja, Comm’r, Colorado Pub. Util. Comm’n (Jan. 14, 2019) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
263. See Interim Decision Denying Motion to Dismiss Formal Complaint at 14, Delta-Montrose
Elec. Ass’n v. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, No. 18F-0866E (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n
Feb. 14, 2019); Commissioners’ Decision Closing Proceeding at 1–2, Delta-Montrose Elec. Ass’n v.
Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, No. 18F-0866E (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Aug. 14,
2019).
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approximately $48 million in forfeiture of patronage capital.264 Delta-Montrose
also signed a contract with Guzman Energy for the purchase of wholesale power
that was similar to Guzman’s contract with Kit Carson.265
In 2019, La Plata Electric and United Power sought exit-fee
determinations from Tri-State, and, concerned that Tri-State would not offer
them fair exit fees, La Plata Electric and United Power filed actions with the
Colorado Commission to either force Tri-State to provide exit numbers or for
the Commission to determine those numbers itself.266 It remains to be seen
whether Tri-State can take additional actions to retain these members through
legal actions or by adding clean energy to its generation mix, expanding member
cooperative self-generation limits, or other measures.
In January 2020, Tri-State’s CEO announced its “Responsible Energy
Plan.”267 This announcement marked a substantial shift from Tri-State’s longterm reliance on coal and was designed to comply with aggressive clean energy
mandates imposed on all electric utilities, including G&T cooperatives, under
New Mexico and Colorado state law.268 The plan was forecasted to save TriState hundreds of millions of dollars from 2018 to 2030.269 It also proposed 904
MW of coal retirements by 2030 and 1,019 MW of “planned renewable capacity
additions.”270 Tri-State would also allow for member utilities to take a “partial
264. See Robert Walton, Colorado Cooperative Reaches $136.5M Agreement To Exit Tri-State, UTIL.
DIVE (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/colorado-cooperative-reaches-1365magreement-to-exit-tri-state-service/575971/ [https://perma.cc/R8US-5WGJ].
265. Of the $88.5 million payment, $62.5 million was provided by Guzman Energy to compensate
Tri-State for the loss of Delta-Montrose’s load from the Tri-State network, and the remaining $26
million was provided by Delta-Montrose itself to purchase a variety of transmission assets previously
owned by Tri-State. Judith Kohler, Tri-State, Delta-Montrose Cooperative Agree To End Contract in $62.5
Million Deal, DENVER POST, https://www.denverpost.com/2020/04/17/tri-state-to-end-contract-withcooperative/ [https://perma.cc/ES5M-PAR2] (Apr. 17, 2020, 2:09 PM). In contrast to the KitCarson/Guzman contract, the Delta-Montrose/Guzman contract limits Delta-Montrose to a maximum
of only 20% self-generation of energy. Id.
266. See Complaint at 20–23, United Power v. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, No.
2020-CV-30649 (Colo. Dist. May 4, 2020); Formal Complaint at 19–20, La Plata Elec. Ass’n v. TriState Generation & Transmission Ass’n, No. 19F-0620E (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Nov. 5, 2019).
267. Tri-State Announces Retirement of All Coal Generation in Colorado and New Mexico, TRI-ST. (Jan.
9, 2020), https://tristate.coop/tri-state-announces-retirement-all-coal-generation-colorado-and-newmexico [https://perma.cc/7ZUF-QGT5] (“Serving our members’ clean energy and affordability needs,
supporting state requirements and goals, and leading the fundamental changes in our industry require
the retirement of our coal facilities in Colorado and New Mexico . . . .”).
268. Id.; TRI-STATE GENERATION & TRANSMISSION ASS’N, RESPONSIBLE ENERGY PLAN 2–3
(2020) [hereinafter TRI-STATE GENERATION, RESPONSIBLE ENERGY PLAN], https://tristate.coop/
sites/tristategt/files/PDF/Responsible-Energy-Plan/Tri-State-Responsible-Energy-Plan.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X9U2-G8E4].
269. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., TRI-STATE’S RESPONSIBLE ENERGY PLAN 9 (2020).
270. Id. at 1. The Responsible Energy Plan also finalized the cancellation of the proposed Holcomb
Station coal plant. TRI-STATE GENERATION, RESPONSIBLE ENERGY PLAN, supra note 268, at 3. The
proposed plant, a collaboration with Kansas-based G&T cooperative Sunflower Energy, was subject to
litigation for over a decade which delayed its construction. Tri-State 2019 10-K, supra note 224, at 17.
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requirements” option that would allocate an aggregate 300 MW of self-supply
capacity among Tri-State’s member cooperatives.271 However, with the limited
capacity made available, the program establishes a race among members to
develop self-supplied generation before the cap is met.
2. G&T Requests for Federal Regulation To Displace State Regulation
Before the Colorado Commission could act on the 2019 distribution
cooperatives’ exit-fee determination requests, Tri-State filed an action with
FERC seeking exclusive FERC regulation of its rates, charges, contracts, and
exit fees under the FPA.272 Prior to 2019, Tri-State was entirely owned by
distribution cooperatives and thus was a non-jurisdictional utility exempt from
FPA regulation.273 However, in 2019, Tri-State amended its Bylaws to allow
the admission of members that were for-profit entities.274 The Tri-State board
then voted to add three private, for-profit members—a ranch and a greenhouse
in Colorado and a California-based natural gas supplier.275 With these three new
non-utility members, Tri-State was no longer statutorily exempt from federal
regulation, and thus it submitted a rate filing with FERC seeking exclusive
federal regulation of its rates, charges, and contracts under the FPA.276 Tri-State
also requested that FERC preempt the La Plata Electric and United Power
action pending before the Colorado Commission.277 The Colorado Commission,
La Plata, United, and the Sierra Club opposed the request, with United stating
that the additions of non-utility members to Tri-State were illegal sham
transactions whose only purpose was to avoid Colorado Commission
regulation.278
Tri-State estimated that it lost $93.5 million on the endeavor; Tri-State also estimated a $37.1 million
loss from the 2019 closing of the Nucla coal plant. Id. at 69.
271. Press Release, Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, Tri-State Takes Significant Step
To Increase Member Flexibility, Sets Contract Termination Payment Methodology (Apr. 9,
2020), https://tristate.coop/tri-state-takes-significant-step-increase-member-flexibility-sets-contracttermination-payment [https://perma.cc/S2NG-VEWN].
272. See Petition of Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, Inc. for Declaratory Order on
Jurisdiction Under Part II of Federal Power Act at 1, Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, No.
EL20-16-000 (FERC Dec. 23, 2019) [hereinafter Petition on Jurisdiction].
273. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text (discussing the general exemption of rural
electric cooperative rates from FERC regulation under the FPA); Tri-State Generation &
Transmission Ass’n, 170 FERC ¶ 61,224 para. 1 (Mar. 20, 2020) (granting in part and denying in part
Tri-State’s petition).
274. See Mark Jaffe, Tri-State’s Clean Energy Battles with Two Colorado Electric Co-ops Now Threaten
the Utility’s Finances, COLO. SUN (May 18, 2020, 3:45 AM), https://coloradosun.com/2020/05/18/tristate-generation-finances-united-power-la-plata/ [https://perma.cc/BMK4-3JVJ].
275. Tri-State 2019 10-K, supra note 224, at 3. The ranch and the greenhouse in Colorado both
purchase energy from Tri-State facilities and the natural gas company, MIECO, supplies gas to TriState’s gas-powered plants. Id.
276. Petition on Jurisdiction, supra note 272, at 1–3.
277. Id.
278. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, 170 FERC ¶ 61,224 paras. 37–39.
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The potential exit of members of the size of United and La Plata posed an
existential threat to Tri-State. As of 2020, United Power and La Plata were TriState’s first- and third-largest members, respectively, and represented a
combined 24% of Tri-State’s revenue from members.279 In its 2019 10-K filing,
Tri-State warned that low exit-fee determinations in the pending proceedings
could result in “increased rates to our Members, a materially adverse effect on
our financial condition” and potentially a contractually required prepayment of
long-term debt.280
In May 2020, United Power filed a complaint against Tri-State and the
three newly added, non-utility members in a Colorado district court alleging
that during Tri-State’s efforts to seek FERC regulation of its rates, Tri-State
engaged in a civil conspiracy with the non-utility members and committed fraud
against United Power.281 The lawsuit seeks hundreds of millions of dollars in
compensatory and punitive damages as well as a finding that Tri-State
materially breached its contract with United Power.282
While FERC initially determined that it held concurrent jurisdiction with
the Colorado Commission over the exit-fee determinations, it later determined
that it held exclusive jurisdiction over that issue, with the Colorado state court
holding jurisdiction over the civil conspiracy and fraud claims.283 After the
FERC decision, the Colorado Commission dismissed the exit-fee proceedings
pending before it.284 In 2021, FERC issued a preliminary finding that TriState’s contracts with its members were unjust and unreasonable under the FPA
“based on the barriers it imposes on utility members considering whether to
terminate their membership in Tri-State.”285 FERC focused specifically on the
“lack of clear and transparent exit conditions” and ordered Tri-State within
279. CTR. FOR THE NEW ENERGY ECON., supra note 25, at 2; Tri-State 2019 10-K, supra note
224, at 5.
280. Tri-State 2019 10-K, supra note 224, at 27; see also Jaffe, Western Slope Utility, supra note 257;
Selene Balasta, S&P Downgrades Tri-State on Potential Exit of 2 Cooperative Members, S&P GLOB. (Nov.
20, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/7qLvsVbquwQh
OOh_AGeeiQ2 [https://perma.cc/34YH-3LLW].
281. See Complaint, supra note 266, at 1–3; Robert Walton, United Power Sues Tri-State Claiming
“Civil Conspiracy” To Block Colorado Jurisdiction over Exit Fees, UTIL. DIVE (May 6, 2020), https://
www.utilitydive.com/news/united-power-sues-tri-state-claiming-civil-conspiracy-to-block-coloradoj/577456/#:~:text=United%20Power%20on%20Monday%20filed,charged%20by%20the%20G%26T%2
0utility [https://perma.cc/LYX7-D37F].
282. Complaint, supra note 266, at 31–40; Walton, supra note 281.
283. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, 172 FERC ¶ 61,173 paras. 7–9, 35 (Aug. 28,
2020); see supra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing FERC orders in 2020 and 2021 on exit
fees related to another contract between a G&T and distribution cooperative).
284. See Emma Penrod, Colorado PUC Dismisses Exit Fee Complaints Against Tri-State, Says FERC
and District Courts Have Jurisdiction, UTIL. DIVE (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/
colorado-puc-dismisses-exit-fee-complaints-against-tri-state-says-ferc-and/587706/ [https://perma.cc/
LZ3H-Q667].
285. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, 175 FERC ¶ 61,229 para. 1 (June 17, 2021).
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thirty days to either “show cause” why its contracts were in fact just and
reasonable or, in the alternative, explain the changes it believed would remedy
FERC’s concerns.286
Putting to the side the legal issues raised in the various FERC and district
court filings and orders, the disputes over exit fees also invoke several of the
Cooperative Principles. Most directly, the Cooperative Principle of open and
voluntary membership implies that members can freely enter and exit.287
According to one cooperative governance scholar, “the right to exit can be
perceived as an essential instrument of minority protection.”288 While it is
accepted that an exiting member must still fulfill its financial commitments to
the cooperative, any fees imposed in meeting that commitment must not
“imprison” it in the larger cooperative.289 If exit fees are found to imprison a
member, this undermines other Cooperative Principles like the autonomy and
independence of members and democratic control of the cooperative. However,
the proposition of free entry and exit in the context of rural electric
cooperatives, compared to other types of cooperatives, is fundamentally in
tension with the scale economies in electricity that incentivize infrastructure
investments with high fixed costs and debt obligations that extend for multiple
decades.
Conversely, while leaving the G&T cooperative might be in the best
interest of a particular member cooperative, the Cooperative Principles require
that an individual cooperative look beyond its own best interests in making the
decision to exit. Another Cooperative Principle requires cooperation among
cooperatives.290 In many ways, the aggregation of individual distribution
cooperatives into a G&T cooperative is a pure expression of this principle.291
And more formally, in order to lower the perceived risks of not being able to
pay back loans, long-term power supply contracts that guarantee a stable
demand for the generation owned by the G&T cooperative were deemed in the
interest of the full membership in decades past to lower the overall cost of
financing assets. Moving forward, while some distribution utilities may be able
286. Id.; see also Catherine Morehouse, Tri-State Asks FERC To Approve ‘Transparent and
Simpler’ Contract Termination Approach for Members, UTIL. DIVE, https://www.utilitydive.com/news/
ferc-finds-it-basically-impossible-for-members-to-determine-cost-of-exiti/602024/ [https://perma.cc/
7UAZ-ZJPR] (Sept. 3, 2021).
287. INT’L COOP. ALL., GUIDANCE NOTES TO THE CO-OPERATIVE PRINCIPLES 5 (2015).
288. Ville Pönkä, The Legal Nature of Cooperative Membership, 7 J. ENTREPRENEURIAL & ORG.
DIVERSITY 39, 47 (2018).
289. Id. Notably, in some European nations, member-owners may withdraw from cooperatives
“only in certain, limited circumstances.” Id. at 47 n.29.
290. INT’L COOP. ALL., supra note 287, at 71.
291. Id. (“While some larger co-operatives have been created through mergers and acquisitions,
the normative approach . . . is for co-operatives to co-operate with each other in competitive markets
through forming co-operative groups, secondary co-operatives and federations to realise the cooperative advantage and create common wealth for mutual benefit.”).
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to take advantage of opportunities for lower-cost power offered by power
marketers with limited fixed costs of their own, it is important to consider
historic responsibilities to other cooperative members as well as the ancillary
benefits of G&T membership derived from other forms of resource pooling
(such as larger hedging ability against volatile market prices or more ready
access to transmission rights in wholesale markets). By leaving the association
of cooperatives that make up a G&T cooperative, a distribution cooperative is
leaving the cooperative association in favor of contractual relationships with
non-cooperatives like Guzman Energy that are not self-governed as in a
cooperative.292
B.

Change Through Collaboration

In sharp contrast to the contentious litigation involving Tri-State and its
members, Great River Energy (“GRE”) in Minnesota has addressed member
concerns in part by renegotiating contracts with at least one member to allow
for greater flexibility, diversifying its energy resources, and collaborating with
its distribution utility members to support their efforts to invest in distributed
energy resources. GRE is a relatively young G&T cooperative, created in 1999
from the merger of two other G&T cooperatives.293 It currently serves twentyeight member distribution cooperatives and approximately 1.7 million people
in Minnesota and Wisconsin.294
As of 2018, 95% of the energy produced at GRE-owned energy generation
assets was generated at coal-fired power plants.295 However, like most
cooperatives, GRE relies on a more diverse mix of generation resources—
including many resources it does not directly own—to provide power to its
member cooperatives. In 2016, the energy supply GRE provided to its members
was 66% coal, 3% natural gas, 11% market purchases, 12% renewables, and 8%

292. See, e.g., GUZMAN ENERGY, https://www.guzmanenergy.com/ [https://perma.cc/TX4P4RGA] (explaining that Guzman Energy, a non-cooperative wholesale power provider, contracts with
cooperatives interested in energy access).
293. Resolutions of the Board of Directors of Great River Energy 2 (Dec. 11, 1998) [hereinafter
Resolutions] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
294. GREAT RIVER ENERGY, 2018-2032 INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN 2 (2017) [hereinafter
GRE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN], https://greatriverener.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/
2017/04/GRE-2017-IRP-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9F9-6BA8]; 20 Years On, Still United and Still
Cooperative, GREAT RIVER ENERGY (Jan. 16, 2019), https://greatriverenergy.com/20-years-on-stillunited-and-cooperative/ [https://perma.cc/S462-QYYL]; GREAT RIVER ENERGY, 2019 ANNUAL
REPORT 1 (2020) [hereinafter GRE 2019 ANNUAL REPORT], https://greatriverenergy.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/Final_2019_Annual_Report_1_CMP.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9G2-LAJ7].
295. VAN ATTEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 36 (showing GRE fuel mix of owned power plant assets
in 2018); Form EIA-923 Detailed Data with Previous Form Data (EIA-906/920), supra note 8 (choose
“2018:EIA-923 ZIP” on right sidebar) (showing annual generation in 2018 for GRE-owned assets at
9,833 gigawatt-hours, of which 9,310 gigawatt-hours were from coal).
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hydropower.296 GRE has decreased its reliance on fossil fuels since then and, in
2020, its energy supply portfolio included 55% coal, 1% natural gas, 18% market
purchases, 25% renewables, and 1% hydropower.297
When GRE was created in 1999, it established new articles of
incorporation and bylaws.298 As part of the merger, all of the existing wholesale
power contracts of GRE’s predecessor G&T cooperatives (Cooperative Power
Association and United Power Association) were terminated and replaced with
new agreements with GRE.299 Within the unique window of opportunity
created by the merger, GRE’s member cooperatives gained greater autonomy
and flexibility in determining the sources of their power generation. The
agreements provided the distribution cooperatives with the opportunity to elect
to fix their purchases from GRE. Over time, eight of GRE’s twenty-eight
member distribution cooperatives elected the fixed option.300 If a distribution
cooperative chose the fixed-purchase option, the amount of power and energy
purchased from GRE was fixed based on historic consumption at the time of
the member’s election of the fixed option.301 Fixed-purchase member rates are
determined based on the cost of the resource pool that reflected GRE’s existing
resources at the time the member fixed its power and energy purchase
obligations.302 Members’ fixed-purchase obligations decrease over time as the
resources that were present in GRE’s portfolio at the time of a fixing decision
are retired, thereby gradually decreasing the members’ power supply purchases
from GRE and increasing their power supply purchases from alternative

296. GRE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN, supra note 294, at 7 (showing Capacity Mix by Fuel
Type in Figure 1 and Portfolio Energy Generation Mix by Fuel Type in Figure 2).
297. Power Supply Interim Update at 3, In re Great River Energy’s 2018-2032 Integrated
Resources Plan, No. ET2/RP-17-286 (Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 1, 2021).
298. See Resolutions, supra note 293, at 2–3.
299. Id. at 6. The merging G&T cooperatives carried REA debt, and in order to obtain REA/RUS
consent to the restructuring transactions and allow the cooperatives to obtain additional financing,
GRE, Cooperative Power Association, and United Power Association effectively linked all of their
assets as security for their debt obligations, making the REA/RUS a third-party beneficiary to the new
power purchase agreements. Power Purchase Contract Between Great River Energy and Redwood
Electric Cooperative 1, 18 (Jan. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Power Purchase Contract] (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (showing RUS as third-party beneficiary of contracts).
300. See GRE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN, supra note 294, at 4 (“GRE provides services to
two types of members: All Requirements (AR) members and Fixed Obligation (Fixed) members. The
20 AR members purchase all of their power and energy requirements from us, subject to limited
exceptions. For instance, the AR members have the option to self-supply up to 5% of their power and
energy requirements from renewable resources. The eight Fixed members purchase a fixed portion of
their power and energy requirements from us, and purchase all supplemental requirements from an
alternate power supplier.”).
301. See Power Purchase Contract, supra note 299, at 2–3.
302. Second Amended Complaint at 8–9, Crow Wing Coop. Power & Light Co. v. Great River
Energy, No. 18-CV-17-1291 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 21, 2019).
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sources.303 One fixed-purchase distribution cooperative in particular, WrightHennepin, has used this flexibility to add more renewable energy and wholesale
market purchases into its energy mix,304 while others have supplemented their
energy needs by purchasing from other G&Ts.305
More recently, GRE and Wright-Hennepin Cooperative Electric
Association, a fixed member of GRE, renegotiated their existing power supply
contract. With the new contract, upon the retirement of GRE’s resources,
Wright-Hennepin will have greater flexibility to select replacement resources,
including through GRE.306
GRE joined the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (“MISO”)
in 2004.307 MISO is a not-for-profit RTO covering Manitoba in Canada, and
portions of fifteen states from Minnesota and North Dakota in the northern
United States to Louisiana and Arkansas in the southern United States.308
MISO manages the transmission of power across the bulk power grid and runs
wholesale energy, capacity, and ancillary service markets for its members to
provide cost-effective energy, transmission, and related services.309
Twenty of GRE’s twenty-eight member distribution cooperatives
maintain all-requirements contracts with GRE.310 The contracts include a
number of exceptions to the all-requirements purchase obligation, including the
right of distribution cooperatives to self-supply up to 5% of power and energy,
which more than half of GRE’s all-requirements members have used to build

303. Power Purchase Contract, supra note 299, at 6. The member may reduce their obligation by
the percentage of the energy supplied by that resource from the Fixed Resource pool. Id.
304. WRIGHT-HENNEPIN COOP. ELEC. ASS’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2020, at 2 (2020),
https://www.whe.org/assets/documents/news-releases/gre-wh-solar-nr-2-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3
W3-FH7T] (describing how Wright-Hennepin worked with GRE to construct a 2.25 MW solar array
in Wright-Hennepin’s service area that GRE owns and uses to supply power to Wright-Hennepin).
305. Wholesale Power Contract by and Between Basin Electric Power Cooperative and Crow
Wing Cooperative Power & Light Company 1–2 (May 30, 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); Supplement and Amendment to Wholesale Power Contract by and Between Basin Electric
Cooperative and East River Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. 1 (Mar. 17, 2008) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
306. Member Moment: Wright-Hennepin Cooperative Electronic Association, GREAT RIVER ENERGY
(Dec. 16, 2020), https://greatriverenergy.com/member-moment-wright-hennepin-cooperativeelectric-association/ [https://perma.cc/V587-CVTU].
307. 15 Years of Regional Transmission Services, MISO MATTERS, http://timeline.misomatters.org/
[https://perma.cc/RZH5-3JKD] (showing the Great River Energy joined MISO as a transmissionowning member in October 2004).
308. Electric Power Markets, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/industries-data/market-assessments/
overview/electric-power-markets [https://perma.cc/58VC-KSCW].
309. See About MISO, MISO, https://www.misoenergy.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/2RB4DE9G]. Like all MISO members, GRE sells all of its generation output onto the market, and all of
GRE’s members are supplied with energy directly from the market rather than from GRE. GRE
INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN, supra note 294, at 63.
310. See GRE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN, supra note 294, at 4.
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renewable resources.311 GRE has partnered with its all-requirements
distribution cooperatives to support them as they add solar and other
distributed energy resources under their 5% self-supply allocation.312 Some
GRE members have capitalized on the flexibility afforded by self-supply
provisions to build innovative clean energy projects. In 2018, GRE’s largest allrequirements distribution cooperative, Connexus Energy, completed two solarplus-storage projects with solar arrays interconnected to lithium-ion batteries.313
Together, the arrays have 10 MW of production capacity and 15 MW of storage,
with the storage primarily used to align the delivery of solar energy to reduce
Connexus’s demand during GRE’s system peaks.314 Connexus dispatches power
from the batteries into the system at peak demand times, reducing its peak
demand charges from GRE.315
One of the most publicized components of GRE’s clean energy transition
has been its reduction in coal-fired power. In 2014, GRE negotiated a contract
termination with the owner of the Genoa 3 coal facility in Wisconsin, with
whom it had previously contracted to purchase 50% of the plant’s output.316
GRE retired its Stanton Station, a 189 MW coal facility, in 2017.317 GRE has

311. Id. at 4–5; Clean Energy Organizations’ Information Request No(s). 21-44 to Great River
Energy at 9, In re Great River Energy’s 2018-2032 Integrated Resource Plan, No. ET2/RP-17-286
(Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n July 21, 2017).
312. See Clean Energy Organizations’ Information Request No(s). 21-44 to Great River Energy,
supra note 311, at 9.
313. Connexus Energy Celebrates Innovative Solar-Plus-Storage Project, GREAT RIVER ENERGY (Nov.
15, 2018), https://greatriverenergy.com/connexus-energy-celebrates-innovative-solar-plus-storageproject/ [https://perma.cc/YMA6-53HK].
314. Id. This installation is the second-largest energy storage project in a cooperative nationwide
and the eighth-largest of any utility in the country. See 2019 Top 10 Winners, SMART ELEC. POWER
ALL., https://sepapower.org/2019-top-10-winners/ [https://perma.cc/L4ZM-YGE4]; NAT’L RURAL
UTIL. COOP. FIN. CO., COBANK & NRTC, BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE OVERVIEW 35 (2019),
https://www.cooperative.com/programs-services/bts/documents/reports/battery-energy-storageoverview-report-update-april-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/KRV7-A633].
315. See Connexus Energy Celebrates Innovative Solar-Plus-Storage Project, supra note 313. In August
2021, GRE’s largest member cooperative, Connexus Energy, announced its desire to exit its allrequirements power-supply contract with GRE that otherwise runs through 2045. Mike Hughlett,
Connexus Electricity Co-op Wants a New Power Deal with Great River Energy, STARTRIBUNE (Aug. 30,
2021, 12:01 AM), https://www.startribune.com/connexus-electricity-co-op-wants-a-new-power-dealwith-great-river-energy/600092131/ [https://perma.cc/RF8W-TZGY]. But because GRE’s contracts
do not include termination clauses, id., the terms of Connexus’s potential exit remain to be seen. Unlike
with other examples of distribution cooperatives exiting their relationship with their G&T, Connexus
and GRE have each expressed a desire to negotiate in good faith to find a solution. See id.
316. See GRE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN, supra note 294, at 32.
317. Id.; Stanton Station Celebrates 50 Years of Generation, GREAT RIVER ENERGY (Nov.
17, 2016), https://greatriverenergy.com/stanton-station-celebrates-50-years-of-generation/ [https://
perma.cc/5UQF-CDEG].
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announced that its Spiritwood Station,318 which is capable of running on either
coal or natural gas, will be modified to run exclusively on natural gas.319
More recently, after declaring in its 2018 Integrated Resource Plan that it
had no plans to retire the 1,151 MW Coal Creek Station coal facility in North
Dakota,320 GRE changed course in May 2020, announcing that it would shut
down the plant in the second half of 2022 or sell the plant.321 GRE estimated
that Coal Creek Station has lost money every year since 2008, including a $170
million loss in 2019, in comparison to replacement energy options.322 To meet
its electricity demand and reliability needs, GRE plans to add at least 900 MW
of wind energy purchases and a 1-MW long-duration battery by the end of
2023.323
But Coal Creek Station has faced unique political tensions due to
geography: Coal Creek Station is the largest power plant in North Dakota and
receives its coal from the adjoining Falkirk Mine, but almost all of GRE’s
members served by the power plant reside in Minnesota.324 After announcing
its intention to close Coal Creek Station, GRE attempted to negotiate with
officials in McLean County, North Dakota, to amend the county’s zoning
ordinances so that GRE could connect new wind projects with the high voltage
direct current (“HVDC”) transmission line connected to the plant.325 GRE’s
HVDC transmission line was built to connect Coal Creek Station with the
Twin Cities metro area in Minnesota—one of only a small number of HVDC
318. GRE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN, supra note 294, at 137.
319. See Press Release, Great River Energy, Major Power Supply Changes To Reduce Costs to
Member-Owner Cooperatives (May 7, 2020) [hereinafter Press Release, Major Power Supply],
https://greatriverenergy.com/major-power-supply-changes-to-reduce-costs-to-member-ownercooperatives/ [https://perma.cc/QZ2A-UGR5].
320. See GRE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN, supra note 294, at 135 (“[I]t is more cost effective
to continue to operate the plant than to retire it.”); id. at 71 (“We have no plans to retire Coal Creek
Station.”).
321. Press Release, Major Power Supply, supra note 319; see also Extension Request at 1, In re Great
River Energy’s 2022-2036 Resource Plan, No. ET2/RP-17-286 (Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n June 26,
2020); Press Release, Great River Energy, Long-Duration Battery Project in the Works (June 17, 2020)
[hereinafter Press Release, Long-Duration Battery Project], https://greatriverenergy.com/longduration-battery-project-in-the-works/ [https://perma.cc/8DVV-J8D3].
322. Dan Gearino, Plan To Save North Dakota Coal Plant Faces Intense Backlash from Minnesotans
Who Would Help Pay for It, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (July 23, 2021), https://insideclimatenews.
org/news/23072021/north-dakota-coal-minnesota-clean-energy-coal-creek/ [https://perma.cc/6BK2M4MQ] [hereinafter Gearino, North Dakota Coal Plant]; Amy R. Sisk, Coal Creek Power Plant Looking
for Solutions to Financial Woes, BISMARCK TRIB. (Feb. 7, 2020), https://bismarcktribune.com/news/
state-and-regional/coal-creek-power-plant-looking-for-solutions-to-financial-woes/article_5eabc71f98ea-5708-a2b6-ca855aebaff2.%e2%80%a6 [https://perma.cc/8PRF-UQ6V].
323. Press Release, Major Power Supply, supra note 319; see also Extension Request, supra note
321, at 1; Press Release, Long-Duration Battery Project, supra note 321.
324. See GRE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN, supra note 294, at 2, 6; see also About Us, E. CENT.
ENERGY, https://www.eastcentralenergy.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/38MS-7SLG].
325. Jeffrey Tomich, How a Coal Plant Closure Created Wind Bans and Grid Limbo, E&E NEWS
(July 24, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063617469/ [https://perma.cc/JD88-ZZ36].
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lines in the country.326 GRE also offered to make voluntary annual payments to
the local government equivalent to the amount Coal Creek Station would have
generated in local taxes for the five years following its closure.327 However, the
county board refused GRE’s request to help facilitate new wind generation and
instead enacted ordinances that limited the potential for wind resources in the
area surrounding Coal Creek Station that would utilize the existing HVDC line
if the plant were to be retired.328 To avoid the uncertainty and risks created by
the ordinances, GRE decided it would instead purchase new wind generation
interconnected to MISO via its existing peaking generation capacity in
Minnesota.329
Unable to utilize its HVDC line to transport wind energy from North
Dakota and facing increased concerns about market volatility after the 2021
polar vortex that saw market prices of electricity spike,330 GRE announced in
June 2021 that it had agreed to sell Coal Creek Station and the HVDC
transmission line to a private North Dakota-based power marketer.331 The buyer
intended to install carbon capture technology and incremental wind generation
near the plant, in part to meet the North Dakota governor’s goal of making the
326. Letter from David Saggau, President & Chief Exec. Officer of Great River Energy, to
McLean Cnty. Planning and Zoning Comm’n & Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs. (Mar. 25, 2020); Tomich,
supra note 325 (discussing the value of GRE’s HVDC line for transporting wind energy in the MISO
region and North Dakota’s effort to limit the use of wind energy in an effort to support the state’s coal
mines and coal-fired power plants); see also FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, REPORT ON BARRIERS AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR HIGH VOLTAGE TRANSMISSION 3 (2020) (stating that high voltage
transmission can “improve the reliability and resilience of the transmission system by allowing utilities
to share generating resources, enhance the stability of the existing transmission system, aid with
restoration and recovery after an event, and improve frequency response and ancillary services
throughout the existing system” as well as provide “greater access to location-constrained resources in
support of renewable resource goals”); U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ASSESSING HVDC
TRANSMISSION FOR IMPACTS OF NON-DISPATCHABLE GENERATION 9–16 (2018) (discussing the
role of HVDC lines in integrating more renewable energy into the electric grid); Press Release, Great
River Energy, Great River Energy Analyzes Future of Unique Transmission System (June 17, 2020),
https://greatriverenergy.com/great-river-energy-analyzes-future-of-unique-transmission-system/
[https://perma.cc/GBP4-777A] (noting that GRE was also open to selling Coal Creek Station bundled
with the interconnection rights to the HVDC line).
327. Press Release, Major Power Supply, supra note 319.
328. Amy R. Sisk, As Co-op Considers Closing Coal Creek, Concerns Play Out in Zoning Spat,
BISMARCK TRIB. (Apr. 19, 2020), https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/as-co-opconsiders-closing-coal-creek-concerns-play-out-in-zoning-spat/article_e38f60d4-d05d-51c5-abec0a341af10c44.html [https://perma.cc/52A9-YP7J].
329. GREAT RIVER ENERGY, 2021 INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN 1–2 (2021),
https://greatriverenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/2021-Integrated-Resource-Plan-040121.
pdf [https://perma.cc/6V4F-RT9K].
330. GREAT RIVER ENERGY, JULY 1, 2021 GRE MEMBER BRIEFING 12 (2021) [hereinafter
GRE MEMBER BRIEFING], https://www.dakotaelectric.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/RedactedPowerPoint-07-01-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/CE6F-TMKZ].
331. Press Release, Great River Energy, Rainbow Energy Center To Purchase Coal Creek Station
(June 30, 2021) [hereinafter Press Release, Rainbow Energy Center], https://greatriverenergy.com/
rainbow-energy-center-to-purchase-coal-creek-station/ [https://perma.cc/4J8Y-DFVB].
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state carbon neutral by 2030.332 Under the proposed sale, GRE would continue
to purchase the full output of Coal Creek Station for two years and then less
than one-third of the plant’s current rated output for eight additional years.333
GRE estimates that moving from a plan to retire Coal Creek Station to a plan
to sell the plant and the HVDC line will delay GRE’s need to build new peaking
capacity or expand market purchases through the length of its agreed ten-year
contract with the new owner of Coal Creek Station.334 However, as of
September 2021, the sale was undergoing additional public comment ordered
by the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission specifically related to the sale of
the HVDC transmission line that serves Minnesota.335
Collectively, GRE’s actions will dramatically alter its energy supply,
increasing its renewable energy capacity, primarily through power purchase
agreements, from 650 MW in 2020 to more than 1,500 MW by 2025, which will
bring its energy mix to 61% renewable.336 In doing so, GRE will increase its
reliance on bilateral or market purchases of energy while pursuing additional
contracts for capacity, upgrading existing peaking plants, and potentially
expanding demand response programs.337 At the same time GRE has attempted
to scale back its coal investments, it has also accelerated its electric transmission
investments. GRE was a founding member and participant in CapX2020, a
transmission-development initiative which includes eleven municipal utilities,
investor-owned utilities, and cooperatives.338 The final result of the CapX2020
initiative included the installation of eight hundred miles of new transmission

332. See Gearino, North Dakota Coal Plant, supra note 322. According to unofficial reports, GRE
will sell Coal Creek Station for just $1, with the associated high-voltage power line commanding $225
million. Id.; see also Press Release, Rainbow Energy Center, supra note 331; Press Release, Sen. John
Hoeven, Hoeven: Carbon Capture Is Coal Creek’s Next Chapter (June 30, 2021), https://www.hoeven.
senate.gov/news/news-releases/hoeven-carbon-capture-is-coal-creeks-next-chapter [https://perma.cc/
GP9G-7PVN].
333. GRE MEMBER BRIEFING, supra note 330, at 73 (“Purchase power agreement with Rainbow.
10-year purchase for capacity and energy[;] 1050 MW through February 2023[;] 300 MW thereafter.”).
334. Id. (“PPA [power purchase agreement] capacity purchase delays peaking fleet capacity
investment until 2032 . . . [and] [r]educes market capacity purchases by 100 MW until 2032.”).
335. Mike Hughlett, PUC Delays Approval of Great River Power Line Sale, STARTRIBUNE (Sept. 9,
2021, 6:42 PM), https://www.startribune.com/puc-delays-approval-of-great-river-power-line-sale/
600095575/?refresh=true [https://perma.cc/EG2B-ME2Z].
336. See Press Release, Major Power Supply, supra note 319; see also Power Supply Interim Update,
supra note 297, at 1, 3.
337. See Extension Request, supra note 321, at 4; GREAT RIVER ENERGY, REQUEST FOR
PROPOSALS FOR LONG-TERM CAPACITY 3–4 (July 2, 2020), https://aces-wpengine.netdnassl.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/GRE-Capacity-RFP-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/PRV9-46JF].
338. CAPX2020, CAPX 2050 TRANSMISSION VISION REPORT 7 (Mar. 2020), http://www.
capx2020.com/documents/CapX2050_TransmissionVisionReport_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NP
6-XURM].
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lines and twenty-two substations, enabling the interconnection of 3,600 MW
of wind generation on the MISO grid.339
GRE’s reduction in its owned generation capacity, coupled with
significant access to transmission, may ultimately become a more significant
factor in its clean energy transition than its stated commitment to reducing its
use of coal-fired power. This is because it signals a greater emphasis on its role
as a transmission entity with the flexibility to rely on the market and distributed
energy resources to meet its energy and capacity needs. In this transition, GRE
is reenvisioning its relationship with its member utilities as one that had been
historically rooted in providing a vehicle for collective investment in centralized
power plant assets. GRE has the opportunity to demonstrate a new model for
G&T cooperatives—one that maintains the cooperative’s position as an entity
that facilitates collective action and captures economies of scale to benefit its
members, while still supporting distributed energy resources, transmission of
power over long distances, and flexibility to balance loads over short and long
time scales. GRE’s collaborative strategy with its member distribution utilities
is aided in this transition by its history of relatively more flexible power supply
contracts, geography in the wind-rich Upper Midwest, and status as an active
member of MISO.
C.

Change Through Grassroots Advocacy and Member Accountability

Another lever of change for cooperatives is increasing member
representation, accountability to members, and member self-organizing. Here,
we highlight several examples of cooperative members more actively
participating in their cooperatives, thereby increasing democratic control.
While some examples highlight the autonomy and independence of cooperative
members organizing themselves, other examples illustrate cooperation among
cooperatives and other not-for-profit organizations through national and
regional grassroots organizations that have organized cooperative members to
advocate for greater transparency and to more actively engage in the democratic
channels of control.340
Increasing member accountability is occurring through contemporary
efforts to engage cooperative members to actively participate in cooperative
339. Id. at 8, 13, 32–34 (analyzing impacts of the electric industry’s shift away from generation by
large-scale fossil fuel plants (“dispatchable energy,” like that offered by Coal Creek) to “nondispatchable” resources like wind or solar and discussing the role that various technologies could play
in avoiding intermittency and other concerns associated with non-dispatchable resources).
340. There are also important examples of self-organization without external instigation in
some cooperatives. See, e.g., Ivy Main, Customer-Owned Utilities Should Be Leaders on Clean Energy.
Why Do Most of Them Fail To Deliver?, APPALACHIAN VOICES (July 9, 2019), https://appvoices.org/
2019/07/09/customer-owned-utilities-should-be-leaders-on-clean-energy/ [https://perma.cc/8QKW-R
VVU] (describing efforts of a group called Repower REC, led by members of the Rappahannock
Electric Cooperative, to promote reform board candidates).
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governance, to vote in favor of clean energy initiatives at the G&T and
distribution cooperative levels, and to promote issues of equity—including
gender and racial justice—within the cooperative structure.341 Across the
electric-utility sector, despite broad agreement that diversity improves
reputation and financial performance,342 gender and racial representation is less
equal than in other sectors. In 2015, across all types of utilities (not just
cooperatives), only 5% of boards included women and less than 15% of board
members of the largest utilities were Black or Latino.343 Issues of equity across
racial and gender differences should be viewed as legitimately falling within
cooperatives’ duties in line with the Cooperative Principle of open and
voluntary membership. According to this principle, “[m]embership in a
cooperative is open to all people who can reasonably use its services and stand
willing to accept the responsibility of membership, regardless of race, religion,
gender, or economic circumstances.”344
The movement for racial equity in cooperatives is particularly prevalent
in the southeastern United States, where cooperatives have historically served
a large percentage of Black members who are not well represented on
cooperative governing boards.345 Racial disparities between cooperative boards
and cooperative members exist in many Southeastern rural electric
cooperatives.346 In Georgia, for example, 96.5% of rural electric cooperative

341. See, e.g., Derrick Johnson & Ashura Lewis, Organizing for Energy Democracy in Rural Electric
Cooperatives, in ENERGY DEMOCRACY 93, 98–100 (Denise Fairchild & Al Weinrub eds., 2017).
342. ALISON KAY, ERNST & YOUNG GLOB. LTD., TALENT AT THE TABLE: INDEX OF WOMEN
IN POWER AND UTILITIES 14 (2014), https://esmap.org/sites/esmap.org/files/DocumentLibrary/EYWomen-in-P%26U-May2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/WUY8-8MR2].
343. See QUADRENNIAL ENERGY REV., supra note 48, at 5-3.
344. Understanding the Seven Cooperative Principles, supra note 25; see also ELEC. COOP.
GOVERNANCE TASK FORCE, supra note 116, at 44 (highlighting the NRECA and CFC Electric
Cooperative Governance Task Force’s recommendation that an electric cooperative’s board of directors
should “reflect[] the diversity of the cooperative’s membership” and that cooperatives and their boards
should “solicit diverse individuals to seek [nomination and] election” to boards); Victoria A. Rocha,
Diversity, Equity, Inclusion: “So Our Entire Community Can Flourish,” RE MAG. (Jan. 1, 2021),
https://www.cooperative.com/remagazine/articles/pages/co-ops-diversity-equity-inclusion-so-ourentire-community-can-flourish.aspx [https://perma.cc/5SKE-T7FX] (describing recent efforts in
cooperatives to advance diversity, equity, and inclusion).
345. See, e.g., Henry Leifermann & Pat Wehner, A Question of Power: Race and Democracy in Rural
Electric Co-ops, 18 S. CHANGES 3, 15 (1996) (showing racial and gender demographic information for
cooperative boards by state as compared to cooperative members by state).
346. See, e.g., Racial Capitalism, Designs for Energy Transition and the Green New Deal, OPEN
TRANSCRIPTS (Dec. 5, 2019), http://opentranscripts.org/transcript/racial-capitalism-energytransition-green-new-deal/ [https://perma.cc/BSV9-AEAP] (transcribing a moderated conversation in
which Jacqui Patterson, Director of the NAACP Environmental and Climate Justice Program, stated:
“We worked a lot in the in the [sic] south in Mississippi and Alabama and so forth. And when we talk
about kind of taxation without representation, we worked with the rural electric coops there, and were
just struck by the fact that we have kind of a modern day Apartheid when it comes to rural electricity
coops, which is how a lot of folks in those areas get their electricity, where for the most part these rural
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board members are White and only 3.5% are Black despite the counties served
by many cooperatives in the state having much higher percentages of Black
residents.347 The board member racial statistics are similar in Mississippi and
Louisiana, which have even higher percentages of Black cooperative
members.348
When it comes to gender disparities, the inequality is also stark, with men
constituting over 90% of cooperative board members across the country, as of
2012.349 This lack of diversity is also reflected in cooperative leadership on a
national level. The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
(“NRECA”), the national trade group for cooperatives, has forty-eight board
members—one for each state where rural electric cooperatives provide power—
and as of 2020, only three board members are women and only two are nonWhite.350
A range of member-led organizations are working to bring about more
racial, gender, and social equity in cooperative leadership along with a strong
emphasis on clean energy transition.351 Some of these organizations operate on
a national level, while others, particularly in the southeastern United States, are
regional in scope. For instance, the New Economy Coalition (“NEC”) is a
national organization founded in 2012 “to support a just transition from an
extractive to a regenerative economy by building the scale and power of the
solidarity economy movement in Black, Indigenous, and working class
communities in every region of the United States.”352 NEC now includes two
hundred and eight member organizations representing local and national groups
from a large spectrum of movements.353 One of the NEC working groups is the

electric coops are in primarily African American jurisdictions where the entire boards of directors for
the rural electric coops are white American”).
347. LAB. NEIGHBOR RSCH. & TRAINING CTR & ACORN INT’L, THE CRISIS IN RURAL
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES IN THE SOUTH 12 (2016); GA. WATCH, GEORGIA ELECTRIC
MEMBERSHIP COOPERATIVES: IRC § 501(C)(12) COMPLIANCE AND TRANSPARENCY 7–8 (2015),
https://www.georgiawatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/GEORGIA-EMCs_Report-on-IRSCompliance-and-Transparency.pdf [https://perma.cc/TF8W-S9BU].
348. LAB. NEIGHBOR RSCH. & TRAINING CTR & ACORN INT’L, supra note 347, at 15–18.
349. See Phil Kenkel, The Need for Board Diversity in Agricultural Cooperatives, OKLA. ST. UNIV.
EXTENSION AGEC-1069, AGEC-1069-2 (Jan. 2020), https://extension.okstate.edu/fact-sheets/theneed-for-board-diversity-in-agricultural-cooperatives.html [https://perma.cc/S3QD-YG6H] (citing a
study conducted in 2012 finding that females represented 8.9% of rural electric cooperative boards).
350. See Board of Directors 2021, NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, https://www.electric.coop/
our-organization/board-of-directors/ [https://perma.cc/W7WQ-TYHZ].
351. Telephone Interview with Shiva Patel, Energy Just. Trainer, Energy Democracy Leadership
Inst. (July 24, 2020) [hereinafter Patel Interview].
352. About NEC: Our Mission, NEW ECON. COAL., https://neweconomy.net/about [https://perma.
cc/PRY2-ECF6]; see also About NEC: Our History, NEW ECON. COAL., https://neweconomy.net/
about/#history [https://perma.cc/23KS-GLF8].
353. See Member Directory, NEW ECON. COAL., https://neweconomy.net/#our-members
[https://perma.cc/4WKP-XJFJ]. These member organizations include representative groups for
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Rural Electric Cooperative Working Group (“RECWG”),354 which strives to
re-democratize the rural electric cooperative and push for renewable energy.355
To help facilitate the reorganization of hundreds of individual cooperatives
across the country, RECWG created the Rural Electric Cooperative Toolkit as
a resource for cooperative members engaging in the democratic process.356 This
toolkit covers topics ranging from what a rural electric cooperative is to
understanding bylaws, elections, and cooperative finance.357 Additionally,
RECWG undertook a mapping project that allows NEC’s member groups to
map energy burden.358
We Own It is another national organization that seeks to organize
members of rural electric cooperatives. The group’s mission is to “[c]atalyz[e]
citizen action for democracy, participation, and excellence in cooperatives,
through member education and organizing.”359 We Own It identifies a lack of
transparency, information, and resources as major barriers to greater turnout in
board elections, and therefore, to democratic control of cooperatives.360 Many
members of rural electric cooperatives do not know they are member-owners
who can vote for board of directors nominees.361 We Own It recognizes the
potential for rural electric cooperatives to be a major driving force of a shift to
renewable energy.362 For instance, its network director has stated that “[w]e
need to make sure that rural communities are part of the Green New Deal
worker’s rights, climate action, community-based venture capital, cooperative democratization, racial
equity, education, and more. See id.
354. Our Work & Programs: Member Working Groups, NEW ECON. COAL., https://neweconomy.
net/our-work/ [https://perma.cc/89CW-V9HG].
355. The Rural Electric Cooperative working group is made up of member organizations including
Clean Energy Works, We Own It, MACED, and CURE. (Rural Electric) Power to the People!, NEW
ECON. COAL. (Aug. 15, 2019), https://neweconomy.net/rural-electric-power-to-the-people/ [https://
perma.cc/J757-F68N]; see also Johanna Bozuwa, Nikita Perumal, Adam Simpson & Chris Woolery,
Democratizing Power in Rural America Through Electric Co-ops, NEXT SYS. PROJECT (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://thenextsystem.org/learn/stories/democratizing-power-rural-america-through-electric-co-ops
[https://perma.cc/RY6E-NXC6].
356. Rural Electric Cooperative Toolkit, ELEC. COOP. ORG., https://www.electriccooporganizing.
org/toolkit [https://perma.cc/Y238-KPTP].
357. Id.
358. See Sam Zacher, Liz Veazey, Chris Woolery & Erik Hatlestad, Community Power: How
Grassroots Organizing Coalitions Are Democratizing Rural Electricity, TROUBLE (Dec. 7, 2019),
https://www.the-trouble.com/content/2019/12/7/community-power-how-three-grassroots-organizersare-democratizing-rural-energy [https://perma.cc/RG3Q-QUVV]. Energy burden is defined as the
“percentage of gross household income spent on energy costs.” State and Local Solutions Center: LowIncome Community Energy Solutions, OFF. ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, https://
www.energy.gov/eere/slsc/low-income-community-energy-solutions [https://perma.cc/T56K-B726].
359. About Us, WE OWN IT, https://weown.it/about [https://perma.cc/W2JD-THS8].
360. 72% of cooperatives have less than 10% average turnout for board elections. See Grimley, supra
note 79; see also Spinak, supra note 51, at 241–46 (explaining the enduring low participation in rural
electric cooperative elections).
361. Zacher et al., supra note 358.
362. See id.
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conversation . . . [c]o-ops can really be this local democratic institution that can
engage people to develop the local vision for a Green New Deal and then carry
it out.”363
In the Southeast, there are several grassroots organizations with similar
goals focused on the specific needs of the region. For example, the Partnership
for Southern Equity (“PSE”) is an advocacy group based in Georgia with the
mission of “advanc[ing] policies and institutional actions that promote racial
equity and shared prosperity for all in the growth of metropolitan Atlanta and
the American South.”364 Started in 2008, the group’s efforts encompass a broad
set of goals and advocacy platforms.365 One of PSE’s advocacy platforms is Just
Energy.366 The Just Energy platform is designed to address racial inequity to
create a “fair distribution of benefits and burdens from energy production and
consumption.”367 The coalition “organiz[es] and engag[es] marginalized
communities and communities of color around the sourcing and
commodification of power and generation in the south.”368 This includes
empowering marginalized residents to run for seats on cooperative boards.369
PSE also supports leadership development through the Just Energy Academy,
designed to teach skills to advocates so that they may be leaders in their own
communities, engage in community organizing, and convene technical experts
with community members to advance clean energy.370
The Advancing Equity and Opportunity Collaborative (“AEO”) was cofounded in 2014 by organizers from nearly twenty groups, including PSE,
across eleven states with the goal of building more grassroots power around
equity and justice in the South.371 AEO has six core values that guide its work:
Specificity of Place, Collaboration, Participatory Democracy, Frontline
363. Id.
364. Home, P’SHIP FOR S. EQUITY, https://psequity.org/ [https://perma.cc/E3NL-CQQ6].
365. See id.
366. Just Energy, P’SHIP FOR S. EQUITY, https://psequity.org/just-energy/ [https://perma.cc/
K8VK-E6QP].
367. Id.; see also Looking Forward to the Next Just Energy Summit, YOUTUBE (APR. 9, 2019),
https://youtu.be/SvgS1cvfUv8?t=30 [https://perma.cc/66QU-9FMC] (statement of Nathaniel Smith,
founder and Chief Equity Officer) (“Energy systems are disproportionately affecting in a negative
way . . . communities of color.”).
368. Just Energy Circle, P’SHIP FOR S. EQUITY, https://sites.google.com/view/pse-just-energycircle [https://perma.cc/G4PS-7BBL].
369. Case Studies, WILD ENERGY, https://www.choosewildenergy.org/toolkit/case_studies.html
[https://perma.cc/SSJ5-MKPB].
370. See Home, JUST ENERGY ACAD., http://justenergyacademy.org/ [https://perma.cc/RV5K3LNZ] (“Provide knowledge, leadership skills, and tools for participants to effectively engage
stakeholders and community member[s] regarding energy equity, racial equity, climate justice and
energy policies that impact their communities.”).
371. See Meet the AEO Collaborative, AEO COLLABORATIVE, https://sites.google.com/view/
aeocollaborative/meet-the-aeo-collaborative [https://perma.cc/6YF2-YVHT]; Patel Interview, supra
note 351.
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Leadership, Solidarity, and Compassion.372 AEO is designed to be a “regional
organizing platform” to encourage collaboration between the groups and ensure
a base of support for each individual organization’s campaigns.373 In 2015, AEO
partnered with the Southeast Climate and Energy Network to address climate
change as part of the focus on equity and opportunity.374 This led to the creation
of the Democratizing Rural Electric Co-ops (“DREC”) working group to focus
on furthering these goals within rural electric cooperatives.375 Through strategic
planning and implementation, DREC created a master plan for rural electric
cooperative democratization that included drafting model state legislation,
addressing coal debt, and pushing for solar investment and energy efficiency
within cooperatives.376
These organizations are leveraging the structure of rural electric
cooperatives to allow them to act as a democratic engine for both clean energy
transition and greater racial and social equity. But change from the bottom up
takes time. One example of this is the Roanoke Electric Cooperative, which
serves a majority-Black area of North Carolina.377 In the 1960s, Black
community leaders helped elect the first Black board member of a rural electric
cooperative; today, two-thirds of Roanoke’s board members are Black.378 Over
this time, Roanoke has become a leader in the community for economic
opportunity and clean energy. For example, Roanoke implemented a program
to preserve forest land and support Black farmers with financial assistance.379
Roanoke was also one of the first utilities in the country to adopt innovative
financing programs that increase the affordability of energy-efficient home
upgrades to lower the bills of low-income members.380
In recent years, there has been evidence that the kind of grassroots,
member-driven change exemplified by cooperatives like Roanoke and
Pedernales381 could be replicated. Curtis Wynn, the CEO of Roanoke, was
elected to serve as NRECA’s board president for 2020–2021, becoming the
372. Meet the AEO Collaborative, supra note 371.
373. See Just Energy Circle, supra note 368.
374. Seandra Pope, Keya Chatterjee & Danielle Hilton, An Inclusive Climate Movement Starts To
Rise in the Southeast, GRIST (Apr. 30, 2015), https://grist.org/article/an-inclusive-climate-movementstarts-to-rise-in-the-southeast/ [https://perma.c/Z8AQ-SP6D].
375. Patel Interview, supra note 351.
376. Id.
377. See Grant Williams, Community Power: Fighting To Remain in Rural America II, COLAB RADIO
(Nov. 8, 2016, 7:29 AM), http://colabradio.mit.edu/community-power-fighting-to-remain-in-ruralamerica-ii/ [https://perma.cc/2AU3-LA6K].
378. Id.
379. See id.
380. See id.; Nate Berg, With No Upfront Costs, This Innovative Financing Tool Makes Energy Efficiency
Affordable to All, ENSIA (Feb. 26, 2019), https://ensia.com/articles/energy-efficiency/ [https://perma.
cc/SKA7-8BGU].
381. See supra notes 155–57.
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group’s first Black president.382 Since assuming the NRECA board presidency,
Wynn has been particularly welcoming to the grassroots advocacy groups
discussed in this section—inviting some to the NRECA annual meeting,
listening to their concerns, and engaging in outreach.383 Thus, strengthening
member accountability creates another pathway, along with the cooperative
board actions discussed earlier in this part, to spur a self-governed, clean energy
transition in cooperatives.
IV. COOPERATIVE CLEAN ENERGY
In this part, we discuss how to implement “cooperative clean energy.”
While we have documented examples of cooperative self-governance
challenges,384 we argue that a reinvigoration of the foundational Cooperative
Principles is the most promising path forward for cooperatives to meet the
challenges and seize the opportunities of the clean energy transition.385 Building
on the case studies in Part III, we argue how this can be done through four areas
of reform:
1. increasing the value of the clean energy transition by more closely
integrating cooperatives in wholesale markets;
2. new approaches to cost allocation for clean energy investments;
3. new approaches for the retirement of existing fossil fuel infrastructure;
and
4. bolstering support for internal governance that represents all
cooperative members equitably.
These proposals come with a few caveats. First, we recognize that not all
the proposals are appropriate for all cooperatives. Cooperatives vary
significantly in terms of their history, contractual relationships, geography,
382. See Shiva Patel & Wan Smith, It’s Time To Democratize the Rural Energy System, MEDIUM
(May 8, 2020), https://medium.com/center-for-biological-diversity/its-time-to-democratize-the-ruralenergy-system-2cd5740398e7 [https://perma.cc/E6PL-96ZP] (“Curtis Wynn, the first African
American president of NRECA . . . gave a remarkable keynote speech that addressed the need
to embrace innovation, transparency and diversity.”); see also LAB. NEIGHBOR RSCH. &
TRAINING CTR. & ACORN INT’L, supra note 347, at 32 (discussing Roanoke Electric Cooperative);
FARRELL ET AL., supra note 101, at 11 (discussing Roanoke); Along Those Lines, Episode 9:
NRECA’s President Curtis Wynn Looks to Co-ops’ Future, NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N
(June 14, 2019), https://www.electric.coop/along-those-lines-episode-9-nreca-president-curtis-wynn
[https://perma.cc/HQ8Z-R92R] (interviewing Curtis Wynn).
383. Patel & Smith, supra note 382 (“Our group of 30 or so people [from groups associated with
AEO] came to this year’s [NRECA] annual meeting because there is finally a leader at the highest level
of co-op governance who shares our principles, values and vision for cleaner, inclusive and transparent
cooperatives across the country.”).
384. See supra Section I.C.
385. See supra Part II.
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existing and potentially available energy resources and infrastructure, state
regulatory environments, and member preferences. Nevertheless, we believe
there are many aspects of these proposals that are suitable for a broad range of
cooperatives around the country that can no longer ignore the financial risks
associated with continued reliance on the legacy system predominantly run on
fossil fuels. Further, as democratic institutions, cooperatives are likely to see
increased pressures from their members to transition to clean energy. As a
result, cooperatives will continue to hold important agency in directing their
membership’s interest toward proven and innovative approaches to clean
energy deployment that align with their members’ preferences and needs.386
Moreover, in proposing nonregulatory solutions, we do not mean to
downplay the role that state and federal policy can play in supporting clean
energy transition generally and for rural electric cooperatives specifically. For
example, in states that impose clean energy mandates on cooperatives, these
laws can serve as a backstop or as an added incentive to meet environmental
goals. As discussed in Part III, Tri-State announced in early 2020 that it was
retiring its coal plants in New Mexico and Colorado (but not in other states) to
meet those states’ aggressive carbon-free energy mandates.387 Likewise, in
Minnesota, GRE has cited federal policies and the state’s renewable energy
standard as reasons it is accelerating the closing of coal plants and drastically
reducing its carbon footprint.388 While these state laws are important where
they exist, many states, including those with a strong cooperative presence, do
not impose meaningful clean energy mandates on any power providers and do

386. See, e.g., Cary Funk & Meg Hefferon, U.S. Public Views on Climate and Energy, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2019/11/25/u-s-public-views-on-climateand-energy/ [https://perma.cc/K2ZS-QMDQ] (finding that, in 2019, 77% of U.S. adults held the
opinion that it was a more important priority to develop alternative energy than expand
fossil fuels); Jennifer Marlon, Peter Howe, Matto Mildenberger, Anthony Leiserowitz
& Xinran Wang, Yale Climate Opinion Maps 2020, YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE
COMMC’NS, https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us/ [https://perma.cc/
W3M2-XQJK] (finding that, in 2020, 68% of U.S. adults overall, and at least 50% of adults in every
congressional district, supported setting strict carbon dioxide limits on existing coal-fired power
plants); David Roberts, Utilities Have a Problem: The Public Wants 100% Renewable Energy,
and Quick, VOX (Oct. 18, 2018, 9:19 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/
9/14/17853884/utilities-renewable-energy-100-percent-public-opinion [https://perma.cc/3WEE-F6L2
(staff-uploaded archive)] (according to a utility-industry-funded study, in 2018, 70% of the public
agreed that “in the near future, we should produce 100% of our electricity from renewable energy
sources such as solar and wind”).
387. See supra Section III.A.
388. See GREAT RIVER ENERGY, RESOLUTION GRE R13-8-1: GREAT RIVER ENERGY (“GRE”)
PLAN TO REDUCE EXPOSURE TO GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION 1 (2013), http://cms.bepc.
com/sites/CMS/files/files/pdf/Energy-Producing-States/05-2014-Great-River-Energy-resolution.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RG2V-AAJE]; GREAT RIVER ENERGY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND
CONSERVATION 1–2 (2019), https://greatriverener.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2019energy-efficiency-conservation-statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7NP-UP5F].
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not appear poised to do so anytime soon.389 At the federal level, the Biden
administration announced in 2021 a proposal for $10 billion for federal
partnerships with rural electric cooperatives to retire polluting power plants and
fund clean-energy replacements.390 Thus, we acknowledge that state and federal
policy—as well as external third-parties—can play important roles as backstops
and complements to cooperative self-governance.
Due to their historical foundation as community-created self-help
organizations, we argue that the most important levers for change in
cooperatives are internal. However, the internal governance of cooperatives is
not well understood by scholars and advocates because, unlike with regulated
utilities, there is a minimal public record of the internal decision-making and
“self-regulation” of cooperatives. As a result, there is a bias in the prior (limited)
legal scholarship and in the agendas of advocates toward strengthening external
regulation of cooperatives.391 In formulating our recommendations, we build on
the foundational norms that guide the self-governance of cooperatives—the
seven Cooperative Principles. But we also recognize that our recommendations
must be filtered through the contextual understanding of these norms within
individual cooperatives.392 And, as an overarching recommendation, we suggest
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, NRECA, state rural electric cooperative
associations, and other adjacent organizations build a stronger system of support
for cooperative governance.
Finally, the clean energy transition is made more urgent by the imperative
of addressing climate change.393 Approaches to the clean energy transition that
require legislative policy change or significant restructuring of utilities as a
precondition to deploying clean energy threaten to delay progress within the
narrowing window of opportunity to protect public health and welfare from
climate change. This is particularly true because the fundamental economics of
clean energy on their own create a real potential for alignment between
historically divergent parties (especially cooperatives and environmental
advocates) in the near- to medium-term. And so clean energy deployment need
not necessarily rely on restructuring and new legislation as a precondition for
389. Sophia Ptacek & Amanda Levin, Race to 100% Clean, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Dec. 2,
2020), https://www.nrdc.org/resources/race-100-clean [https://perma.cc/FU54-52NE] (providing
dynamic maps showing states with renewable portfolio standards and clean energy mandates).
390. THE WHITE HOUSE, HOW THE AMERICAN JOBS PLAN WILL CREATE JOBS IN RURAL
AMERICA 3 (2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/American-JobsPlan_Rural-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2L4-AZAZ].
391. See sources cited supra note 23.
392. See Stephanie Lenhart, Gabriel Chan, Lindsey Forsberg, Matthew Grimley & Elizabeth
Wilson, Municipal Utilities and Electric Cooperatives in the United States: Interpretative Frames, Strategic
Actions, and Place-Specific Transitions, 36 ENV’T INNOVATION & SOCIETAL TRANSITIONS 17, 17
(2020).
393. See, e.g., The Climate Crisis: A Race We Can Win, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/
un75/climate-crisis-race-we-can-win [https://perma.cc/W8CV-5GFR].
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action. It is in this narrowing window before us when some of the most
important decisions need to be made to avoid the worst impacts of climate
change.
A.

Increasing the Value of the Clean Energy Transition for Cooperatives Through
Wholesale Market Integration

The fundamental economics of clean energy have improved dramatically
in the past few decades.394 However, continuing to grow the value of clean
energy—particularly large-scale renewable energy and distributed energy
resources—will depend on the ability to integrate clean energy into wholesale
markets. Wholesale market integration increases clean energy’s value generally
by allowing intermittent renewable energy to be balanced over a more
diversified pool of resources, both geographically and by resource type.395
Rural electric cooperatives could see particular benefit through the parallel
expansion of wholesale markets with clean energy adoption. Increasing
participation in wholesale markets could also be made consistent with the
Cooperative Principle of autonomy and independence, which guides
cooperatives to “enter into agreements with other organizations . . . on terms
that ensure democratic control as well as their unique identity.”396 On the one
hand, increasing participation in wholesale markets could give rural electric
cooperatives greater flexibility in accessing low-cost resources across regional
transmission networks. This can be an important enabling factor for
cooperatives seeking greater flexibility to meet their members’ energy needs as
they reduce obligations to legacy capital investments. However, in expanding
their participation in wholesale markets, cooperatives would also lose some
degree of autonomy, as they face greater exposure to changing wholesale
prices.397 Overall, cooperatives need to consider their participation in wholesale
markets as a balanced tradeoff between more flexible and affordable power
supply options on the one hand and potentially reduced control over short-run
power costs on the other hand. A long-term perspective suggests that the
benefits of participation are likely to outweigh the costs in contexts where

394. See supra Part II.
395. ADVANCED ENERGY ECON., PUTTING DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES TO
WORK IN WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS 2–3 (2019), https://info.aee.net/hubfs/Putting%20
Distributed%20Energy%20Resources%20to%20Work%20in%20Wholesale%20Electricity%20Markets.
pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9CB-RQ72].
396. Understanding the Seven Cooperative Principles, supra note 25.
397. See, e.g., Jaclyn Diaz, Texas Energy Co-op Files for Bankruptcy After Storm, High Bill, NPR
(Mar. 1, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/03/01/972408584/texas-energy-co-op-files-forbankruptcy-after-storm-high-bill [https://perma.cc/37PP-HCLZ] (describing how one G&T
cooperative in Texas filed for bankruptcy to protect its members from rate increases after experiencing
unprecedented wholesale market price volatility during the winter storms of February 2021).
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markets can add value to cooperative members through lower energy costs and
more feasible attainment of a reliable supply of clean energy.
As resource patterns change, the value of participation in wholesale
markets will also change in proportion to the benefits that participants can
realize in leveraging markets to reduce the costs of providing reliable electricity.
Currently, areas with lower-cost wind, solar, and natural gas see the greatest
benefit to wholesale market participation. Further, recent FERC orders to
facilitate the integration of energy storage and distributed energy resources
could help utilities, including cooperatives, create new opportunities to deploy
resources at the distribution-scale that create value for the entire G&T through
wholesale market integration.398 These orders could create new opportunities to
align wholesale market participation with cooperative goals, particularly if the
Cooperative Principle of autonomy and independence to deploy distributed
energy resources by individual member-owners and distribution cooperatives is
balanced with the principle of cooperation among cooperatives to grow value
for all affected members and protect against cross-subsidization.
With regard to the growth and value of wholesale markets, in 2020, about
two-thirds of electric load in the United States was delivered through electricity
markets and coordinated transmission systems within RTOs/ISOs.399 Neither
Congress nor FERC have mandated that power providers join RTOs/ISOs,
with FERC instead choosing to provide financial incentives for joining them.400
Notably, parts of the country without RTOs/ISOs are also areas with many
cooperatives—the Southeast and Intermountain West. However, this is
beginning to change. In 2014, power providers in the West formed an “Energy
Imbalance Market” designed to create a real-time market for low-cost energy

398. See Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission
Organizations and Independent System Operators, 162 FERC ¶ 61,127 (Feb. 15, 2018); Participation
of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission
Organizations and Independent System Operators, 172 FERC ¶ 61,247 (Sept. 17, 2020).
399. See Electric Power Markets, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N (OCT. 23, 2020),
https://www.ferc.gov/industries-data/market-assessments/electric-power-markets [https://perma.cc/K
3AQ-BBPR].
400. Electric Transmission Incentives Policy Under Section 219 of the Federal Power Act, 86 Fed.
Reg. 21972 (proposed Apr. 26, 2021) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
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throughout the region, better integrate renewable energy, reduce costs, and
enhance grid reliability.401 In 2020, similar efforts began in the Southeast.402
These regional collaborations, whether or not they become full-fledged
FERC-regulated RTOs/ISOs, create significant opportunities for rural electric
cooperatives. Cooperatives do not have the same profit incentives to build
electricity infrastructure as investor-owned utilities, which receive a rate of
return on most capital investments in electricity generation, transmission, and
distribution but do not receive a rate of return from purchased power (either
purchased bilaterally or in markets). Thus, cooperatives could choose to rely
more heavily on obtaining energy and capacity from regional markets, which
are better able to integrate large-scale renewable energy, without the financial
disincentives of doing so that exist for investor-owned utilities. However, in
relying on wholesale markets for reliability without sufficient self-owned firm
capacity, cooperatives may also be vulnerable to large-scale shocks that
destabilize wholesale markets.403
Arguably, investor-owned utilities’ profit motives, insufficient regulation,
and inadequate market rules have caused them to build (or attempt to build)
unneeded natural gas capacity as they retire coal plants—imposing excess costs
on captive ratepayers—rather than relying on the lower-cost options available
to them in RTO/ISO markets.404 Cooperatives would not have these same
401. See About, W. ENERGY IMBALANCE MKT., https://www.westerneim.com/Pages/About/
default.aspx [https://perma.ccDF89-HGT3]; Stephanie Lenhart, Natalie Nelson-Marsh, Elizabeth J.
Wilson & David Solan, Electricity Governance and the Western Energy Imbalance Market in the
United States: The Necessity of Interorganizational Collaboration, 19 ENERGY RES. & SOC. SCI. 94,
95 (2016); Robert Walton, Avista Signs On to Western Energy Imbalance Market, Projecting More
Renewables Integration, UTIL. DIVE (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/avista-signson-to-western-energy-imbalance-market-projecting-more-renewab/553672/ [https://perma.cc/W7BPP4AK].
402. Iulia Gheorghiu, Duke, Southern, Plan Path for Energy Imbalance Market, UTIL. DIVE (July 14,
2020), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/duke-southern-plan-path-for-southeast-energy-imbalancemarket/581556/ [https://perma.cc/2JPY-2N85]; Iulia Gheorghiu, TVA Interested in Joining Southeast
Energy Market, but Stakeholders Question Lack of Detail, UTIL. DIVE (July 22, 2020),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/tva-interested-in-joining-southeast-energy-market-butstakeholders-questio/582078/ [https://perma.cc/EH9Y-4Q7K]; Catherine Morehouse, Duke, Dominion,
Southern File SEEM Proposal with State Regulators, Plan To File with FERC by End of Year, UTIL. DIVE
(Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/duke-dominion-southern-file-seem-proposal-withstate-regulators-plan-to/592072/ [https://perma.cc/J2DU-D2CZ].
403. See Diaz, supra note 397.
404. See Stephanie Tsao & Richard Martin, Overpowered: PJM Market Rules Drive an
Era of Oversupply, S&P GLOB. MKT. INTEL. (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/
marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/8N3IBtYIeExmKGkF882AqQ2 [https://perma.cc/CN
8J-A3AQ] (discussing critics of the PJM RTO regional market who argue that PJM’s market rules have
led to a “power glut that serves mainly big utilities and power-plant developers, rather than
ratepayers”); Richard Martin & Darren Sweeney, Overpowered: In Virginia, Dominion Faces Challenges
to Its Reign, S&P GLOB. MKT. INTEL. (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/
en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/overpowered-in-virginia-dominion-faces-challenges-to-itsreign-54171542 [https://perma.cc/A2TD-FF29] (discussing Dominion Energy Virginia over-
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misaligned incentives. Further, cooperatives also have a potential to lead in
building out more robust wholesale markets that can better account for
reliability. The original history of cooperatives in delivering reliable service to
rural communities can still inform their perspective moving forward. Despite
reliability requirements established by the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation, the pursuit of profits by many market actors that puts downward
pressure on prices may erode overall system reliability, and if they engage more
fully, cooperatives could be key advocates for RTOs/ISOs to give higher
priority to long-term reliability planning.405
Likewise, cooperatives control a significant amount of transmission over a
large geographic area, including transmission assets associated with coal plants
that are at or near the point of retirement and are associated with
interconnection rights that could be valuable for clean energy. Further,
additional investments in transmission capacity could bolster renewable energy
capacity across rural areas and could be encouraged by the financing bodies that
support cooperatives, such as the RUS. Repurposing existing transmission
infrastructure to support clean energy and financing new transmission lines can
allow G&T cooperatives to earn increased revenues for their member-owners.
These earnings can be reinvested into clean energy and other projects within
member service areas. Such an approach would position cooperatives to be key
enablers for connecting clean energy resources from renewable-rich rural areas
to regions without sufficient renewable resources.406 Importantly, transmission
build-out is generally a “zero-sum game” between utilities competing to win the
rights to build an approved transmission project. Cooperatives may have a
forecasting its peak energy demand in its integrated resource plan and proposing to build eight new
natural gas plants between 2018–2033—the plans for these plants were subsequently cancelled).
405. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Manny Fernandez, Ivan Penn & Rick Rojas, How Texas’ Drive for
Energy Independence Set It Up for Disaster, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/02/21/us/texas-electricity-ercot-blackouts.html [https://perma.cc/754P-PAZU (dark archive)]
(describing how the market structure in Texas, driven primarily by for-profit utilities, pursued lower
average prices and incidentally enabled a shortfall in reliability during the February 2021 winter storm);
see also Ari Peskoe, Is the Utility Transmission Syndicate Forever?, 42 ENERGY L.J. 1 (2021) (contending
that investor-owned utilities “exploited nearby non-profit utilities and regionalized their dominance
through collusive agreements with each other that obstructed competition and cartelized infrastructure
development”); JIM PARDIKES, RON KENNEDY & CHRIS NAGLE, MCR PERFORMANCE SOLS., THE
EIGHT DRIVERS OF INCREASED TENSION BETWEEN IOU/TRANSCO INCUMBENTS AND OTHER
TOS IN A JOINT PRICING ZONE 1 (2020) (describing an industry perspective that, compared to
investor-owned utilities and private transmission companies, “[p]ublic power and many cooperatives
desire enhanced reliability and are increasingly questioning rising zonal rates; as a result, they are trying
to increase their fair share of transmission investment in joint pricing zones”).
406. See, e.g., Valley Electric System To Sell Its Transmission System to GridLiance, VALLEY ELEC.
ASS’N (Sept. 15, 2016), https://vea.coop/2016/10/valley-electric-association-to-sell-its-transmissionsystem-to-gridliance/ [https://perma.cc/KJ2J-SJK2]; Transmission Sale-230kv, VALLEY ELEC. ASS’N
(Nov. 2016), https://vea.coop/2016/11/transmission-sale-230kv/ [https://perma.cc/YB5M-M2TL]. For
an example of a G&T using existing interconnection rights to develop new clean energy, see supra note
329.
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meaningful cost advantage over investor-owned utilities in building
transmission, due to being exempt from federal and state income taxes, having
a lower equity ratio, and having a lower cost of debt (through access to RUS
loans).407 Thus, supporting cooperatives in capturing the opportunities to be the
owners of new transmission projects can lower overall system costs, while
providing a degree of economic benefit to the communities that will be
impacted by the land-use changes imposed by transmission expansion.408
GRE in Minnesota provides a good example of how this could work in the
rest of the country. GRE owns significant transmission assets within the MISO
system.409 GRE’s clean energy plan relies heavily on purchasing lower-cost wind
energy throughout the Upper Midwest and obtaining capacity through MISO
to balance renewables and replace lost coal generation.410 However, recent
experience in MISO also reinforces the importance of building transmission as
part of the clean energy transition, as there is a significant backlog of renewable
projects waiting for interconnection permission in MISO.411 The combination
of actions GRE has taken to use its position in MISO to accelerate the clean
energy transition is not currently as readily available to cooperatives outside of
RTOs/ISOs.
B.

Allocating the Fixed Costs of Clean Energy Additions

Fixed costs are fundamental to the electricity system, and a central
function of electric utilities and their regulators is to determine a just and
reasonable rate structure that allocates fixed costs to users.412 In cooperatives,
407. JIM PARDIKES, RON KENNEDY & CHRIS NAGLE, MCR PERFORMANCE SOLS., THE
COOPERATIVE COST ADVANTAGE: ANOTHER REASON WHY COOPERATIVES SHOULD BE
INVESTING IN TRANSMISSION 1 (2021) (estimating that in the Midcontinent Independent System
Operator and the Southwest Power Pool, two regions likely to see significant transmission buildout
and with a high fraction of cooperatives, investor-owned utilities and transmission companies have 24%
higher costs than a typical cooperative when building a typical transmission project).
408. A similar argument holds for siting land-intensive renewables. There are also prominent
examples of electric cooperatives’ early embrace of wind energy as a vehicle of community economic
development through infrastructure projects based in their service area. See KEITH A. TAYLOR,
GOVERNING THE WIND ENERGY COMMONS 118–19 (2019).
409. As Renewable Energy Expands, Reliability Remains Paramount, GREAT RIVER ENERGY (Feb.
10, 2021), https://greatriverenergy.com/as-renewable-energy-expands-reliability-remains-paramount/
[https://perma.cc/W95H-8XWP] (discussing the role of Great River Energy in MISO).
410. See supra Section III.B.
411. Rao Konidena, To Clear the Backlog of Network Upgrades, We Need Steel in the Ground,
RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/solar/toclear-the-backlog-of-network-upgrades-we-need-steel-in-the-ground/#gref [https://perma.cc/GJK8-F
WE8].
412. LAZAR ET AL., supra note 241, at 25 (discussing that the primary purpose of economic
regulation is to impose “just and reasonable” pricing discipline on monopolies as a substitute for the
discipline that competition imposes in competitive industries in the context of fixed cost allocation for
electric utilities); LISA WOOD, ROSS HEMPHILL, JOHN HOWAT, RALPH CAVANAGH, SEVERIN
BORENSTEIN, JEFF DEASON & LISA SCHWARTZ, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB’Y, RECOVERY

100 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2021)

76

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

the allocation of fixed costs is institutionalized in the rate structure within the
power supply contracts between G&T and distribution cooperatives and the
rate structures of distribution cooperatives and their member-owners. The
Cooperative Principle of members’ economic participation guides cooperatives
to consider a cooperative’s capital as “common property” and to create benefits
for “members in proportion to their transactions with the cooperative.”413
Cooperatives, compared to investor-owned utilities, also have a stronger
institutional rationale to manage risks and pursue the long-term interests of the
consumers they serve rather than the short-term interests of financiers. Thus,
cooperatives may be well-positioned to develop consumer-focused strategies for
spreading the fixed costs of the clean energy transition over longer time
horizons, thereby lowering the short-term barriers to retiring legacy assets and
investing in new assets.
Transitioning to clean energy raises two related issues with respect to
fixed-cost allocation that challenge cooperative adoption of clean energy: (1)
allocating the fixed costs associated with a cleaner, more flexible, and more
distributed electricity system with a higher ratio of fixed-to-variable costs
(addressed in this section); and (2) allocating the fixed costs that become
“stranded costs” when clean energy makes fossil fuel legacy assets obsolete
ahead of their depreciation schedule (addressed in the next section).
The fixed costs associated with energy generation and transmission are
generally allocated by G&T cooperatives to their distribution members through
the rates established in power supply contracts. For legacy centralized
generation, the process of determining the rates in contracts relies on a
determination of the required revenue to allow debt repayment on large capital
investments. This contract structure worked well to give G&T cooperatives the
ability to finance large, primarily fossil fuel generation assets in the legacy
system and is likely suitable to support large, utility-scale renewable energy and
transmission projects.414 However, these contracts were not designed to
OF UTILITY FIXED COSTS:
PERSPECTIVES 7 (Lisa Schwartz

UTILITY, CONSUMER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIST
ed., 2016), https://eta-publications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/lbnl1005742.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PB7-BJ93] (positing that the fundamental question for paying for the
evolving grid is: “How do we change current ratemaking and rate design practices to accommodate the
increasingly important role of the distribution grid and the grid services it provides?”); Citizens Action
Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 485 N.E.2d 610, 614–15 (Ind. 1985) (“The statutes which
govern the regulation of utilities and which grant the PSCI its authority and power provide a surrogate
for competition . . . and insure that the responsibilities of utility investors and consumers are
commensurate with the responsibilities of investors and consumers in a competitive market.”).
413. See Understanding the Seven Cooperative Principles, supra note 25.
414. NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, GUIDES FOR ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE
DEVELOPMENT AND RURAL ELECTRIFICATION 16 (2016) (“‘All-requirements’ clauses grant the
G&T the authority to provide 100% of the member distribution cooperatives’ power supply needs. Put
differently, a member distribution cooperative may obtain power supply only through its G&T. This
gives the G&T the required legal and marketing strength to enter with confidence into power purchase
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accommodate more dynamic and distributed clean energy technologies at the
“grid edge.”
As the economics of clean energy—including distributed energy
resources—have dramatically shifted,415 historic practices of cost allocation have
become insufficient to reflect the new potential of distribution-utility-sited
resources and consumer-sited resources to provide the same services as the
centralized assets owned by G&Ts. This new potential is changing who in the
cooperative system will incur the fixed costs of the future system—they may be
on the distribution utility’s system balance sheet416 or in an individual memberowner’s household or corporate budget.417 This suggests the need to rethink cost
allocation in cooperative ratemaking to rely less on passing through top-down
rates from all-requirements contracts. Instead, approaches should be devised
that value resources from the “bottom-up” (individual members receiving fair
compensation for their energy resources) and the “middle-out” (distribution
utilities being able to create new value streams for their members and being
fairly compensated by their G&T cooperative).
Flexibility in layering additional value streams into the contractual
arrangements that allocate fixed costs and incentivize distributed energy
resource adoption is not unfamiliar to cooperatives. Cooperatives, primarily in
the Midwest, have decades of experience installing electric water heaters and
other devices in members’ homes that they remotely control to reduce aggregate
peak electricity demand.418 Cooperatives, usually at the G&T level, operate
these load-control devices to lower overall costs and then pass benefits back to
members. Deployment of distributed energy resources under this type of
arrangement taps into a cooperative’s particular ability to lower system costs by
creating new financial arrangements that align interests vertically across the
cooperative structure. Such cooperative-led deployment of distributed energy
agreements with other power producers, with power plant investment financing agreements as direct
investors/owners, and for other functional purposes.”); see supra notes 65, 221 (discussing allrequirements contracts).
415. See supra Part II.
416. For example, nearly two hundred rural electric cooperatives, mostly distribution utilities, have
installed community solar gardens. See NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, A SOLAR REVOLUTION
IN RURAL AMERICA 8 (2018). A typical cooperative community solar garden is connected at a
distribution utility and sells subscription shares to members who opt into a contract that is functionally
similar to a power purchase agreement. See id.
417. See RON REBENITSCH, NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, GUIDE TO COOPERATIVE
RESIDENTIAL SOLAR PROGRAMS 39–50 (2017) (giving examples of cooperatives developing programs
for member-sited solar, many of which include new costs to participating members).
418. See MIGUEL YANEZ, LIZ VEAZEY, RIC EVANS & NATHAN SHEPHERD, EQUITABLE
BENEFICIAL ELECTRIFICATION (EBE) FOR RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES 9 (2019) (referring
to the over 250 cooperatives in thirty-four states that use their customers’ electric water heaters to
reduce peak demand by 500 MW); id. at 16 (providing examples of cooperatives offering benefits to
their members to adopt controllable water heaters that the cooperative can use to reduce aggregate
system costs).
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resources could also be applied to more advanced portfolios of aggregated
distributed energy resources, such as co-optimized solar, storage, and demand
response.419 This could be an important role for G&T cooperatives to take on
in order to maximize the value and minimize the costs of distributed energy
resources.420 Further, aggregation can build on cooperatives’ unique
“efficiencies of scope” in the communities in which they operate, with the
ability to work with members more intensively to manage energy resources in
front of and behind the meters.421
But creating new contract and rate structures need not preclude some
cooperatives, particularly smaller ones, from continuing to rely heavily on their
G&T. For example, Tri-State’s Wyoming and Nebraska members continue to
rely on Tri-State for nearly all their power needs even while some Tri-State
members pursue higher levels of distributed energy resources.422 In fact, with a
long-run perspective, building flexibility into power supply contracts can create
greater financial security for the G&T cooperative, as aggregated distributed
energy resources, fairly valued, contribute to overall system reliability and cost
reductions. As clean energy is deployed at different scales, cost allocation
practices should better reflect the incidence of costs so that the Cooperative
Principle of autonomy and independence does not conflict with the
foundational role of the G&T cooperative as a vehicle to deliver benefits best
achieved through collaboration.
C.

Allocating the Fixed Costs of Stranded Assets

The clean energy transition threatens to make large parts of the legacy
system of fossil fuels obsolete before their associated financing costs can be
repaid, raising the specter of stranded costs that threaten the financial viability
of electric utilities and cause retrenchment and political opposition to deploying
clean energy that would further increase stranded costs.423 Some stranded costs
419. See NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, THE ROLE OF THE CONSUMER-CENTRIC UTILITY
5 (2017) [hereinafter ROLE OF THE CONSUMER-CENTRIC UTILITY], https://www.cooperative.com/
value-of-membership/documents/51st-state-report-phase-iii.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MRV-ZSAT].
420. See JEFFREY J. COOK, KRISTEN ARDANI, ERIC O’SHAUGNESSY, BRITTANY SMITH &
ROBERT MARGOLIS, EXPANDING PV VALUE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM UTILITY-LED
DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCE AGGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2018),
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy19osti/71984.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQ9F-4F8Z] (describing the gridrelated services that distributed energy resource aggregation can provide).
421. See ROLE OF THE CONSUMER-CENTRIC UTILITY, supra note 419, at 2.
422. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing how Tri-State covers territory in New
Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming, and Nebraska); supra Section III.A.1 (discussing how utilities in New
Mexico and Colorado have sought to exit Tri-State).
423. See INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, STRANDED ASSETS AND RENEWABLES 6 (2017)
(estimating that meeting international climate change targets would imply between $10–20 trillion in
stranded asset costs); id. at 9 (“In the case of asset stranding, these sunk costs could be a very significant
barrier to companies that act in accordance with decarbonisation policies and goals. Companies could
be wedded to previous strategies (their sunk costs), particularly when it may be economically irrational
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are historically legitimate because they were incurred based on a sound analysis
of available options and forecasts that were understood at the time an
investment decision was made. But even if assumptions later prove incorrect,
stranded costs may still be considered legitimate as long as it was reasonable to
have relied on those assumptions ex-ante. However, once a resource no longer
can be economically utilized as intended, allocating stranded costs is morally
and legally complex.424 For cooperatives, the challenges of allocating the
stranded costs associated with the obsolescence of assets of the legacy system
are most clearly demonstrated by the contested exit-fee determination in TriState.425 However, even in cooperatives that are not experiencing the same level
of internal contestation, the challenges of allocating responsibility for paying
for stranded costs still apply.
At a principles level, the central tension in allocating stranded costs
revolves around the dilemma of allocating the responsibility to pay back the
debts a G&T cooperative incurred through the collective decision-making of its
members balanced against market requirements for reliability and the
opportunity of members and G&T cooperatives to pursue new opportunities to
serve loads. Stranded costs are largely from coal plants that can no longer
compete with new low-cost resources at many points throughout the year,
although a wave of failed nuclear plants raised similar issues of stranded costs
in the 1980s, as discussed in Section I.B.1. Over the next decade, it is likely that
the debts associated with many more coal plants will not be economically
recoverable from the utilization and sale of electricity generated from these
plants. Thus, in the face of generation assets that can no longer cover their fixed
costs and an imperative to address climate change, reliable grid operation will
require either new forms of economic “firm” energy resources or additional
socialized costs to support these uneconomic firm resources.426 In the case of
Tri-State, when individual members—who were party to the past collective
decision to invest in its now stranded assets427—sought to exit their contractual
to do so. This could exacerbate the stranded assets issue as companies ‘throw good money after bad’
and further delay action due to ‘loss aversion,’ despite the illogicality. There is also the potential that
companies will actively lobby to reduce the scale and pace of the low carbon transition.”); see also
William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Stranded Costs, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 835, 835 (1995)
(arguing that “the most critical regulatory issue facing electric utilities will be stranded costs”).
424. See LAZAR ET AL., supra note 241, at 97–100.
425. See supra notes 240–42.
426. See, e.g., Nestor A. Sepulveda, Jesse D. Jenkins, Fernando J. de Sisternes & Richard K. Lester,
The Role of Firm Low-Carbon Electricity Resources in Deep Decarbonization of Power Generation, 2 JOULE
2403, 2403 (2018) (finding deep decarbonization scenarios that utilize firm-dispatchable resources
lower the costs of energy provision by 10–62% relative to scenarios that rely on renewables, energy
storage, and demand response alone).
427. The extent to which individual member distribution utilities of Tri-State were truly parties
to Tri-State’s investment decisions in now stranded assets has been challenged by members seeking to
leave Tri-State. See, e.g., Herman K. Trabish, Colorado Tri-State Ruling Could Provide Co-op Exit
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obligation to pay back debts, the guiding principle has been to identify the exit
fee that would leave the remaining Tri-State members “whole”—in other
words, in the same financial position they would have been in if not for the
departing members.
The application of this principle focuses on the narrow considerations that
would enable departing cooperatives to individually act to procure clean energy
for their own members’ energy demands without harming others. However, we
argue that this principle should be reconsidered and balanced with the principle
of accelerating the clean energy transition for the entire cooperative system,
which requires cooperatives to collectively act toward the accelerated retirement
of stranded assets. Towards collective action, we suggest that cooperatives focus
on where their whole system needs to go to create shared benefits—balanced
with accommodating the individual early movers who have the internal capacity
to seize new clean energy opportunities for their own members.
How can stranded costs be addressed systemically for a G&T cooperative
as a whole? One approach being utilized by G&T cooperatives and other owners
of uneconomic coal plants is accelerated depreciation.428 Under accelerated
depreciation, coal plant operating lifetime is reduced through increasing debt
payments in the short-term in a way that results in higher short-term costs to
create long-term benefits to ratepayers.429 The short-term costs of accelerated
depreciation could also be timed to coincide with new investments in clean
energy that could lower costs in the short and long run, mitigating the rate
impact of retiring coal plants early.

Template amid Rising Tensions with G&T Providers, UTIL. DIVE (May 13, 2020),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/colorado-tri-state-ruling-could-provide-co-op-exit-template-amidrising-ten/577624/ [https://perma.cc/6S38-9LP3] (quoting an attorney representing departing
distribution cooperative members who stated “[s]ome G&Ts made investments over the disapproval
of a part of their membership and the question is whether those investments should be part of the
charge to co-ops exiting their contracts”).
428. See Ron Lehr, How Arcane Accounting Rules Could Help Save Coal Heavy Utilities, UTIL.
DIVE (May 15, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/how-arcane-accounting-rules-could-helpsave-coal-heavy-utilities/554773/ [https://perma.cc/DXJ7-TRQL]; RON LEHR & MIKE O’BOYLE,
ENERGY INNOVATION, DEPRECIATION AND EARLY PLANT RETIREMENTS 8–9 (Dec.
2018), https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Depreciation-and-Early-PlantRetirements-Brief_12.3.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4Q2-ZGBJ]; Barry Cassell, Great River Energy
Accelerates Depreciation of Two Coal Plants, TRANSMISSION HUB (Nov. 4, 2014),
https://www.transmissionhub.com/articles/2014/11/great-river-energy-accelerates-depreciation-oftwo-coal-plants.html [https://perma.cc/KDQ7-SPT5].
429. See, e.g., GREAT RIVER ENERGY, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 22 (2013), http://
greatriverenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/2013_annual_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7CCTYDG] (approving accelerated depreciation of two coal plants). But see Comments of the National
Rural Electric Cooperative Ass’n at 12, No. PL19-3-000 (FERC Aug. 26, 2019) (explaining that
accelerated depreciation creates “unlawful intergenerational inequities in violation of a fundamental
principle of ratemaking” because it creates benefits for future cooperative members at a cost to current
members).
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Utilities can manage the remaining debt after an accelerated depreciation
analysis is completed by creating a new “regulatory asset” that allows the utility
to recover a reduced, fixed level of remaining asset value through rates in a
separate account without requiring that asset to be utilized.430 Such a scheme
could allow near-term savings to cooperative members if the incremental cost
of new clean energy is less than the marginal operating cost of continuing to
operate a coal plant. For example, GRE has established regulatory assets
associated with the remaining liability of undepreciated plant value,
decommissioning, and demolition (net of sale value) for two of its coal plants.431
Accelerated depreciation can also be complemented by coal plant
securitization—which requires legislatively granted authority that only exists in
some states—to issue new state bonds backed by a utility’s ratepayers.432 Third
parties could also play a role in paying off stranded costs, as the exit-fee
payment by the private firm, Guzman Energy, illustrates in the Kit Carson
case.433 In that example, a third party worked with a distribution cooperative to
pay down the fixed costs of legacy generation. In principle, the exit fee paid by
Kit Carson would pay down the portion of remaining debt associated with Kit
Carson’s anticipated future utilization of the legacy assets continued to be held
by Tri-State. However, whether the exit fee Kit Carson and Tri-State agreed
to will be of sufficient scale to accelerate the depreciation and eventual
retirement of Tri-State’s legacy fossil fuel assets is yet to be seen.434 Such
430. See Lehr, supra note 428 (providing a more detailed description of how the creation of a
regulatory asset can support accelerated coal retirement while allowing debt to be repaid).
431. See GRE 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 294, at 14, 40 (discussing regulatory accounting
associated with GRE’s retirement of the Stanton Station coal plant in 2017, the Elk River coal plant in
2019, and the one-time write off of the remaining regulatory asset costs of the Spirit Wood Station
coal plant in 2019; GRE held $95 million in regulatory asset liabilities associated with plant retirements
in 2019).
432. See, e.g., Herman K. Trabish, Securitization Fever: Renewables Advocates Seize Wall
Street’s Innovative Way To End Coal, UTIL. DIVE (May 28, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/
securitization-fever-renewables-advocates-seize-wall-streets-innovative-w/555089/ [https://perma.cc/
73VG-7JNP]; ANNIE BENN, PAUL BODNAR, JAMES MITCHELL & JEFF WALLER, MANAGING THE
COAL CAPITAL TRANSITION 49–50 (2018). The appeal of securitization to cooperatives may be
limited given the relatively low costs of capital that cooperatives can attract with federally backed debt.
433. See supra Section III.A; LEHR & O’BOYLE, SWAPS, supra note 10, at 2, 8–9 (discussing
Guzman Energy’s attempt at “negotiation by press release” to finance the early retirement of 50% of
Tri-State’s coal assets and replace the retired generation with a mix with more than 70% renewable
energy).
434. A similar dynamic occurs with investor-owned utilities, as seen in efforts by cities to
“municipalize” their electricity supply and local governments forming Community Choice
Aggregations that end the franchise agreement with a monopoly utility and instead procure power
independently. A similar dynamic also can be seen in electric customers bilaterally contracting for
energy from parties other than their monopoly utility provider. In these cases, local governments and
large consumers are able to meet their clean energy goals and lower their energy costs, raising concerns
that for-profit monopoly utilities are not minimizing costs through their unique ability to attract capital
and realize economies of scale. See LEHR & O’BOYLE, SWAPS, supra note 10, at 4; Welton, Public
Energy, supra note 4, at 285, 308.
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arrangements also raise three uncertainties for cooperatives relevant for the
long-run energy transition: (1) the long-run dynamics of costs and clean-energy
utilization of an exiting cooperative that contracts for new clean energy relative
to what their costs and clean-energy utilization would have been without
exiting; (2) the potentially increased volatility of more limitedly hedged energy
services that an exiting distribution cooperative now has exposure to;435 and (3)
the management of the debt continuing to be held by the remaining members
of a G&T cooperative as their assets are utilized less, thereby making debt
potentially more difficult to repay than originally planned.
Finally, while we have focused our analysis in this Article on the
possibilities for enacting cooperative clean energy without state or federal
policy, we believe it also is important to consider the federal government’s
important historic role in enabling the deployment of a large fraction of
cooperative-owned coal generation through loans from the RUS.436 Some
advocates and policymakers have suggested that the federal government could
forgive RUS-held debt associated with coal plants to facilitate cooperatives’
transition to clean energy.437 Ultimately, cooperative debt tied to stranded assets
will need to either be repaid by cooperative members or socialized by states or
the federal government through debt forgiveness and repayment. Policymakers
should consider the tradeoffs associated with asserting government
responsibility for this debt conditioned on driving policy objectives while
maintaining some degree of local control.
D.

Reflecting the Needs of the Full Cooperative Membership

Rural electric cooperatives were founded as local democratic institutions,
but the accountability of cooperative boards and managers to their memberowners does not always live up to cooperatives’ democratic ideals. The concept
of “energy democracy” offers a framework for how cooperatives can reform their
internal governance practices to more closely live up to the Cooperative
Principle of democratic member control.438 Energy democracy has developed
435. See Shin, supra note 254.
436. See supra Section I.A (describing the role of the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of
1978 in limiting cooperative-owned fuel choices).
437. See Esther Whieldon & Gaurang Dholakia, Forgiving Co-ops’ Federal Coal Debt To Promote
Renewables Faces Hurdles, S&P GLOB. MKT. INTEL. (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/
marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/TmCJLa6VEIt3_meORsYNyA2 [https://perma.cc/J3J
6-TLK4] (noting that while the RUS may have been the original lender to G&T cooperatives for coal
plants, “several of the co-ops with the most coal-fired generation no longer owe the federal government
money” due to refinancing agreements that have moved debt obligations to private lenders).
438. See, e.g., Kacper Szulecki, Conceptualizing Energy Democracy, 27 ENV’T POL. 21 (2018);
Matthew J. Burke & Jennie C. Stephens, Energy Democracy: Goals and Policy Instruments for Sociotechnical
Transitions, ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 33, 35–48 (2017); Welton, Energy Democracy, supra note 4, at
601; Bregie van Veelen & Dan van der Horst, What Is Energy Democracy? Connecting Social Science Energy
Research and Political Theory, 46 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 19, 20 (2018).

100 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2021)

2021]

COOPERATIVE CLEAN ENERGY

83

outside the realm of rural electric cooperatives to include a broad range of
sometimes conflicting goals.439 There are three dimensions of energy democracy
to consider for areas of reform in the rural electric cooperative realm: (1)
supporting cooperative utility staff in understanding new technologies and
engaging community members in their own decision-making and utility
decision-making; (2) increasing (horizontal) grassroots accountability and
engagement of distribution cooperatives with their member-owners; and (3)
reflecting the needs and desires of member-owners (vertically) through the
cooperative structure, from distribution utilities to G&Ts. Across the levels of
a cooperative, democratic control must balance responsiveness to the majority
with protecting minority interests, just as with other democratic institutions.440
This balancing act is likely to become more complex as the democratically
governed group becomes larger and more heterogenous.
The rapidly changing energy system is enabling greater autonomous
decision-making through small-scale distributed energy resources and
opportunities to participate more directly in energy markets. And the
increasingly distributed decision-making potential has created alignment with
proponents of energy democracy that also seek to bolster local control of the
energy system. While much of the energy democracy movement in the United
States has focused on investor-owned utilities, distribution cooperatives are the
most well-established organizations in the energy sector that have adopted
principles of democratic accountability in their foundation. Indeed, democratic
member control is one of the Cooperative Principles, and as frustration with
the democratic accountability of some investor-owned utilities has grown,
customers and legislators have proposed replacing some investor-owned
utilities with new cooperative models.441
Rural electric cooperatives should enact practices to increase transparency
so that members can participate more fully and be more knowledgeable in board
elections. The example of Pedernales highlights how member-directed reforms
can increase transparency in a cooperative.442 Rural electric cooperatives are
required to disclose significantly less financial and operational information to
state and federal regulators than investor-owned utilities.443 But as largely selfregulated entities, transparency of cooperative operations to members is
important. And here cooperatives face a unique challenge in balancing
transparency to member-owners and protecting confidential information about
439. Welton, Energy Democracy, supra note 4, at 585–87.
440. Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 245 (1997).
441. See Ivan Penn, California Mayors Back Plan To Make PG&E a Cooperative, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/business/energy-environment/pge-california-mayors.
html [https://perma.cc/924G-JJ5T (dark archive)].
442. See supra Section I.C.1.
443. See supra Section I.B.
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cooperative operations. While national cooperative organizations provide
recommendations on a base level of information that cooperatives should
disclose on their own websites,444 these standards have not been universally
adopted.445 Cooperatives should embrace their principle of concern for
community to not only provide a base level of information to their members
but to work upwards through higher levels of participation, such that members
can more fully control the direction of the cooperative in an informed
manner.446 But more democratic energy governance must contend with the
technical complexity of energy systems, raising the importance of
representative democracy to be accountable to constituents, rather than simply
bolstering direct democracy.447 To this end, cooperatives could lift up state and
local organizations who, in turn, can help advance the Cooperative Principle of
education, training, and information to support member participation in
cooperative governance and develop best practices to build cooperative staff
expertise. Building cooperative staff expertise is particularly important for
smaller rural electric cooperatives. While over 20% of cooperative utility
employees and 50% of cooperative CEOs are eligible to retire between 2017–
2022,448 for smaller cooperatives, highly technical institutional memory of the
cooperative can be lost with only a small number of retirements.449
Perhaps the most important way cooperatives could bolster representative
democracy is to make board elections more inclusive. While the governing
bodies of distribution cooperatives are elected by cooperative member-owners,
empirically, they fall short of equally representing their constituents when it
comes to gender and racial representation.450 Clean energy transition requires
444. See ELEC. COOP. GOVERNANCE TASK FORCE, supra note 116, at 54.
445. See The Full Report Card: What Each Co-op Posts on Its Website–or Doesn’t, MINN. LOC. ENERGY
PROJECT, https://mnlocalenergyproject.org/#reportcard [https://perma.cc/QQJ5-EKQQ] (providing
one limited example from a survey of distribution cooperative websites in Minnesota in 2018,
finding that 55% of co-ops did not post information on how to vote in co-op elections and 39%
did not explain how to run for a co-op board seat); see also Cooperative Scorecard Data, ENERGY
DEMOCRACY Y’ALL, https://energydemocracyyall.org/tn/scorecard/download-data/ [https://perma.cc
/8LNH-ZRPX] (giving an example of another scorecard of cooperative utilities in Tennessee, including
dimensions related to disclosing information to members regarding the cooperative’s governance).
446. See generally Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 85 J. AM. PLANNERS ASS’N
24 (2019) (articulating a seminal taxonomy of degrees of citizen participation).
447. See Szulecki, supra note 438, at 31.
448. Compare NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, 2017 NRECA ANNUAL REPORT 19 (2018),
https://www.cooperative.com/nreca/governance-reporting/Documents/2017_NRECA_Annual_
Report_4.27_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U8A-4SST] (“500 electric cooperative CEOs and 15,000 coop employees [are] eligible to retire within the next five years.”), with AMERICA’S ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVES, supra note 8 (“In 2017, electric cooperatives . . . [had] 68,200 electric co-op jobs.”).
449. See Victoria A. Rocha, Core Competencies: Detailed Professional Development Models,
COOPERATIVE.COM (June 7, 2017), https://www.cooperative.com/news/Pages/Core-CompetenciesDetailed-Professional-Development-Models.aspx [https://perma.cc/L35H-4VR2] (noting, for
example, cases of staff turnover raising concerns of loss of skills and knowledge).
450. See supra Section III.C.
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local leaders who are knowledgeable about cooperative structures, bylaws,
governance, and the demands for energy services in the region. To achieve this,
cooperatives should consider adopting internal measures to increase the
representativeness and capacity of their boards, following the Cooperative
Principle of democratic member control that prioritizes the accountability of
cooperative directors to their membership.451 One measure could be
implementing board member term limits (sufficient as to not erode institutional
knowledge) and contracting with independent third parties to verify board
election votes.452 Increasing turnout could be accomplished by creating positive
incentives for voting (for example, the cooperative could offer a monetary or
nonmonetary reward for voting), by lowering the cost of voting (for example,
by encouraging absentee voting), or by creating structural incentives to increase
turnout (for example, by creating an incentive for a cooperative manager to
increase participation in board elections). Lessons from the reforms
implemented by Pedernales following its governance scandal in the mid-2000s
could also be instructive. Opening all board meetings to the public, recording
and making accessible all board meetings, and providing oversight to the board
can promote democratic accountability.453 Increasing democratic accountability
in cooperatives is particularly important for realizing the goals of a just energy
transition, as rural electric cooperatives serve 92% of the nation’s persistentpoverty counties and serve consumers with median incomes 11% below the
national average.454
While energy democracy suggests clear reforms relevant for governing
smaller-scale institutions such as distribution cooperatives, there are distinct
challenges for considering democratic accountability across the vertical scales of
cooperatives from distribution cooperatives to G&T cooperatives. Challenges
of vertical accountability and the limited effectiveness of bottom-up local
control are not unique to cooperatives.455 Particularly because large-scale
transmission networks and some amount of large-scale clean energy deployment
may be the most cost-effective approach for cooperatives to adopt clean energy,
451. See ELEC. COOP. GOVERNANCE TASK FORCE, supra note 116, at 38 (“The Task Force
supports using every reasonably possible method to encourage and promote electric cooperative
members to attend member meetings and participate in director elections . . . . The Task Force also
supports using reasonable incentives . . . .”).
452. See James Bruggers, A Legacy of the New Deal, Electric Cooperatives Struggle To Democratize and
Make a Green Transition, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Feb. 28, 2021), https://insideclimatenews.
org/news/28022021/electric-cooperatives-new-deal-fossil-fuels-renewables/ [https://perma.cc/JD62-L
YAA] (describing the lack of term limits and third-party election verifiers in Tennessee co-ops).
453. See supra Section I.C.1.
454. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
455. See Welton, Energy Democracy, supra note 4, at 641 (stating in the context of investor-owned
utilities that “energy localism may result in a sort of false empowerment, with residents believing they
have substantially contributed to solving a problem that in fact cannot be addressed through their
actions at the local level”).
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the G&T cooperative structure provides a critical framework to bolster vertical
accountability. However, deficits remain in many G&T cooperatives’
accountability to their distribution members, and ultimately, the memberowners. In many cases, internal technical capacity within a cooperative
association is disproportionately held at the G&T level and distribution utilities
show strong deference to their G&T cooperatives. Further, most G&Ts
cooperatives generally follow the standard cooperative practice of having
governing boards comprised of single representatives from each of the
distribution utilities they serve. But the G&T cooperatives’ board members do
not represent equal numbers of constituents, and therefore contributions to
total costs, within the G&T network—a problem exacerbated as economic
growth and electricity demand have grown unevenly in the rural areas served
by cooperatives.456 Today, some G&T cooperatives are governed by boards in
which the largest member distribution cooperatives have equal representation
to the smallest cooperatives, which can create governance challenges,
particularly with regard to cost allocation of common G&T assets that are
unequally utilized by the constituents of the G&T.457
To bolster vertical accountability, G&T cooperatives and distribution
utilities should find new ways to work collaboratively. For instance, G&T
cooperatives could support their distribution members through more robust
stakeholder processes, peer exchanges, and technical capacity sharing. Critical
to this support should be a balanced approach to not only protecting the smallest
members from unfairly cross-subsidizing (or being cross-subsidized by) other
members of the G&T cooperative but also actively creating opportunities for
the smallest members to benefit from the clean energy transition. This could
include efforts for the G&T cooperative to pilot new technologies—such as
electric-vehicle fast chargers or investments in distributed energy resources—
with a broad diversity of their distribution members, not just the most
politically well-represented and not just the largest and most technically
456. See, e.g., supra Section I.C.2 (discussing McKenzie’s representation on the board of Basin
Electric, which has remained unchanged even as its electricity demand has grown rapidly).
457. G&T board members generally hold a “dual director” status. See, e.g., Tri-State Generation
& Transmission Ass’n, Presentation on Fiduciary Duties of Cooperative Directors 12 (Dec. 2013) (on
file with author). As detailed in the by-laws of the Tri-State G&T, (1) “the Director’s fiduciary duties
are to the G&T [and] to the distribution cooperative”; (2) “[t]he Board of Directors of a G&T is not a
representative democracy where each Director’s responsibility is to represent the interests of her
distribution cooperative”; and (3) “[t]he G&T Director must discharge his or her fiduciary duties in
the best interests of the G&T; however, the Director still owes duties to his or her distribution
cooperative.” Id. In 2009, five Nebraska-based member-owners attempted to leave Tri-State, and in
response, Tri-State personally sued the dual-board members of four member-owners for breach of
fiduciary duty. Chimney Rock Pub. Power Dist. v. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, No.
10-CV-02349-WJM-KMT, 2013 WL 4494284, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 21, 2013). The court dismissed the
case, holding that cooperative board members were immune from personal liability under a Nebraska
statute. Id. at *10–11.
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capable. In this way, clean energy solutions can scale more rapidly throughout
the whole G&T cooperative, providing value across a range of distribution
members.
Tying together the roles distribution cooperatives play in engaging their
members and the need for greater vertical coordination in the energy transition,
the multilevel structure of cooperatives also calls for new modes of member
engagement to understand and shape the decisions of their G&T. Distribution
cooperatives and G&T cooperatives should help their member-owners actualize
their rights to direct the full cooperative network in which G&T cooperatives
operate. The multistate networks of G&Ts could become an important
structure through which even isolated parts of rural America can enjoy “an
authentic gateway to a national network of co-ops that imparts economic and
political power, at scale.”458 In this way, rural electric cooperative memberowners are already positioned to shape a more democratic, systemic clean
energy transition.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we draw on the structure and foundational principles
underlying rural electric cooperatives to identify pathways forward through the
clean energy transition for cooperatives. The proposals we develop in this
Article do not rely on imposing new federal or state clean energy mandates on
cooperatives, even though these policies can certainly be helpful where they
exist. Because of the urgency of climate change, our proposals focus instead on
actions cooperatives can take right now, even in the absence of new policies.
We draw on the Cooperative Principles and clean energy economics to propose
a range of reforms that include greater integration of cooperatives into regional
wholesale energy and electric transmission markets, new approaches to
allocating costs of old and new energy resource assets, and increasing democratic
participation and accountability to members in cooperative governance. These
approaches allow cooperatives to engage in the clean energy transition in a way
that is consistent with their history and foundational principles. These
approaches also incorporate the increasing movement to promote enhanced
democratic engagement as well as racial, gender, and social equity in cooperative
governance.

458. TAYLOR, supra note 408, at 164.
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